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Abstract 
Maritime container supply chains (MCSCs) is exposed to various risks arising from both 
internal operations and the external environment, and the increasing complexity of the modern 
global logistics system makes the situation even worse, thus causing a significant challenge to 
the effective risk management of MCSCs. However, systematic studies on this topic are 
relatively few. In view of this, this study aims to explore and analyse various MCSC risks, 
develop suitable risk assessment methods, and evaluate the overall performance of MCSCs 
from a systematic perspective, so as to ensure the safety, reliability, and resilience of MCSCs. 
This research starts with the identification and classification of all possible risk factors that 
may be involved in an MCSC based on a comprehensive literature review, and the research 
results are further validated through a Delphi expert survey. The identified risk factors are then 
analysed, screened, and assessed in detail. The novelty of this study lies not only on the risk 
assessment of MCSCs under an uncertain environment from a supply chain level but also on 
the consideration of the impact of risk condition of each individual MCSC on the overall 
performance of the entire container supply network.  
The research results will provide useful insights and valuable information for both 
researchers and practitioners on the risk analysis and assessment of MCSCs, which is beneficial 
to different types of stakeholders involved in the maritime shipping industry. The work is also 
able to provide a theoretical foundation for risk-based decision making and shipping route 
optimisation in further work. Although the risk assessment methods are presented on the basis 
of the specific context in MCSCs, it is believed that, with domain-specific knowledge and data, 
they can also be tailored for a wide range of applications to evaluate the reliability and 
performance of other supply chain systems, especially where a high level of uncertainty is 
involved.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Summary 
This chapter provides a general analysis of the research background that helps to understand 
the research necessity from a practical viewpoint. The challenges of conducting the research 
are demonstrated following the explanation of the research objectives and statement of the 
hypothesis. The methodology employed in the research is also presented and justified. Finally, 
this chapter describes the layout and the scope of the thesis and summarises the deliverables 
and contributions to knowledge and achievements against research objectives. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Container shipping in large part has promoted globalization and driven the rapid economic 
development over the past few decades. Container shipping has become increasingly important 
after its wide application from the 1970s owing to its significant advantages in promoting the 
standardization of cargo packaging and transportation, which enhances loading and unloading 
operation efficiency and dramatically reduces the costs of transport and the risks of cargo 
damage. It provides the foundation needed to achieve the intermodal transportation among the 
global logistics system. However, with globalization and outsourcing practices, there are more 
and more members involved in the container shipping process, which increases its complexity 
considering the requirements of commercial partners throughout the globe. Responding to this 
situation, container liner shipping has evolved from the original transport service of shipping 
lines to an advanced container supply chain system, which can be regarded as a specific type 
of supply chain with the rapid development of container transport and large-scale international 
trade (Hu, Yang and Huang, 2009). The integration of the supply chain in container shipping 
can be beneficial to all the members being involved in terms of their competitiveness (Lam and 
Van de Voorde, 2011). According to Meijer (2007), a container supply chain can be defined 
as: 
“The network of organizations that are involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, 
in the different container transport related processes and activities that produce value in the 
form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate consumer (shipper or consignee)”. 
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In this study, we mainly focus on the maritime segment of a container supply chain, 
involving container port/terminal operations and seaborne container transportation1, which is 
referred to as a maritime container supply chain (MCSC). Developed from the traditional 
container shipping, an MCSC shares some characteristics of both container shipping and 
maritime supply chains such as high capital intensity, being easily impacted by fuel price and 
exchange rate, being limited by inflexible supply of container ships, facing the problem of 
empty container reposition, and having to follow international maritime regulations (Chang, 
2013). These characteristics indicate that an MCSC is associated with a wide range of risk 
sources in a complex and volatile international environment, and the complicated physical 
structure of the global MCSC system makes it more likely to be exposed to many more possible 
undesirable hazards. As all parties involved in an MCSC (e.g. consignees, consignors, ports, 
terminal operators, and agencies) closely interact with each other, the overall performance of 
the MCSC will be deteriorated if any of its parts is negatively influenced by hazards and/or 
security threats.  Therefore, it is important to develop suitable tools for effectively identifying 
the hazards, analysing their associated risks, and measure their impact on the system 
performance under the challenges of uncertainty and complexity across the global environment 
(Thun and Hoenig, 2011), in order to build a more efficient and resilient MCSC.  
1.2 Research Objectives and Their Hypothesis 
The primary aim of this study is to develop a novel and integrated framework for risk 
assessment of MCSCs considering both local risk conditions of MCSCs and their global impact 
on the entire container supply network, so as to achieve the comprehensive safety evaluation 
of each individual MCSC within the global container maritime logistics system. The newly 
developed models and methods will help to provide a clear insight into the risks existing in 
MCSCs and enhance their resilience under various circumstances. The results will offer a 
useful reference for stakeholders such as policy makers and MCSC operators, enabling them 
to improve their policy-making operations and risk management actions. In order to achieve 
this aim, some subsidiary objectives need to be carefully addressed. They are: 
                                                 
1 Although the landside logistics of containers is beyond the scope of this paper, the proposed framework for risk 
factors analysis has been applied to other container transport modes (e.g. road and rail) in the authors’ on-going 
research project. 
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 To understand the technical challenges in hazard identification, risk assessment, and 
resilience applications in MCSCs through conducting a literature review. 
 To develop a novel risk classification framework for identifying risk factors existing in 
MCSCs from different aspects and clarifying the relationships among the identified risk 
factors. 
 To produce an advanced dynamic risk assessment technique using the fuzzy rule base 
and Bayesian network to realise the estimation of the identified risk factors.  
 To develop a network-based model and analyse the importance of port and MCSCs 
within the global container shipping using the centrality measures.  
 To integrate the estimations of local risk conditions of MCSCs and their global impact 
on the performance of the system into one framework using the evidential reasoning 
(ER) approach so as to achieve the comprehensive evaluation of MCSC resilience. 
 To test the proposed models and methods by conducting sensitive analysis and case 
studies. 
The hypothesis that the objectives depend on is that the most widely used uncertainty 
treatment theories such as fuzzy logic, Bayesian theory, Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory and 
network analysis methods can be the foundation of and significantly contribute to developing 
novel and advanced risk management models in the context of MCSCs2. 
1.3 The Statement of the Problem 
Complexity has been identified as one of the most distinctive characteristics of the modern 
MCSCs, attracting much attention from both academia and industry (Kriheli and Levner, 2018). 
The complex MCSCs are closely associated with not only the complexity of physical structure 
and operational processes of the global MCSC system but also that of their risks existing in 
almost every segment of an MCSC. The complexity of the risks can be observed in, at least, 
the following three aspects: different risk forms, numerous existing risk definitions, and the 
inherent uncertainty feature of risks. 
Different risk forms are reflected in the usage of diverse categorising methods. Some 
research classified the risk types into two broad categories including operational and disruption 
risks, internal and external risks (Trkman and McCormack, 2009; Olson and Wu, 2010), and 
                                                 
2 A number of academic papers gave been submitted and published (see Appendix Eleven) to validate the 
reliability of the deliverables against the objectives. 
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macro and micro risks (Tang, 2006). While, some applied ternary classification methods, such 
as environmental, network-related, and organisational risks (Jüttner, Peck and Christopher, 
2003), or material flow, financial flow and information flow risks (Tang and Musa, 2011). 
There are also many other ways of categorising risks. For example, the Centre for Logistics 
and Supply Chain Management (CLSCM) in Bedfordshire (UK) investigated the risks in 
supply chains considering five main risk sources, which are demand, supply, process, control, 
and environmental risks (CLSCM, 2003). Tang and Tomlin (2008) discussed risks originating 
from supply, process, demand, intellectual property, and behavioural and political aspects. 
However, categorising methods developed in previous work is too broad to provide specific 
information needed for the risk management of MCSCs. Besides, the majority of the studies 
were carried out to analyse several specific kinds of risks focusing on one or two or several 
risk types, which is fragmental. This calls for a holistic MCSC risk management framework to 
cover as many risk sources and factors as possible for analysing and managing multiple types 
of risks in MCSCs, in order to provide an inclusive risk picture in the container shipping 
industry. 
As an interdisciplinary term, risk per se has not met an agreed definition, and different ways 
of understanding the risk concept can be observed in the literature in different research areas 
ranging from economy to psychology, and from business to engineering (Aven, 2012). It is still 
the case in the context of supply chain risk management. As indicated by the review of 
Heckmann, Comes and Nickel (2015), although only a few authors explicitly defined what 
supply chain risk is in their research, different definitions of supply chain risk exist 
simultaneously. Jüttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) defined risk as the effect of mismatch 
between supply and demand. Ellis, Henry and Shockley (2010) emphasised the potential loss 
associated with the disruption of supply. Differences between the existing supply chain risk 
definitions indicate a different understanding of risks, which results in a variety of ways 
approaching the risk analysis. For example, most of the researchers mainly focused on the two 
widely investigated aspects of risks - the occurrence likelihood and associated adverse outcome 
(e.g. Chen and Yano, 2010; Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Chang, Xu and Song, 2014). While, 
some pointed out the importance of visibility (Caridi et al., 2014), as the lack of visibility of 
upstream and downstream flows and stocks makes it difficult to make optimal operational 
control measures at each stage of the MCSCs. Thus, it is important to select suitable and 
rational risk attributes/parameters and modelling techniques for the successful risk assessment 
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of MCSCs considering both the accuracy of the results and the cost-effectiveness of conducting 
the risk assessment.  
Uncertainty is also considered to be a major contributor to the complexity of the risks (Yang 
et al., 2005b), making it even more difficult to identify and assess the risks. Generally, the 
uncertainty is interrelated with risks, and it is almost inevitable in our daily life. Aven and Renn 
(2009) defined risk as a kind of uncertainty about the severity of the consequences. Bedford 
and Cooke (2001) argued that probability could be regarded as a measure of uncertainty about 
future events and consequences. The uncertainties associated with the MCSCs’ risks have 
different sources and diverse forms. Three major types of uncertainties have been identified, 
which are fuzziness, incompleteness and randomness (Blockley et al., 1997). Fuzziness 
represents imprecision. It occurs during the subjective interpretation processes especially when 
human judgements are involved. For example, fuzziness will be produced in an expert survey 
when risk parameters are measured using linguistic terms (which are more suitable to represent 
human knowledge rather than precise values in such situations or in the case of a lack of 
statistics data). Incompleteness refers to the knowledge that we do not know and thus cannot 
be modelled. This is usually the reason for the deviation of results between a theoretical model 
and the reality. Incompleteness is a kind of epistemic uncertainty. It may occur due to the 
incomplete understanding or unavailable information of the MCSC systems being modelled. 
Randomness can be defined as the lack of a specific pattern in events. The randomness depends 
on the variations between observations and the number of observations, which is usually 
expressed in terms of sample variance. The complex dynamic behaviour of the MCSCs further 
increases the randomness of probability distributions of risk factors. The above-mentioned 
situation highlights the importance to understand and appropriately deal with the uncertainties 
in MCSCs by using advanced risk modelling and analysis methods. 
In the previous studies, risk assessment of MCSCs is mainly conducted from a local 
perspective without the consideration of the impact of MCSC risk condition on the overall 
performance of the entire MCSC system. This may lead to a sub-optimal decision in terms of 
the allocation of limited resources on supply chain risk management from a system perspective 
because the MCSC with the most severe risk condition does not mean that it also has the most 
impact on the overall performance of the MCSC system. For example, the shutout of the Port 
of Shanghai (China) is believed to have much more influence on the global container shipping 
performance than that of the Port of Mogadishu (Somalia) due to the huge container 
throughputs, leading position, and excellent global connectivity of Port of Shanghai, although 
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the risk condition of the latter is higher because of its relatively undeveloped infrastructure and 
frequent pirate attacks nearby. The breakthrough of the network research in recent years (e.g. 
Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Barrat et al., 2004; Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz, 2010) has 
provided new opportunities to investigate the complexity of physical MCSC systems from a 
network perspective, which is believed to be able to offer more insight into the complexity of 
the container shipping network in terms of the spatial and topological structure. Some 
applications can be found, for example, in Ducruet and Notteboom (2012), Li, Xu and Shi 
(2015), Ducruet (2017), and Xing and Zhong (2018). However, a novel model is still needed 
to combine the structural importance and the risk status of MCSCs together in order to provide 
more comprehensive evaluation results of the system performance. 
1.4 Research Methodology and Scopes of the Thesis 
The methodological view on risk assessment adopted in the thesis is originated from two 
streams. On the one hand, a series of risk models are generated to support hazards identification, 
risk analysis and assessment of MCSCs under uncertainty, while on the other hand, a network-
based approach is developed to measure the importance of MCSCs from a physical structure 
perspective. Finally, the two branches merge together by using an integrated framework for the 
evaluation of MCSC performance from a systematic view. Generally speaking, the 
methodology consists of six interrelated essential steps of realising the research objectives as 
follows: 
1. Research background analysis and challenge identification. 
2. A critical review of the MCSCs in terms of the operation process, development, and 
literature related to the challenges identified in Step 1. 
3. The development of a novel framework for identifying risk factors of MCSCs in a 
hierarchical structure based on the review in Step 2, and classifying those risk factors 
using a risk matrix approach. 
4. Fuzzy rule and BN based risk modelling for providing a more effective and powerful 
technique to deal with the uncertainties involved in the assessment of risk factors of 
MCSCs identified in Step 3. 
5. Network-based analysis of the importance of MCSCs from a perspective of the 
container shipping network topological structure. 
 7 
 
6. Development of an integrated approach for combining the risk assessment results in 
Step 4 and the structural importance of MCSCs obtained together in Step 5 so as to 
achieve the comprehensive evaluation of MCSC performance. 
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A graphical flowchart is presented in Figure 1.1 for clarifying the logical backbone of the 
complex methodology. More detailed explanations of the relationship between the steps of the 
methodology are unified together with the study of the thesis layout and given in the following.  
The research scopes are set up to surround the core of the thesis, which is risk management 
of MCSCs. The intention is to provide a hierarchical framework for risk identification, an 
advanced risk modelling method for risk assessment under uncertain environments, and an 
integrated approach for the evaluation of MCSC resilience considering both their local risk 
condition and global impact on the MCSC performance. The document therefore only explains 
the relevant theories and methods up to the level where they are used to suit the objectives and 
aims of the research instead of proving an in-depth analysis of the theories themselves. The 
proposed method considers the uncertain nature of the risks and the industry’s requirements of 
instantly ranking the risk factors with updated information. It is particularly innovative when 
the importance of MCSCs is taken into consideration to support risk management in a complex 
global environment, compared to the traditional risk assessment mainly conducted from a local 
level which lacks the resilience impact analysis on the whole system.  
The thesis is compiled in seven chapters. Following the discussion of the research process 
in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 reviews the important literature closely related to the current study. It 
includes the status quo of MCSCs, the demonstration of an MCSC’s operation, the review of 
risk assessment methodologies and approaches related to MCSCs, and the attempt at broadly 
understanding the resilience concept and its applications in maritime transportation systems. 
The emphasis and kernel of the thesis start with Chapter 3 and end with Chapter 6. They are 
presented in detail as follows. 
Risk factor identification is regarded as the very first step in risk management. Chapter 3 
proposes a structured framework composed of four levels of risk classification and 
identification. This chapter firstly identifies all the possible risk factors involved in MCSCs 
according to the reviewed relevant literature on risks in general container supply chains. After 
that, a Delphi expert survey is conducted to validate the risk factors and explore more risk 
factors that are not mentioned in previous studies in order to expand the coverage of the risk 
factor identification. The identified risk factors are preliminarily analysed in terms of their 
occurrence likelihood and consequence severity based on empirical data collected through a 
large-scale questionnaire survey (and an online survey). The risk matrix method and the 
ALARP principle are applied to further categorise the identified risk factors into different risk 
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levels according to their ARI values so as to screen the most severe ones that need more 
attention. 
However, the consideration of only two risk parameters (i.e. occurrence likelihood and 
consequence severity) may lead to the ignorance of some useful risk information in terms of 
the analysis of the identified risk factors in practice. Therefore, Chapter 4 makes two main 
extensions based on the traditional risk definition to rationalise the risk assessment of MCSCs. 
Firstly, the visibility of risk in a supply chain is considered, which indicates the level of 
awareness of the risk factors to be estimated. Secondly, the consequence parameter is 
decomposed into three specific ones according to their risk impact on the performance of 
MCSCs. They are time delays, economic costs, and damage to quality. Having done that, a 
novel risk evaluation method is proposed by incorporating the fuzzy rule base (FRB) with 
Bayesian network (BN) techniques in a complementary way, where FRB is used to model the 
relationships between risk parameters and risk status of risk factors in a logical manner under 
uncertainty, and the BN modelling is used to achieve the risk inference and prioritise risk 
factors in a real-time way. The proposed method is believed to be able to provide sensitive and 
flexible risk results without sacrificing the easiness of the modelling process and transparency 
of risk information. 
Chapter 5, as the other research branch in parallel with the risk factor assessment, aims to 
provide a theoretical basis for the importance measurement of MCSCs from a network 
perspective. In this chapter, the maritime container supply network is abstracted to a graph, in 
which container ports constitute the nodes and liner shipping services provide the links within 
the network. Based on that, the statistical properties of the sample container shipping network 
is investigated in terms of its degree, degree distribution, average path length, and clustering 
coefficient, in order to reveal the topological features (e.g. small-world phenomenon) of 
maritime container shipping network. Different centrality measures are applied to study the 
position of ports with respect to their connectivity, accessibility, and transitivity within the 
network, and a novel indicator is further proposed for comprehensively measuring the overall 
importance of ports taking into consideration the influence of both ports’ centralities including 
degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality and annual container throughput. As such, the 
proposed importance measure is able to reflect not only the topological features of ports but 
also their individual operational and development status.  
Based on the research results from the previous chapters, Chapter 6 develops an integrated 
approach to comprehensively evaluate the resilience of MCSCs considering both the local risk 
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conditions of MCSCs and their global impacts on the performance of the whole supply network. 
The ARI values calculated by using the risk matrix are used to calculate the relative weights of 
risk factors, based on which, the estimations of each identified risk factor are synthesised using 
the ER approach to provide the risk conditions of MCSCs; the score of port importance is 
applied to support the measurement of MCSC importance within the targeted maritime 
container supply network; The ER approach is utilised again to combine the risk conditions 
and structural importance of MCSCs to achieve the overall performance evaluation 
systematically. The sensitivity analysis helps to quantify the impact of each individual MCSC 
on the performance of the entire system. Finally, an empirical case study focusing on the 
operational risks is conducted form a shipping company’s perspective to demonstrate the 
feasibility and applicability of the proposed method. 
Chapter 7, the conclusion chapter of this thesis, summarises the main research findings on 
the identification, classification, and assessment of risk factors associated with the MCSCs and 
highlights the novel and sound risk assessment methodology with many original and advanced 
risk modelling and analysis methods. The research findings have been disseminated through 
academic publications in research journals and at international conferences making 
contributions to academic and industrial areas for further research on risk management of 
MCSCs. The limitations of the current research are outlined, and the opportunities arising from 
the proposed methods are suggested for future improvements and applications. 
Based on this research, the panorama picture of risk factors in MCSCs will provide a 
reference for exploiting research gaps of MCSC risk management in follow-up studies and 
provide useful insights for managers in better understanding the risks of their companies in 
daily operations from a whole supply chain perspective. The risk modelling and reference 
techniques can support the real-time risk assessment and decision making in the container 
shipping industry, and in-depth analysis results of the identified risk factors can be used to 
determine which parts deserve more attention in daily operations so as to rationalize the safety 
resource allocation of a company for accident prevention, and put forward suitable risk 
mitigation countermeasures as well. The vulnerability analysis of the container shipping 
network sheds light on the identification of important ports from a more comprehensive 
perspective considering both its topological structure and operational condition, which can be 
helpful for daily operations and management of container shipping routes. The integrated 
framework for evaluating the overall supply network performance can provide guidance for 
managers on the proper management of risk factors from a systematic viewpoint, which is also 
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believed to be beneficial to the shipping industry. Thus, this research will contribute to the risk 
management of MCSCs from both academia and industrial aspects.
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW  
Summary 
This chapter presents an overview of the container shipping industry in terms of its 
development situation, and the three main logistics flows associated with the operational 
processes of MCSCs. The fragments of isolated investigations on the identification, analysis, 
and assessment of risk factors in MCSCs are gathered to provide critical insights into the risk 
management of MCSCs. An emerging concept, which is, becoming popular rapidly in recent 
years - resilience - is also reviewed in a relatively broad range of research fields, in order to 
facilitate its further application in the risk management of MCSCs. The research gaps identified 
in this chapter indicate the significance and value of the work to be conducted in the following 
chapters. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The expanding scale and increasing volume of international trade, development of 
transportation infrastructure, and technology innovation in the last several decades have 
contributed to the rapid and significant growth of container shipping worldwide. However, the 
growth in globalisation and complexity of international container transportation systems also 
brings uncertainties into MCSCs, thus making it difficult yet necessary to manage risks 
properly and efficiently. The statistics show that in the past decade, MCSC risks caused the 
loss of billions of dollars in the European Union (EU) alone and the number of accidents and 
severity of the consequences are growing fast because of the growth of container transportation. 
Taking security risk as an example only, we see the estimated losses of 8.2 billion Euros due 
to cargo crime across the whole of Europe according to the Transported Asset Protection 
Association (TAPA) in the 2007 EU Parliament report (TAPA, 2017). Cargo crime incidents 
doubled in EU in 2014-2016 with an annual increase rate of 115% (Lloyd’s list, 2017). In terms 
of container loss at sea, based on the results of the nine-year period (2008-2016) surveyed, the 
World Shipping Council (WSC) estimates that there were on average 568 containers lost at sea 
each year, not counting catastrophic events, and on average a total of 1,582 containers lost at 
sea each year including catastrophic events. On average, 64% of containers lost during the last 
decade were attributed to catastrophic events (WSC, 2017a). Accidents may occur during every 
stage of the MCSC processes, which hinders safe and efficient operations. The risks occurring 
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in modern MCSCs come from not only the technical failures during container shipments, but 
also the vulnerabilities at wider levels such as political, managerial, and man-made threats. 
Both academics and industry have initiated research on more powerful and effective methods, 
and tools, to manage the MCSCs. Therefore, it is significant to give an overall and detailed 
review of the MCSC operational processes, risk factor identification and risk assessment 
research related to MCSCs under such an uncertain environment, and the emerging methods 
and models in today’s supply chain risk management, in order to demonstrate the necessity and 
motivation of this research. 
2.2 Overview of the Maritime Container Supply Chains 
2.2.1 The Status Quo of the Container Shipping Industry 
Maritime transportation is at the core of international trade due to its outstanding advantages 
compared to other transport modes, accounting for around 80% of the volume of goods 
transported around the globe, and this share is estimated to be even higher for most developing 
countries (WSC, 2017a). Containerized transport service, as an irreplaceable part of the global 
maritime transportation system, is responsible for the most trade in manufactured and 
intermediate goods. In terms of cargo value, containerized general cargos exceed 90% of all 
general cargos (UNCTAD, 2017). Thus, containerization links the producers with the ultimate 
consumers and facilitates the rapid development of the global economy.  As shown in Figure 
2.1, following the negative impact from the financial crisis in 2008, global containerized trade 
continued to expand after 2009, and reached an expansion rate of nearly 5 per cent in 2017, 
with volumes attaining an estimated 145 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) (UNCTAD, 
2017). The recovery trend from 2015 to 2017 was driven by volume growth in the peak leg of 
the Asia-Europe trade, intra-Asian cargo flows and positive trends in the trans-Pacific. 
In terms of different cargo types in the seaborne trade, Figure 2.2 reveals that the volume of 
seaborne containerized trade has increased more than fifteen times during the last three decades, 
and its share of world seaborne trade shows an increasing trend, taking up 23.8 per cent of the 
total dry cargo volumes in 2016. 
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Figure 2.1. Global containerized trade in recent two decades (Millions TEUs and annual 
percentage change) 
Sources: By author based on the data from the Review of Maritime Transport 2017 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. International seaborne trade from selected years (Millions of tons loaded) 
Sources: By author based on the data from the Review of Maritime Transport 2017 
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A country’s participation in global seaborne trade and the ability to provide reliable shipping 
services are important factors in determining nations’ competitiveness of container transport 
(Panahi, Ghasemi and Golpira, 2017). In 2004, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) developed a novel indicator to quantify a nation’s containerized liner 
trade which is known as Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI). The LSCI is calculated 
based on the information of the world’s container shipping fleet, consisting of five components. 
They are the number of ships deployed to and from each country’s seaports, their combined 
container-carrying capacity, the number of companies that provide regular services, the number 
of liner services, and the maximum container ship size (UNCTAD, 2017). Accordingly, 
relevant information related to the top ten countries in terms of their annual capacity of total 
container ship deployment is collected and summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Top ten countries in terms of total container ship deployment 
Country 
Deployed annual 
capacity (103 TEU) 
Number of ships 
on services 
Number of 
operators 
Number of 
services 
Maximum ship 
capacity (TEU) 
China 85347.7 1996 907 463 18506 
Korea 40924.8 1017 465 245 18506 
Malaysia 36663.7 906 365 196 18506 
US 36154.5 990 437 200 13950 
Germany 26427.5 621 253 143 18350 
UK 24946.1 594 235 139 18506 
Spain 21685.9 605 213 151 18506 
UAE 20468.7 393 158 94 17387 
France 18823.5 466 176 87 17387 
Japan 18584.6 594 291 204 12939 
Sources: Collected from Review of maritime transport 2017 (until May 2017). 
2.2.2 The Characteristics and Operations of MCSCs  
Normally, traditional supply chains can be understood as an integration of all activities 
associated with the flow and transformation of goods from raw materials to end users 
encompassing processes such as sourcing, production, and inventory management. However, 
MCSCs are developed on the basis of both the widespread application of containers in the 
global logistics system and the urgent requirement of safe and resilient container shipping 
services in the increasingly complex and uncertain environment. It is a kind of transport-
oriented service. From a function perspective, an MCSC can be regarded as an organic 
integration of the container transport and transhipment services, by means of different transport 
modes (e.g. rail, road, air, and maritime) from the origin to the destination, under the 
cooperation of different service providers involved in it, in order to realise the efficient and 
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accurate shipment of cargos according to consignors’ requirements. The stability of MCSCs is 
relatively low compared with that of a traditional supply chain, due to the heterogeneity and 
volatility of customer needs. The unique characteristics of MCSCs are as follows (Li, 2016): 
 Fast and low cost. This is mainly due to the standardisation which can be regarded as 
the most prominent feature of MCSCs. During the logistics process, containers rather 
than cargos are taken as the basic units which can be handled anywhere in the world 
(ISO standard) through specialized modes (e.g. ships, trucks, wagons, and trains), 
handling infrastructures and equipment, so that the operational efficiency of container 
loading, unloading, and handling at transhipment centres and container terminals can 
be improved. The usage of containers also reduces the packing expenses, the 
warehousing costs, and the costs due to loss or damage as well since the containers are 
easier to pack and store and can protect contents on long journeys. Thus, the level of 
standardisation (as well as collaboration among different service providers) will 
influence the efficiency of the entire MCSC. 
 A wide range of usages. Container units may vary in dimension, structure, materials, 
and construction. Various types of shipping containers including open top containers, 
refrigerated containers, thermal containers, and special purpose containers, are being 
used in order to meet requirements of all kinds of cargos of different sizes. Thus, 
MCSCs have a wide application in global freight transportation.  
 Complex operational process. A typical door-to-door journey using container supply 
chains involves the interaction of approximately 25 different participants, generates 
more than 30 documents, and needs to be handled at as many as 12 to 15 physical 
locations (Yang et al., 2005a). Due to the geographic dispersion of the supply chain 
members, multiple transportation modes are usually involved in MCSCs to support the 
transport of containers worldwide. However, the laws, regulations, procedures and 
documents concerning container transportation are not uniform in different countries, 
making the situation of international multimodal transport even more difficult. 
 Repositioning of empty containers. The repositioning of empty containers is one of the 
most complex problems concerning global cargo distribution. It is estimated that empty 
containers account for about 10% of existing container assets and 20.5% of global port 
handling (Rodrigue, 2017). Trade imbalance has been identified as one of the major 
causes of the empty containers repositioning problem, because a region that imports 
more than it exports will face the accumulation of empty containers, while a region that 
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exports more than it imports will face a shortage of containers. Container repositioning 
can occur at local, regional, or international scales, depending on the nature of the 
container flow imbalances. 
 A high level of uncertainty. Uncertainties in MCSCs come from different sources. 
Firstly, differences exist among various transport modes in terms of their layouts, 
transport technology and equipment, infrastructure, and shipping capacity; secondly, 
the uncertainties in the external environment such as the change of macroeconomic 
situation, international trade development, market demand, and national and customs 
policies will also influence the turnaround time and costs of MCSCs; thirdly, as all the 
enterprises involved in MCSCs such as shipping companies, shipping agents, container 
terminal operators, and port enterprise, have their specific development situation and 
goals, they are among the competition and cooperation relationships with each other, 
making the situation more complex. 
Although this research mainly focuses on the maritime segment, the whole operational 
process is introduced in this subsection in order to maintain the integrity of a general container 
supply chain. A typical operational process of the container supply chain (including the 
movement of containers) is developed and designed by the author based on the work of Van 
Oosterhout (2003), Lu and Wang (2008), and Chang (2013), as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Flow chart of container supply chain service 
Source: author 
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There are three significant flows in a container supply chain, which are physical flow, 
information flow, and financial/payment flow (Chang, Xu, and Song, 2015). Figure 2.3 
demonstrates the operational process among the supply chain actors, where the physical flow 
is represented by red arrows, the information flow by yellow arrows, and the financial/payment 
flow by blue arrows. 
1) Physical flow 
Physical flows involve the movement, transhipment, and storage of goods. They are the 
most visible piece of a supply chain. In a container supply chain, it refers to the movement of 
container cargos. The consignor transports goods to the inland deport or the container yard 
through inland carriers. Following that, the goods are transferred to the port of origin to wait 
for loading. After being placed on board, the container can be moved and transhipped through 
other ports onto other vessels by shipping companies before arriving at its destination port for 
unloading. Finally, the goods are transported to the consignee by inland carriers in the country 
of destination.  
2) Information flow 
Information flows allow the various supply chain partners to coordinate their long-term 
plans, and to control the daily flow of goods along the container supply chain. The information 
includes the data or documents that need to be transferred for cargo processes. As indicated by 
Figure 2.3, the information flow between the consignee and the consignor indicates the 
negotiation of the cargo price between them. Besides, both the consignor and consignee have 
to apply for the export and import documents respectively from their own governments and get 
permission before transporting the cargos. At the same time, the consignee needs to apply for 
a letter of credit (L/C) from the paying bank (Bank 2), and the paying bank will transfer the 
L/C to the consignor through the Advising Bank (Bank 1). The consignor can directly ask the 
freight price and book container space from the shipping company, or through the forwarder. 
In the next step, the consignor needs to declare export to the customs, and the customs will 
check and discharge the cargos in the container yard (CY). After that, the shipping company 
will contact the CY to load the cargos. The shipping company will also inform the consignee 
after the arrival of the cargos. The consignee needs to declare import to the customs before 
taking the cargos. 
3) Financial flow 
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Financial flows refer to monetary payment from the customer sector to the business sector 
that provides goods or services (Chang, 2013). According to Coyle, Bardi, and Langley (2003), 
the payment flow traditionally has been deemed as one-directional in a supply chain. As shown 
in Figure 2.3, the financial flow between the consignee and the consignor is composed of two 
parts. For the first part, after the contract being signed by the consignor and the consignee, the 
Bank 2 will check the credit of the consignee and transfer the money to the Bank 1. Then Bank 
1 will pay the money for goods to the consignor. For the other part, the consignor will pay the 
money to the shipping company to book the cargo space whether through the forwarder or not. 
The consignor also needs to pay for inland transportation in order to transport the cargos to the 
port of origin. After the cargo arrives at the port of destination, the consignee needs to pay the 
money to the inland transportation on that side for collecting the cargos. 
2.3 Risks and risk assessment of Maritime Container Supply Chains 
In the risk management process, to clearly define the risk of MCSCs and fully investigate 
the connotation and attributes of MCSC risks will aid effective risk analysis.  
2.3.1 Risk Concept in Maritime Container Supply Chains 
2.3.1.1 Definition of MCSC Risks 
Although the research on supply chain risk management showed an increasing trend in the 
last decade (as shown in Figure 2.4), only a few authors explicitly answered the question of 
what a supply chain risk is, and what characteristics it has. Yu and Goh (2014) regarded supply 
chain risks as the probability of occurrence of an adverse event during a certain period within 
a supply chain and the associated consequences which affect supply chain performance. Kull 
and Closs (2008) carried out the risk assessment in a simulation environment to examine supply 
risk issues within the context of a second-tier supply failure. In their study, the grounded 
definition of supply risks based on Zsidisin (2003) was “the potential occurrence of an incident 
associated with the inbound supply from individual supplier failures or the supply market in 
which its outcomes would result in the inability of the purchasing firm to meet demand or 
threaten customer well-being and safety”. Other research on supply chain risk management 
using similar definitions included Goh et al. (2007), and Kähkönen et al. (2016). To minimise 
the supply chain cost with embedded risks, Kumar et al. (2010) defined supply chain risk as 
the potential deviations from the initial objective, which would result in the decrease of value 
at different levels. Overall, among the research with an explicit definition of supply chain risk, 
analysis on supply chain risk was generally approached from three aspects (Heckmann et al., 
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2015), including a) the probability of occurrence of triggering events and their adverse 
outcomes (e.g. Chen and Yano (2010); Yu and Goh (2014)), b) a deviation from the expected 
objective or value (which was often profit-, or cost-oriented) (e.g. Bogataj and Bogataj (2007); 
Kumar et al. (2010)), and c) the supply risk defined by Zsidisin (2003), which arose from 
individual supplier failures or market factors. However, most conceptual work with no explicit 
definition implies the risk to be a triggering event or a probability. An in-depth discussion on 
the definition of supply chain risks refers to Heckmann et al. (2015). 
 
Figure 2.4. Distribution of papers by year of publication 
Source: author 
 
In this study, MCSC risks refer to the combination of the occurrence of a triggering event 
(or a certain situation) during the maritime transport of containers and the associated outcomes 
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of seafarers, interrupting container shipping business, and damaging reputation of shipping 
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 The occurrence of the risk factors, i.e., the probability/likelihood of the occurrence 
of a specific risk factor 
 The consequence that a risk factor may bring, i.e., the severity of adverse effects 
on the occurrence of a specific risk factor 
For a risk to be measured, it is generally represented as Risk = (P, C), where P is the 
probability of a risk occurrence and C is the significance of the consequence. This is one of the 
most commonly used definitions in maritime supply chain risk analysis (Waters, 2007; Vilko 
and Hallikas, 2012; Chang, Xu and Song, 2014). It presents a simple and effective way to 
analyse risk, which has been used together with other assessment methods such as loss 
exposure matrices (Yang, 2011), and risk maps (Chang, Xu and Song, 2014). However, the 
risk is a complex and interdisciplinary concept with a variety of parameters being involved in 
addition to the probability and consequence, such as uncertainty, exposure, and scenarios 
(Aven, 2012). For example, Aven (2010) defined it as Risk = (P, C, U), where U represents the 
uncertainty about P and C. He also tried to connect another parameter – the background 
knowledge (K) – to the subjective probability in the risk description, resulting in Risk = (P, C, 
U, K). Another example of the different elements of risk is seen in FMEA, where risk analysis 
takes into account three risk parameters: the probability of the failure, the severity of the 
consequence, and the chance of the failure being undetected (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008). 
The chance of the failure being undetected is similar to risk exposure; this variable partly 
influences the likelihood that a hazardous event will occur (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).  
1) Likelihood 
Likelihood refers to how likely a risk factor could negatively affect an MCSC. It is 
represented by the frequency of a risk occurring at a certain time period or the probability of it 
occurring, according to the certain circumstance investigated. It is a basic risk parameter that 
has been widely discussed and studied by a number of researchers, see, for example, Manuj 
and Mentzer (2008), Vilko and Hallikas (2012), and Chang, Xu and Song (2014), to name but 
a few. 
2) Consequence 
In the domain of maritime engineering, a hazard is normally defined as “a physical situation 
or a condition with a potential for human injury, damage to property, or damage to the 
environment” (DOSH, 2008). This definition indicates that the risk consequence varies. Some 
consequences are more tangible and easy to measure, such as time delay and financial loss. 
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Other consequences may be intangible and difficult to quantify and evaluate, such as 
environmental damage and reputation loss. According to Rausand (2013), the dimensions of 
risk consequences include: 
 Impact on individuals, such as fatality and personal injury (including either physical 
harm or psychological trauma); 
 Impact on the property, such as property loss and damage (e.g., loss of cargo, damage 
to containerships and port facilities.); 
 Impact on the environment, such as soil, water, and air pollution, the greenhouse effect, 
and global climate change; 
 Impact on business, such as business interruption and damage to a corporate image or 
reputation loss. 
2.3.2 Risk Assessment Techniques  
There are various methods being developed and applied to risk assessment in the industry 
in order to provide a reference for decision analysis. Those popular and most employed risk 
assessment techniques, as well as their features and applications, are introduced in the 
following subsections. 
2.3.2.1 Traditional Risk Assessment Methods 
Significant progress in the development and application of risk assessment methods in 
different industrial fields can be traced back to as early as the 1960s. The nuclear and 
petrochemical industries are the pioneers adopting various risk assessment methods to the 
system design, daily operation, and other aspects. The application of risk assessment in the 
shipping industry is relatively late. With the increasing importance of the shipping industry, 
various traditional risk assessment methods have also been used in the safety analysis since the 
mid-1990s, such as HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP) (Bendixen and O'Neill, 1984), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Ang and Tang, 1984), Risk Matrix Method (Leung and Tummala, 
1996), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Kumamoto and Henley, 1999), Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) (Kumamoto and Henley, 1999), and Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) (Andrews and Moss, 2002). 
1) Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) 
PHA is a method for qualitatively analysing hazards of a system and their risk levels. It is 
mainly performed at the preliminary design stage to identify hazards, associated causal factors, 
effects, risk levels, and mitigation measures in the case of insufficiently detailed design 
information. The level of risk is generally divided into four categories according to the 
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frequency of the accident and its associated consequence severity, which are negligible, 
marginal, critical, and catastrophic. The analysis results are provided by the preliminary hazard 
list (Pillay and Wang, 2003a). A PHA process is described as follows (Kumamoto and Henley, 
1999): 
a) Define the system of interest; 
b) Identify hazards; 
c) Analyse the frequency and consequence severity of the hazards; 
d) Identify the major hazards accruing to risk levels; 
e) Use the analysis results in risk prevention. 
The PHA is applicable to the analysis of all types of systems, facilities, operations, and 
functions, but focuses predominantly on identifying and classifying hazards early in the 
development of a system rather than evaluating them in detail. Mader et al. (2011) applied PHA 
in the development process of automotive embedded systems for the identification of hazards 
and top level safety requirements. A PHA was performed by Weibel and Hansman (2004) for 
two critical hazards (i.e. ground impact and mid-air collisions) of unmanned aerial vehicles in 
the national airspace system of America. However, it is worth noting that the results of PHA 
rely heavily on the subjective cognition and experience of the analysts. Another limitation is 
that the effects of interactions between hazards are not easily recognized. 
2) Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) 
HAZOP was developed by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) in 1974 to detail the 
safety analysis of complex technical equipment systematically. It is a structured technique for 
system examination based on the assumption that risk events are caused by deviations from 
design or operating intentions, in which deviations are identified by using a set of standardised 
guide words. Some common HAZOP guide words include “None”, “More”, “Less”, “As Well 
As”, “Part Of”, “Other Than” and so on. HAZOP is best suited for assessing hazards in facilities, 
equipment, and processes and is capable of assessing systems from multiple perspectives 
including design, environment, and operations. According to the latest international standard 
for HAZOP application guidelines published by the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), the procedure of HAZOP involves the following basic steps (IEC, 2016): 
a) Define the scope and objectives; 
b) Select the suitable analysis team; 
c) Gather the information necessary to conduct a detailed study; 
d) Subdivide the system into logical and manageable parts for efficient study;  
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e) Identify deviation by using guide words on each element; 
f) Analyse the causes of deviations and their consequences; 
g) Formulate appropriate countermeasures; 
h) Record the examination and document the review proceedings.  
As a qualitative assessment method for risk prevention at the design stage, HAZOP is simple 
and easy to perform. At the same time, analysis results generated from HAZOP can be used as 
the basis for further quantitative analysis by other risk assessment methods (e.g. FTA). For 
example, Li et al. (2015) for the first time applied the HAZOP to identify the operational 
hazards of the Chinese train control system. However, many reasons exist that may lead to the 
failure of HAZOP in practice. Some prevalent ones include a lack of experience, failure to 
communicate, management shortcomings, and poor loss-prevention practices (Mckelvey, 
1988). 
3) Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
FMECA began with the standard developed by the US Military, MIL-STD-1629. FMECA 
is an extension of the Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) by including criticality 
analysis. As an inductive and proactive analytical method, FMECA studies the effects of single 
component failures on the system, and through the control of high-risk failure modes, the 
overall safety of the system is achieved. It is useful for exhaustively listing of all potential 
initiating faults. The FMECA procedure typically consists of the following step: 
a) Define the system and create a block diagram of it; 
b) List items or functions of the system in the worksheet; 
c) Identify potential failure modes; 
d) Analyse failure effects and causes; 
e) Perform criticality computations and determine critical items;  
f) Produce a list of recommended actions 
Sayareh and Ahouei (2013) applied FMECA to the cargo handling operations of marine 
bulk terminals in order to reduce the delay risk. Based on the idea of FMECA, Yang and Wang 
(2015) proposed a novel framework for analysing engineering system risks by incorporating 
the fuzzy rule base and evidential reasoning. However, it is noted that the Risk Priority 
Numbers (RPNs) employed by traditional FMECA for ranking risk factors suffers from some 
weaknesses. One of the critically debated limitations is that equal RPN values may generate 
different risk implications (Mandal and Maiti, 2014). Besides, the relative importance among 
the three risk parameters is ignored when calculating the RPNs. 
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4) Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
FTA was originally developed in 1962 at Bell Laboratories, under a U.S. Air Force study 
for the evaluation and estimation of system reliability and safety. FTA is a top-down process 
of deductive reasoning, which is widely used to estimate the probability of an undesired event 
resulting from a sequence of failure events in a diagrammatic manner. As one of the most 
widely used methods in the safety engineering, it can handle both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments. Generally, the following steps are needed to conduct an FTA (Lee et al., 2009): 
a) Define the system and collect accident data for the target system; 
b) Identify representative failures to be studied as the top events; 
c) Construct the fault tree by performing a step-by-step analysis in a top-down process; 
d) Simplify the fault tree and conduct the qualitative evaluation; 
e) Quantify the probabilities of failures and identify the high-risk sources; 
f) Propose countermeasures according to the results. 
FTA is clear in logic and easy to present the abstraction of the target systems for risk 
inference. Thus, its application can be widely seen in the analysis of system safety and 
reliability. Chen et al. (2009) developed an FTA-based approach to investigate the risk factors 
of supply chain disruption, and diagnose the supply chain reliability. Gong, Chen and Gui 
(2012) constructed the fault tree of the automobile logistics service supply chain system failure 
and introduced triangular fuzzy numbers for describing the probability of the basic events. 
However, the main difficulties of achieving FTA lie in how to establish a scientific and 
reasonable fault tree model, which requires the rich knowledge and experience of analysts. 
5) Event tree analysis (ETA) 
ETA is a bottom-up inductive inference method used to evaluate the process and its events 
leading to a possible accident. It is based on binary logic, that is, an event can either happen or 
not. Then, each alternative is considered as a new initial event, and the analysis continues until 
the final result is found. With this forward process, the sequences of events in the process 
leading to the accident will be shown in a graphical logical model. This technique can be 
applied to a system early in the design stage to identify potential risks and prevent negative 
outcomes of the risks from occurring. Typical steps of conducting ETA include (Ericson, 2005): 
a) Define the system and set accident scenarios; 
b) Identify the initiating events; 
c) Develop the event tree model; 
d) Quantify the probability of the event paths and evaluate their risk; 
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e) Take corresponding measures to reduce the risk of the path that is not acceptable. 
ETA is able to clearly present the dynamic development process of accidents in order to 
support analysts on revealing and analysing the accident paths. Based on the probability of 
occurrence of events in each stage, the key path with the highest risk can be identified so that 
the corrective actions can be taken to prevent the accidents from happening. In the work of Fu 
et al. (2016), ETA is used to model the different consequence scenarios of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) leakage on board LNG-fuelled ships. According to the ETA model of LNG leakage, 
three ﬁnal scenarios of LNG leakage are identified, which are ﬂash ﬁre, vapour cloud explosion, 
and pool ﬁre or jet ﬁre. Chu and Wang (2012) combined Markov chains with ETA to deal with 
the uncertainties of some stochastic variables of the probable fire scenarios. One major 
limitation faced by ETA is that many initial events may exist when dealing with complex 
systems, which will result in a large event tree that is too complicated to evaluate, weakening 
its operability in reality. Moreover, similar to FTA, ETA also lacks the ability to handle partial 
dependence between components. 
6)  Risk matrix method 
The risk matrix is also known as the Probability-Impact Matrix. The bases for risk matrix 
are the definition of risk as a combination of the frequency and severity of the consequences 
when it occurs (Markowski and Mannan, 2008). It is used as an effective screening tool during 
the risk assessment to categorise risks according to their importance, so that relatively 
important risks can be highlighted and forwarded for further analysis while trivial ones can be 
disregarded (Wang and Foinikis, 2001). The two-dimensional graphic representation of the risk 
matrix increases the visibility of risks and thus can assist management decision making. 
Generally, the following steps are required to build a risk matrix (Markowski and Mannan, 
2008): 
a) Categorisation and scaling of the frequency and severity of consequences; 
b) Categorisation and scaling of output index (e.g. risk ranking number); 
c) Develop risk-based rules; 
d) Create a graphical edition of the risk matrix. 
Due to its good applicability in risk assessment, the risk matrix approach has been 
recommended in national and international standards and spread through many application in 
the maritime industry. Yang (2011) employed the loss exposure matrix to identify the severity 
and frequency of risk factors originating from the container security initiative (CSI) on the 
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maritime supply chain in Taiwan. Nwaoha et al. (2013) applied the risk matrix approach to 
identify the major hazards related to the LNG carrier operations. Zhang et al. (2013) used the 
risk matrix to assist in developing the inland waterway navigational risk model. In recent 
research, the risk matrix was used in the risk analysis to calculate the frequencies and 
consequence of identified hazards in order to achieve the formal maritime risk assessment of 
the Strait of Gibraltar (Endrina, Rasero and Konovessis, 2018). Furthermore, different 
mathematical approaches are also incorporated into the risk matrix to enhance its applicability, 
includi furtherng fuzzy logic and Borda method. A detailed introduction of some fundamental 
extensions on the risk matrix approach can be found in Ni, Chen and Chen (2010). 
2.3.2.2 Risk Assessment under Uncertain Environment  
With the further development of the probability theory in risk assessment, some inherent 
deficiencies of applying traditional risk assessment techniques are observed, and many risk 
assessment applications in the management-based field indicated that they are more 
possibilistic than probabilistic, and more qualitative than quantitative. Besides, the increasing 
complexity of modern multimodal logistic systems further brings in the uncertainties faced by 
risk assessment. Having emerged in the 1970s, possibility theory developed quickly and 
became one of the most popular approaches to reasoning under uncertain environment. This 
facilitates the development of some advanced risk assessment theories and methods such as 
fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965), Bayesian networks (BN), and evidence theory, showing some 
superiorities (e.g. better adaptability and rationality) when dealing with uncertainties. The 
incorporation of these methods into traditional risk assessment techniques also provides a way 
to deal with their limitations.  
1) Fuzzy logic 
As an extension of traditional/binary logic, the fuzzy logic introduced by Zadeh (1965) is 
built around the central concepts of a fuzzy set (which is a generalisation of the classical set 
theory). It is the logic that deals with situations, where it is difficult or sometimes impossible 
for an expert to provide clear true/false answers, by introducing the notion of the degree in the 
verification of a condition (Mendel, 2001). Fuzzy logic enables the combination of linguistic 
knowledge and numerical data in a systematic way, thus making it possible to process 
imprecise information and take into account uncertainties as well (Adriaenssens et al., 2004). 
Fuzzy logic-based methods are a powerful tool for modelling the behaviour of systems which 
are too complex or too ill-defined to allow for conventional quantitative techniques, or when 
the available information from the systems is qualitative and imprecise (Nait-Said, Zidani and 
 29 
 
Ouzraoui, 2009). However, no perfect application of fuzzy logic in practice has been found 
until its combination with a rule base in the control of a non-linear dynamical system (Mamdani 
and Assilian, 1975), in which its importance as a powerful design methodology was highlighted 
and demonstrated. 
A fuzzy rule-based system is perhaps the most common way to represent human knowledge 
and to model human reasoning in a systematic manner, because in this kind of system human 
empirical and heuristic knowledge is represented in an approximate and linguistic manner - IF-
THEN rules - our own language of communication (Ross, 2009). This makes fuzzy rule-based 
systems an invaluable tool for expression when applied in engineering systems together with 
other mathematical models and data processing approaches in reliability analysis and safety 
assessment (e.g., Bowles and Peláez, 1995; Pillay and Wang, 2003b; Guimarães and Lapa, 
2007; Kong et al., 2012; Polat, Aksoy and Unlu, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2017). 
Some of the advantages of a fuzzy rule-based system include the ability to capture and preserve 
irreplaceable human experience, to develop a system more consistent than human experts, and 
to develop solutions faster than human experts can do (Abraham, 2005). 
2) Bayesian networks (BNs) 
The BN (also known as belief networks) method was developed based on the well-defined 
Bayesian probability theory and networking technique. A BN is a graphical presentation of 
probability combined with a mathematical inference calculation, which provides a strong 
framework for representing knowledge. It also has a good ability in modelling randomness and 
capturing non-linear causal relationships, so that the inference based on incomplete, imprecise 
and uncertain information can be achieved. Generally, a BN can be characterised as a directed 
acyclic graph (DAG) and an associated set of probability tables (Pearl, 1986). A DAG is 
composed of two parts: the set of nodes and the set of directed edges, where the nodes represent 
random variables and are labelled by the variable names, while the edges between pairs of 
nodes represent direct dependencies among variables that are connected. In particular, an edge 
from one node to another represents a statistical dependence between the corresponding 
variables, and a conditional probability table (CPT) associated with each node indicates how 
strong such causal dependence is. As a method that is both mathematically rigorous and 
intuitively understandable (Ben-Gal, 2007), the BN approach has been applied in a range of 
real applications, especially when predicting and diagnosing properties of a complex system 
are involved. However, one common criticism of the Bayesian approach exists in its 
requirement of too much information during the construction of CPTs. Thus, early work has 
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been done, and it revealed that a combination of Bayesian approach and fuzzy logic could be 
beneficial to both by compensating their individual disadvantages (Bott and Eisenhawer, 2002).  
3) Evidence theory 
The evidence theory was first developed by Dempster (1967) and further extended by Shafer 
(1976). Thus it is also called the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (which is often shortened 
to D-S theory). The core of the D-S theory is the rule of the combination by which the evidence 
from different sources is aggregated. Assuming that the information sources are independent, 
the multiple belief structures can then be combined using the orthogonal sum (Wang and Yang, 
2006): 
1 2 km m m m             Eq. 2.1 
where ○+  represents the operator of the combination. Suppose subsets B and C defined on a 
common space θ are associated with belief structures m1 and m2 respectively. The combination 
of m1 and m2 can be achieved as follows (Alyami et al., 2016). 
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the degree of conflict between the pieces of evidence. It is noted that the rule of combination 
is proved to be both commutative and associative (Shafer, 1976), which means that in the case 
of multiple belief structures, the combination can be conducted in a pairwise way. However, 
one major limitation of the original application of combination rule in the D-S theory is that 
irrational results will be concluded when aggregating multiple pieces of evidence in conflict 
(Murphy, 2000). The efforts spared on solving this problem promoted the birth and 
development of the ER approach partly (see Chapter 6). 
4) Network-based analysis 
The concept of centrality was first developed in the social network analysis (Newman, 2010), 
and different indicators of centrality have been designed to identify the most important node 
within a graph. Due to various meanings of importance and implicit assumptions about the way 
that flows move in a network, these centrality measures/indices can be generally classified into 
three categories (Wang and Cullinane, 2016): The most intuitive one is the degree-based 
centrality, which measures the importance of a node according to the number of direct 
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connections associated with it. The second category is related to a node’s ability to control the 
communication within the network. The two representatives under this category are closeness-
based centrality and betweenness-based centrality. The former defines the most central node 
as the one moving through the entire network in the minimum time, while the latter considers 
a node as a central one if it is located on the path connecting pairs of other nodes. The last 
category defines centrality by considering influence measures (e.g. eigenvector centrality). 
Centrality measures provide an approach for assessing the vulnerability of the targeted system 
from a network perspective, which enables the collection of more useful insights on the supply 
chain risk management. 
Centrality measures have been well applied in the global maritime transportation system, 
especially in the container shipping industry. These centrality measures are selected with 
respect to different characteristics of traffic flows and research purposes. Ducruet and 
Notteboom (2012) studied the spatial structure of the maritime network of container shipping, 
in which the degree centrality was applied as a local level measure of a port’s connectivity and 
betweenness centrality as a global level measure indicating a port’s accessibility. Ducruet 
(2017) investigated the multiplex properties of global maritime flows from various 
perspectives such as centrality, assortativity, traffic distributions, and correlations between 
links and nodes. 
2.4 Resilience of Maritime Container Supply Chains 
Transportation, as the core part of a container supply chain, provides the foundation for the 
movement of product from one location to another. It also supports the successful function of 
other flows involved in a supply chain. Therefore, its safety has been one of the issues with 
great importance in both industry and research. However, in recent years, the foci of 
transportation safety have been expanded from traditional risks through security, to resilience, 
and various studies have been conducted on transportation resilience from different 
perspectives. In view of this, this subsection presents a systematic review on transportation 
resilience with emphases on its definitions, characteristics, and research methods applied in 
different transportation systems/contexts, in order to offer new insights into the risk assessment 
of MCSCs. 
 32 
 
2.4.1 Definition of Resilience  
Currently, there are a number of different opinions and definitions of resilience in various 
application domains. For example, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) (2009) 
defined the resilience of an infrastructure system as its ability to predict, absorb, adapt, and/or 
quickly recover from a disruptive event such as natural disasters. In an engineering context, 
Hollnagel et al. (2007) defined resilience as the inherent ability of a system to alter its 
functionality in the face of unexpected changes (Hosseini et al., 2016), to name just a few. The 
definitions applied by previous studies associated with maritime transportation or general 
transportation systems are listed in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Existing definitions of resilience in the transportation field 
Reference Definition of resilience Research topic 
Haimes (2009) 
 
The ability of the system to withstand a major 
disruption within acceptable degradation parameters 
and to recover within an acceptable time and 
composite costs and risks. 
Transportation systems 
Mansouri et al. 
(2010) 
The function of the system’s vulnerability against 
potential disruption, and its adaptive capacity in 
recovering to an acceptable level of service within a 
reasonable timeframe after being affected by 
disruptions. 
Port infrastructure 
systems 
Chen & Miller-
Hooks (2012) 
A network’s capability to resist and recover from 
disruption or disaster. 
Intermodal Freight 
Transportation networks 
Ishfaq (2012) 
The ability to maintain continuity in operations under 
disruptions. 
Multi-mode 
transportation networks 
Miller-Hooks et 
al. (2012) 
Resilience involves both the network’s inherent 
ability to cope with disruptions via its topological and 
operational attributes and potential actions that can be 
taken in the immediate aftermath of a disruption or 
disaster event. 
Freight Transportation 
networks 
Omer et al. 
(2012) 
The ability of the system to absorb shocks as well as 
to recover from a disruption so that it can return back 
to its original service delivery levels or close to it. 
Maritime transportation 
infrastructure systems  
Tamvakis & 
Xenidis (2012) 
The ability of a system to react to stresses that 
challenge its performance. 
Transportation systems 
Chen et al. 
(2013) 
The ability of a system to absorb the consequences of 
disruptions to reduce the impacts of disruptions and 
maintain freight mobility. 
International express 
logistics 
Nursey-Bray et 
al. (2013) 
The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb 
disturbances while retaining the same basic structure 
and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-
organisation and the capacity to adapt to stress and 
change. 
Ports 
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Reggiani (2013) 
The capacity/ability of the system to absorb shocks 
without catastrophic changes in its basic functional 
organisation 
Transportation networks 
Baroud et al. 
(2014) 
A function of the extent of loss experienced at the 
time and the speed at which the system recovers. 
Inland waterway 
transportation networks 
Chang et al. 
(2014) 
The ability to absorb shocks while maintaining 
function. 
Transportation 
infrastructure 
Becker & 
Caldwell (2015) 
The ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still 
retain its basic function and structure. 
Seaports 
Wang (2015) 
The quality that leads to recovery, reliability and 
sustainability. 
Transport planning 
Zhang et al. 
(2015) 
Resilience accounts not only for the network’s 
inherent coping capacity but also its ability to adapt 
post-event efficiently. 
Transportation networks 
Hosseini & 
Barker (2016) 
The ability to predict, adapt and/or quickly recover 
from a disruptive event. 
Inland waterway ports 
Lam & Bai 
(2016) 
Resilience is the ability to tackle unexpected 
disturbances across the supply chain. 
Maritime supply chain 
Chen et al. 
(2017) 
The ability of the system, with the help of immediate 
recovery activities, to meet the transport demand, as 
well as to recover and ensure the persistence of the 
performance level at a rational cost within a limited 
period, when faced with disruptions to the network. 
Container transportation 
networks 
Loo & Leung 
(2017) 
The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover 
from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events 
Transportation systems 
Zhang et al. 
(2018) 
The ability to restore functionality and performance 
in response to a disruptive event. 
Traffic networks 
 
As summarised in the above table, there are a variety of definitions for the notion of 
resilience proposed, and some of them are similar, having overlaps with other relevant concepts 
such as reliability, vulnerability, robustness, and survivability. Even though the research foci 
of these studies are transportation systems, they are conducted from different perspectives. 
Some focus on the resilience of the whole generalised transportation system or network, while 
others concentrate on a specified segment like inland waterways and ports. Moreover, most of 
the definitions of transportation resilience are given either from a system or a network 
perspective. A careful review of definitions of resilience shows that there is no universal 
description of what the transportation resilience is, or what the standard definition of it should 
be. 
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2.4.2 Key Characteristics of Resilience 
Different terms have been used to describe the resilience and its characteristics, including 
but not limited to vulnerability (e.g. Omer et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2015), adaptability (e.g. 
Becker and Caldwell, 2015), robustness (e.g. Blockley et al., 2012), preparedness (e.g. Miller-
Hooks et al., 2012), redundancy (e.g. Berle et al., 2011), response (e.g. DiPietro et al., 2014) 
and recovery (e.g. Adams et al., 2012; Ashok and Banerjee, 2014). It is quite often the case 
that the same term is explained from various perspectives and used in a variety of ways to 
address different requirements. Moreover, authors sometimes introduce new terminologies for 
similar concepts or use terms without clearly defining them. Currently, there are few studies 
analysing the similarity and difference of the application of such terms in the transportation 
area. Here, we extracted from literature those most commonly used terms when describing the 
features and connotations of resilience, as summarised below. 
 Vulnerability  
The increasing importance of vulnerability analysis has been evidenced by many previous 
research findings in various transport segments such as road networks (e.g. Jenelius et al., 
2006), railway networks (e.g. Johansson et al., 2011), maritime transportation systems (e.g. 
Mansouri et al., 2010), as well as those from a higher level, such as comprehensive 
transportation systems (e.g. Zhang and Levinson, 2008) or integrated supply chain networks 
(e.g. Klibi and Martel, 2012).  The vulnerability was defined as the susceptibility to damage or 
perturbation – especially where small damage or perturbation leads to disproportionate 
consequences (Blockley et al., 2012). Also, it was regarded as the property of a transportation 
system that may weaken or constrain its ability to endure, handle and survive threats and 
disruptive events that originated both within and outside the system boundaries (Asbjørnslett 
and Rausand, 1999).  
 Adaptability  
Adaptability (also known as adaptive capacity) is defined as one of the functions of a 
resilient system (Dalziell and McManus, 2004), which reflects its flexible ability to respond to 
new pressures (Fiksel, 2003). Similar definitions were presented by Pettit et al. (2010) as the 
ability to modify operations in response to challenges or opportunities. It has also been 
encompassed in the definition of resilient countries as a timely adaptation in response to a 
changing environment (World Economic Forum, 2013). Such definitions indicate that its main 
features lie in response to changes reflecting the dynamic nature of complex systems. 
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Adaptability and vulnerability have been considered in pairs in a few studies of resilience, e.g. 
Omer et al. (2012) and Wang (2015). 
 Robustness 
Robustness is the property of being strong, healthy and hardy (Blockley et al., 2012).Thus, 
it is generally defined as the ability to withstand or absorb disturbances and remain intact when 
exposed to disruptions (Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2014). In the construction of the 
conceptual framework for resilience, Steen and Aven (2011) considered robustness from a risk 
perspective as a two-dimensional combination of consequences and associated uncertainties, 
given the occurrence of an initiating event. In this context, it became an antonym of the 
vulnerability. Similar ideas can be found in the predictive measure taxonomy given by Cox et 
al. (2011).  
 Flexibility 
The flexibility of a system represents its ability to respond to shocks (Cox et al., 2011) and 
adjust itself to changes through contingency planning after disruptions (Faturechi and Miller-
Hooks 2014a). It is also referred to as an ability to reconfigure resources (Berle et al., 2013) as 
well as to cope with uncertainties (Goetz and Szyliowicz, 1997). Due to its property to adapt 
to changing circumstances and demands (Chen and Miller-Hooks, 2012), it has been 
considered as the same as adaptability in some research (e.g. Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2014) 
in terms of measuring the performance of a system. As such, connotations of flexibility are 
opposite to that of robustness which emphasises the ability to endure these changes rather than 
adapt to them. 
 Reliability 
Being a crucial parameter of resilience (Wang, 2015; Baroud et al., 2014), reliability is 
generally defined as the probability that a network remains operative given the occurrence of 
a disruption event (Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2014). In this way, reliability to some extent 
is a measure for the post-disaster performance of a system. However, Barker et al. (2013) 
suggested that reliability decides a system’s performance during the time period before the 
strike of an external disturbance, in which, it becomes a kind of attribute describing the pre-
disruption performance of a resilient system (Shinozuka et al., 2004), and it is able to provide 
a baseline for the performance of service when the system operates at the stable state (Baroud 
et al. 2014).  
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 Recoverability 
Recoverability has been discussed the most in the research on transportation resilience. It is 
defined as the ability of a network to recover functionality in a timely manner (Baroud et al., 
2014). Instead of using the concept of “recoverability”, similar expressions can be found such 
as “recovery”, and “the ability to recover”. They are regarded as an important feature of secure 
and highly functioning transport networks.  
 Redundancy 
Redundancy indicates the ability of certain components of a system to take over the 
functions of failed components without adversely affecting the performance of the system itself 
(Haimes, 2009). In brief, it reflects the availability of alternative choices (Tukamuhabwa et al., 
2015), through which parallel systems can be utilised to provide alternative operations in case 
of failures of the original one (Omer et al., 2012). In the context of transportation, redundancy 
is also viewed as the existence of optional routes between origins and destinations, which can 
help to mitigate adverse impacts on transportation systems from disasters. It is commonly 
accepted that the more redundancy a system has, the more resilient it will be (Fiksel, 2003), 
leading to a longer term of development (O’Kelly, 2015). The redundancy of routes is of great 
significance, especially in emergency situations. However, it should not be ignored that over-
pursuit of redundancy will inevitably lead to an exorbitant cost.  
 Survivability 
Survivability is generally defined as the ability to withstand sudden disturbances while 
meeting original demands (Faturechi and Miller-Hooks, 2014a). Survivability techniques have 
been considered as access to mitigating the vulnerability of a network or system (e.g. Baroud 
et al., 2014; Barker et al., 2013). Thus survivability approaches can help to reduce the adverse 
impacts on a system from unexpected disruptive events.  
 Preparedness 
Preparedness refers to the preparation of certain measures before a disruption, and it 
enhances the resilience of a system by lessening potential negative impacts from disruptive 
events. It can be subdivided as emergency preparedness and response preparedness, being 
favoured by different industrial sectors (Berle et al., 2011). In the framework of disaster 
management proposed by Altay and Green (2006), preparedness is the second step, and it 
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belongs to the pre-disruption stages (which are mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery).  
 Resourcefulness  
Resourcefulness is defined as the availability of materials, supplies, and crews to restore 
functionality in a study of transportation resilience (Adams et al., 2012). In another research 
relating to the transport security policy, resilience was discussed in terms of its applications at 
the economic level. In that context, resourcefulness was treated as one of the stabilizing 
measures in terms of resilience (Reggiani, 2013). In a review work of resilience analysis of 
engineering and infrastructure systems, Francis and Bekera (2014) defined resourcefulness as 
the level of preparedness in effectively resisting an adverse event.  
 Responsiveness 
Klibi et al. (2010), described responsiveness as the capability of a supply chain system to 
respond positively to disturbances, and the development of this capability can be either 
redundancy or flexibility based. It provides a barrier against threats and risks, so as to increase 
the expected value of supply chain networks (Klibi et al., 2010). Thus, responsiveness is 
regarded as an important factor contributing to the resilience of supply networks (Klibi & 
Martel, 2012). Similar to redundancy, responsiveness factors of a system may also increase the 
costs although it is able to improve the service level of a system. 
 Rapidity 
Rapidity is a well-studied concept in the “resilience triangle”, a framework that has been 
applied in civil infrastructure for decades. It contains a hidden meaning of recovery, but with 
an emphasis on the speed to recover.  
2.4.3 Research Methods Applied in Resilience Studies 
The dominant research methods considered in the literature review are surveys, case study, 
conceptual work, mathematical modelling, simulation and others (e.g. Wacker, 1998; Woo et 
al., 2011; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). A survey aims to study the sampling of individual units 
on a specific topic. It is a commonly used method to collect required information which 
generally can be done through the questionnaire and the interview. A case study is an in-depth 
investigation of a particular person, community or situation. Research conducted through 
surveys or case studies belongs to empirical research (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). The 
conceptual work category here is rather broad, including analysis on concept issues such as 
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definitions, properties, theoretical framework and conceptual modelling. While, being different 
to the conceptual modelling, papers under mathematical modelling refer to those applying 
mathematical concepts and language to describe and represent objective reality. A simulation 
method is used to study the operation of a real-world or a theoretical process/system under 
various pre-set circumstances for different purposes (e.g. numerical testing, observing 
behaviour, optimising performance, or exploration of new states). The category of ‘others’ 
encompasses archival analysis, literature review, and perspectives from industries, etc. The 
number of investigated papers with respect to different research methods is depicted in Figure 
2.5. Empirical studies are further analysed in Table 2.3 in order to provide helpful insights into 
the potential applications of transportation resilience in practice. 
 
Figure 2.5. Distribution of investigated papers by research methods 
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Table 2.3. Overview of empirical research on transportation resilience 
Author(s) Year Country Methodology 
Application 
fields 
Research objectives Disturbances 
Gomes et al.  2009 Brazil Survey 
Helicopter 
transportation 
To discover transport system resilience in terms of 
workload demands and economic pressures. 
Constraints of daily 
operations 
Berle et al. 2011 
USA & 
Panama 
Survey 
Maritime 
transportation 
To provide matrices of the key functions of maritime 
transportation systems. 
Failures 
Adams et al. 2012 USA Case study 
Road 
transportation 
To present a set of criteria to qualify the computed 
resilience measures. 
Disruptive weather 
events 
Nursey-Bray et 
al. 
2013 Australia Survey Port 
To evaluate and learn from practices relating to climate 
change preparedness within Australian ports.  
Climate change 
Bruyelle et al.  2014 UK Case study Metro system 
To propose improvements to the design of metro 
systems, and to improve the management of emergency 
situations. 
Terrorist attacks 
Chang et al.  2014 Canada Survey 
Infrastructure 
system 
To develop a practical approach to characterise 
communities’ infrastructure vulnerability and resilience 
in disasters. 
Earthquake & flood 
Becker et al. 2015 USA Survey Port 
To investigate how port stakeholders consider the 
impacts of storms on seaport’s vulnerability and 
address the concerns  
Storm 
Becker & 
Caldwell  
2015 USA Survey Port 
To identify strategies which can improve the port’s 
resilience from a practice perspective. 
Storm 
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Based on the above review, it can be concluded that a resilient MCSC is well-organised with 
the ability to maintain its basic structure and function, and recover to a required level of 
service/performance within an acceptable time and costs after the failure of one or more 
components. 
2.5 Research gaps 
Although the risk assessment of the MCSCs has been given attention by academics and 
practitioners, the research of comprehensive performance evaluation of MCSCs from a 
systematic view is still a fertile area emerging from growing challenges and the fact that a very 
limited amount of research actually specifies this issue in literature, as well as in practice. The 
specific research gaps are concluded as follows: 
(1) Identification of risk factors is an essential step to produce a list of risks in order to 
manage them well. Although some good insight has been provided by these studies in terms of 
the identification of risk factors in the container shipping industry, special attention is usually 
drawn on some particular aspects such as human factors (e.g. Lu and Shang, 2005; Yang et al., 
2013a; Xi et al., 2017), operational factors (e.g. Chang et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2013b; and 
2014), and shipping security-related political factors (e.g. Yang, 2010; Yeo et al., 2014). Thus, 
risk factors were identified at segment levels, and the attention that is given to systematic 
identification of all possible risk factors faced by an MCSC is scarce. Moreover, the increasing 
complexity of modern MCSCs has given birth to some emerging risk factors which have been 
seldom investigated in previous studies such as climate change and refugee immigrant issues. 
Their influence (especial long-term influence) on MCSCs also deserves attention.  
(2) A broad literature review shows that most of the previous studies on supply chain risk 
assessments paid special attention to the occurrence probability of an event and the severity of 
the consequences (e.g. Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Chang, Xu and 
Song, 2014), leaving the other features of risk not being fully explored during the risk analysis 
of complicated supply chain systems. Relying only on two basic risk parameters (i.e. 
probability and consequence) will inevitably lead to the loss of useful information in risk 
analysis, and more importantly, it cannot really distinguish the safety levels of different risks 
when the investigated chains are large and complicated, presenting hundreds of different risk 
events. Moreover, the existing risk assessment methods more or less showed some drawbacks 
in the industrial applications (e.g. Gaudenzi and Borghesi, 2006; Pujawan and Geraldin, 2009; 
Samvedi, Jain, and Chan, 2013), especially for the quantitative analysis of maritime risks under 
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a highly uncertain environment. This calls for more suitable risk assessment method that is able 
to process different types of information from multiple sources in a consistent manner, to deal 
with the uncertainties in risk inputs, and to provide accurate results while maintaining a certain 
degree of visibility, transparency, as well as easiness to operate. 
(3) The majority of the current research focused on the risk management of a separated 
segment of MCSCs (e.g. port operation and maritime transportation), without the consideration 
of the specific role that the investigated part plays in the whole supply chain system (Soner, 
Asan and Celik, 2015; Alyami et al., 2016; Cui, Wan et al., 2017; Wang and Ma, 2017; Yan et 
al., 2017). This may lead to the suboptimal solutions in terms of risk prevention and control, 
as it is often the case that the riskiest component within a system does not necessarily mean 
that it also has the most impact on the system performance. Thus, both the local risk condition 
of an MCSC and its impact on the whole supply network need to be considered in order to 
obtain more rational and accurate results. 
The identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of additional work that are 
presented below: 
 A holistic framework of risk factor identification 
A holistic framework of risk factor identification is required to capture a more exhaustive 
variety of risks under a broader context and extends the risk factor identification and analysis 
from segment to system levels. 
 Advanced risk assessment methods under uncertain environment 
Advanced and novel risk assessment methods need to be able to process different types of 
information (e.g. quantitative and qualitative, subjective and objective) from multiple sources 
in a consistent manner and to provide accurate results while maintaining a certain degree of 
visibility, transparency, as well as easiness to operate. 
 Comprehensive and systematic performance evaluation methods  
It is important and necessary to take into consideration the weight and influence of each 
MCSC with the entire supply network so as to realise a comprehensive performance evaluation 
of MCSCs from a systematic perspective. 
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CHAPTER 3 - IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS 
INFLUENCING THE PERFORMANCE OF 
MARITIME CONTAINER SUPPLY CHAINS 
Summary 
In this chapter, the definition and classification of supply chain risks are comprehensively 
reviewed in order to provide a reference for the understanding and identification of risk factors 
in MCSCs. Based on the novel framework for risk classification proposed in this chapter, 
distinct risk factors in MCSCs, and those of general supply chains are identified and validated 
by incorporating domain experts’ perceptions. Moreover, an empirical study on the assessment 
of all identified risk factors is conducted using the data collected from a large-scale 
questionnaire survey. The survey was carried about by different groups of maritime 
stakeholders, who own the world leading commercial container fleets and container ports. By 
doing so, this chapter tries to extend the risk analysis from segment to system levels and realises 
the hazard identification and risk analysis of different MCSC nodes (e.g. ports) and links (e.g. 
multi-modal transport) on the same plate so that they can be better understood and managed 
from a supply chain perspective. Those risk factors with relatively higher importance are 
selected for further assessment in the next chapter. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Various kinds of risk factors may appear at different stages of container shipping operations, 
such as fluctuation of fuel price (Notteboom, 2006), dynamic customer demands (Das and 
Dutta, 2013), political instability (Vilko et al., 2016), and transportation accidents (Vernimmen 
et al., 2007), which will result in different types of risks that hinder the safe and efficient 
operations of an MCSC. For instance, on 21 February 2010, a container ship of 657 TEU 
capsized and foundered after leaving the Port of Vieux-Fort on St Lucia in the Carribean. It 
was investigated that the accident was caused by insufficient stability resulting from the 
improper loading and stowage of containers (RINA, 2017). A post-Panamax container ship 
called MOL Comfort broke in two due to bad weather on its way from Singapore to Saudi 
Arabia, losing 4,382 containers in the accident on 17 June 2013 (Gaidai et al., 2018). On 12 
August 2015, a series of explosions occurred at a container storage station at the Port of Tianjin, 
China. Altogether 173 people were killed, and 797 were injured in the accident, causing a direct 
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economic loss of 6.86 billion Chinese Yuan (equivalent to more than 1 billion USD), and severe 
environmental damage as well (BBC, 2015). The above evidence shows that risk studies of 
MCSCs are necessary and urgent. However current literature reveals that most hazards and/or 
risk factors are still dealt with at individual segment levels of MCSCs (e.g. port and container 
shipping), leading to their importance not being measured at the same plate and safety resources 
not being rationalised from a global system perspective. It shows there is a research gap to be 
filled, particularly given the increased number of container transport accidents along with the 
fast growth of containerised multi-modal transportation in MCSCs. 
Analysis of risk factors is critical to the success of effective risk management, as it can help 
identify the hazards/threats a company is facing with priority, understand where a risk may 
emanate from, and evaluate how much a company is exposed to uncertainties, so that rational 
mitigation strategies can be developed to ensure the performance of a whole supply chain. This 
work for the first time uses a uniform scale to evaluate the existent and emerging risk factors 
influencing MCSCs as a whole on the same measurement scales so that they can be better 
managed from a systematic level. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature 
concerning the classification of supply chain risks. Section 3.3 introduces the methods used in 
this study for the identification, measurement and validation of risk factors. A novel framework 
for risk classification is proposed in Section 3.4, along with all risk factors identified based on 
the proposed classification framework. Section 3.5 describes empirical investigation and 
analysis of risk factors based on the descriptive statistical analysis and a risk matrix method. 
The research results, implications, and this chapter are concluded in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Review of Classification of Supply Chain Risks  
As the start point of the traditional risk management process, risk classification and 
identification have been extensively discussed within the context of supply chains. The 
classification process clarifies the relationships among different risk sources and the relevant 
dimensions of potential disruptions in a supply chain as well, providing a basis for the 
identification of risk factors and the follow-up assessment. Various ways of sorting risk sources 
coexist. One of the most basic and straightforward ways is to classify risks into two categories, 
which are internal and external risks. For instance, Kumar et al. (2010) argued that internal 
risks arose due to improper coordination among different levels, including factors like demand, 
production, and supply risks. External risks usually resulted from interactions between a supply 
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chain and its environment, comprising factors such as terrorist attacks, natural hazards, and 
exchange rate fluctuations. In a review of enterprise risk management, Olson and Wu (2010) 
pointed out that internal risks contained those from available capacity, internal operations, and 
information systems, while external risks evolved from nature, political systems, competitors, 
and markets. Another similar method was to classify risks on their endogenous and exogenous 
origins, depending upon whether the risk source lay within or beyond the supply chain 
boundaries. Examples were found in Trkman and McCormack (2009), Wagner and Neshat 
(2012), and Vilko et al. (2016). Other binary classification methods included those considering, 
for example, operational and disruption risks (Tang 2006), quantitative and qualitative risks 
(Svensson, 2000), macro- and micro-risks (Ho et al. 2015), and systematic and non-systematic 
risks (Baghalian et al., 2013). It is worth noting that, in general, different interconnected 
organisations/companies are involved in a supply chain. Therefore, endogenous risk sources 
were further distinguished as “beyond company borders” and “corporate-wide” sources by 
Götze and Mikus (2007). In this way, supply chain risks can be divided into three categories 
(Jüttner et al., 2003), which were environmental risks, network-related risks, and organisational 
risks. Organisational risks were those that lay inside the organisational boundaries, whereas 
network-related risks were from interactions between organisations and other partners within 
the same supply chain. Environment risks comprised uncertainties existing in the external 
environment. An illustration is shown in Figure 3.1. Another classification of supply chain 
risks which had also attracted a lot of attention addressed risk factors from the perspective of 
three main logistics flows, namely, physical/material flow, information flow, and 
financial/payment flow (Chopra and Meindl, 2010). On the basis of Tang’s (2006) research, 
Tang and Musa (2011) identified supply chain risks in terms of material, information and 
financial flows. In the study, material flow risks were investigated from the stages of the source, 
production and delivery. Financial flow risks involved exchange rate risk, price and cost risk, 
financial strength of supply chain partners, and financial handling and practice. Risk factors 
related to information flows lay in information accuracy, information system security and 
disruption, intellectual property, and information outsourcing. In a similar way, a risk analysis 
for container shipping operations was carried out by  Chang, Xu and Song (2015), who 
considered that risk elements associated with information flow were information delay, 
inaccurate information, and IT failure, whereas main risk elements in a physical flow contained 
transportation delay and cargo/asset loss or damage, and risk elements related to a payment 
flow included currency exchange, payment delay, and non-payment. These risk elements were 
further analysed, and finally, 35 risk factors were identified. Additional risk classification 
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methods were found in previous studies that categorised supply chain risks according to their 
influence on supply chain performance, controllability of risks, roles within a supply chain, 
and uncertain parameters in relation to supply chain activities (Cavinato, 2004; Bogataj and 
Bogataj, 2007; Blackhurst et al., 2008; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Tang and Tomlin, 2008; 
Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011; Samvedi et al., 2013; Martino et al., 2017), to name just a few.  
 
Environmental risk sources
Network-related risk sources
Organisational risk sources
 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of risk sources in supply chains 
Source: adapted from Jüttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) 
 
However, most of the research related to the risk identification, assessment, and 
management is usually conducted either from a perspective of the entire supply chain, or with 
focus on a specific function or a part of a supply chain (such as container terminal operations, 
container shipping, or land transportation) without considering the influence from its 
upstream/downstream within the whole supply chain from a systematic viewpoint. By 
incorporating multiple dimensional risk classification methods, MCSC risks are classified into 
two main groups composed of five major risk sources (Zhang et al., 2014). Refer to Section 
3.4 for detailed information. 
3.3 Methodology for Data Collection and Analysis 
In this section, a detailed explanation of data collection and analysis methods applied in this 
chapter will be presented associated with the risk analysis process. To identify and understand 
the risk factors existing in the MCSCs, qualitative methods are involved to collect and examine 
risk data, along with justification due to the lack of standardised statistics data for most of the 
risk factors and a variety of uncertainties existing in daily operations of MCSCs. The first sub-
 46 
 
section introduces the data collection methods in the phase of risk factor identification and 
validation. The second sub-section describes the data collection methods in the measurement 
of verified risk factors. The last sub-section introduces the data analysis methods with emphasis 
on the risk matrix approach, and the method for the validation of collected data is also discussed 
in this sub-section.  
3.3.1 Data Collection Method in Risk Factors Identification and Validation  
3.3.1.1 Identification of Risk Factors 
Several common methods for systematically identifying risk factors are the flowchart 
method, review of accident statistics, analysis of corporate records and documents, risk 
questionnaire, and risk surveys (Yang, 2010). Waters (2007) also suggested other tools that can 
be used in the risk factor identification including document review, interviews, and group 
meetings. 
Generally, the identification of risk factors can be separated into two distinct phases, i.e. 
initial risk factor identification, and on-going risk factor identification. In the first stage, a 
framework for risk factor classification is proposed from a systematic perspective. Based on 
that, all possible risk factors related to each aspect of an MCSC system are identified through 
reviewing relevant literature (A detailed introduction of the framework and all identified risk 
factors will be presented in Section 3.4). The second step is necessary as it helps to 1)  identify 
new risk factors which did not previously arise, 2)  recognise changes in existing risk factors, 
and 3) exclude risk factors which did exist but now do not directly influence our system 
anymore. Several studies have also used a literature review to identify risk factors, e.g., Yang 
(2011) and Chang, Xu and Song (2014). 
3.3.1.2 Validation of Risk Factors 
Given the difference between academic studies and industrial applications, as well as 
potential ambiguities when presenting those risk factors, it is necessary and helpful to involve 
judgements from experts who are most familiar with conditions to validate the identified risk 
factors. Based on the review of previous studies, considering the complex degree of MCSC 
systems and the reliability of data collected from the experts’ survey, this thesis uses the Delphi 
method to validate the identified risk factors and explore other potential ones.  
The Delphi method is a structured communication technique which relies on the results of 
questionnaires sent to a panel of experts. Normally, several rounds of questionnaires need to 
be sent out, and an anonymous summary of responses from previous rounds as well as the 
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reasons they provided for their judgements are aggregated and shared with the group after each 
round. The experts are allowed to revise their earlier answers in subsequent rounds according 
to the replies of other members of the panel. Since multiple rounds of questions are undertaken, 
and the panel is advised on what the group thinks as a whole, the Delphi method is believed to 
be able to obtain a reliable and consistent response to a problem from a group of experts through 
consensus. It is well suited, as a research instrument, to model incomplete knowledge 
(Skulmosji et al., 2007). It thus especially works well in this study given the uncertainties of 
various risk factors and the complexity of an MCSC system. As a flexible research approach, 
Delphi-based methods have been successfully used in industrial risk management, particularly 
in the identification of risk factors where subjective inputs are largely depended on (e.g. 
Chapman, 1998; Markmann et al., 2013; Qureshi et al., 2014).  
Different Delphi processes have been introduced and applied (Linstone and Turloff, 1975). 
According to the specific research background and objectives in our research, a brief flow chart 
of the main processes of the Delphi method is shown in Figure 3.2, while the specific steps 
applied in this study are introduced as follows. The Delphi expert survey started in January 
2017, and it took three months to reach the final results of accepted consensus. 
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Figure 3.2. Flowchart of the Delphi process 
Source: author 
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 Step 1: Define the problem 
Research questions are generally derived in accordance with the main research purpose. In 
this study, we aim to propose a classification framework for the identification of risk factors in 
MCSCs from a systematic perspective, and to identify relevant risk factors and evaluate their 
risk levels. Thus, two issues that need to be dealt with through the Delphi method are 1) 
establishment of a classification framework, and 2) exploration and validation of risk factors 
in an MCSC. It is worth noting that before all questions are finalised for the formal Delphi 
expert survey, a pilot study is firstly conducted to identify the possible ambiguities and 
vagueness in the designed questions. Based on the results and comments of participants in the 
pilot survey, the invitation letter of the survey is improved, and the layout of the questionnaire 
is modified to provide a clearer instruction. 
 Step 2: Research sample 
Selecting research participants is a critical component of the Delphi method since it is their 
expert opinions that contribute to the final outputs of the Delphi survey (Skulmosji et al., 2007). 
In terms of the sample selection of the Delphi survey in this study, 28 experts from different 
countries were contacted. Ten of them from eight organisations replied to the authors within 
the given time window (from 2 to 29 January 2017), showing their willingness to serve as a 
member of the Delphi expert group in this work. The profile information of selected 
participants is listed in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Profile of participants in Delphi expert group 
No 
Type of 
organisation 
Year of 
working 
Department/ 
professional area 
Position Country 
1 University* 32 
International shipping 
business management 
Professor China 
2 University* 26 
Supply chain management 
marketing and operations 
Professor UK 
3 
Port 
authority 
21 
Port safety and operation 
management 
Senior officer 
Saudi 
Arabia 
4 
Maritime 
authority 
27 
Maritime transportation, 
environment, and energy 
Senior advisor USA 
5 
Maritime 
authority 
33 
Maritime safety and waterway 
traffic accident investigation 
Senior marine 
investigator 
China 
6 
Shipping 
company 
25 Contract logistics Senior manager China 
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7 
Shipping 
company 
27 
Supply chain development and 
project management 
Senior manager 
Singapo
re 
8 
Shipping 
company 
27 Marketing and sales Vice present China 
9 
Shipping 
company 
29 Marine operating centre Senior captain China 
10 
Shipping 
company 
26 
Container ships more than 
10,000 TEU 
Senior captain China 
* Both of them also had rich working experience in the container shipping industry. 
A single panel of experts with different backgrounds (for example, academics, industry 
experts, and administrators) was selected in this study for the completeness of the judgements 
from different stakeholders’ perspectives. Their professional areas are balanced in the Delphi 
expert group, thus being able to reasonably represent a general understanding of an MCSC and 
provide reliable outputs. The ten participants are from one university in China, one university 
in the UK, one port authority in Saudi Arabia, one maritime authority in the USA, one maritime 
authority in China, one shipping company in Singapore, and two shipping companies in China. 
Besides, it is worth noting that these three shipping companies are among the top ten container 
shipping companies in the world. In addition, they all have rich working experience in 
container shipping or related industries/research, taking a relatively senior position in the field.  
 Step 3: Round one Delphi expert survey  
In the first round survey, some semi-structured questions are developed to collect opinions 
on the rationality of the risk factor classification structure and the identified risk factors. We 
can then figure out whether the structure of the framework for risk factor categorisation is 
appropriate, whether these identified risk factors really exist, and whether there are any other 
risk factors that should also be considered. The questionnaire is distributed to the ten Delphi 
participants separately, and they are given four weeks to return their comments. During the 
defined period, they can revise their responses at any time, and they are also encouraged to 
attach reasons why these changes are made. The questionnaire for the first round Delphi expert 
survey is listed in Appendix One. 
 Step 4: Round two Delphi expert survey 
All opinions of the participants from the first round survey are summarised, based on which 
some modifications are made to the initially proposed framework and identified risk factors. 
The main changes lie in the structure of the framework for risk factor classification. Besides, 
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some risk factors are modified/deleted, and new ones are added.  The round-two questionnaire 
is developed according to the responses from round one and then released to each participant 
in the Delphi expert group.  
In the second round survey, the participants are first given the opportunity to check if their 
responses in round one indeed reflect their opinions and then asked to evaluate the extent to 
which they agree with (if not agree, explain the reason) the changes made in the previous survey 
in this round. This process may be repeated several times until the convergence on the 
agreement degree of the participants is obtained. A time limit of two weeks is set for the second 
round survey since all participants had already been familiar with the study, and this process 
would not take as much time as the previous one. Again, a similar process of analysis is 
conducted based on all responses from the second round survey. 
 Step 5: Round three Delphi expert survey     
The statements that do not reach the consensus from the last round will be reformulated 
based on panel comments and included in the next round. The round-three questionnaire is 
developed according to the responses of all participants from the second round and then is 
distributed to each participant. Again, these participants are given the opportunity to change 
their answers and to comment on the emerging and modified risk factors according to other 
participants. In this study, the round three Delphi expert survey is the final one. According to 
their feedback, the consensus from the majority of participants in the expert panel on the 
structure of the framework for risk factors classification and the identified risk factors is 
reached. 
 Step 6: Verify and document research results  
For the validation purpose, a revision report generated from the three-round Delphi survey 
is sent to each Delphi expert. The revision report presents the difference between the original 
statement and the modified one in terms of the structure of the framework for risk factor 
classification and the identified risk factors, along with the reasons for all the modifications (as 
shown in Appendix Two). No more modification is needed according to the experts’ feedback, 
revealing an acceptable consensus level of their opinions on the results. 
In this study, the research steps are developed based on the distinct phases introduced by 
Linstone and Turloff (1975) which have proven to be reliable over the years. Moreover, a 
sufficient number of participants who have an academic, industrial or administrative 
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background are chosen and involved in a three-round Delphi survey. All the participants have 
rich working experience (more than twenty years) in container shipping or related 
industries/research areas with a senior position in their fields. In addition, a pilot survey is 
conducted to improve the quality of the questionnaire. Thus, the validity and reliability of the 
Delphi expert survey are guaranteed.  
3.3.2 Data Collection Method in Risk Factors Measurement  
Measurement of risk factors is usually conducted in a quantitative way to provide the 
reference needed for decision making, and two parameters that have widely been used for 
quantifying risks are 1) the occurrence likelihood of a risk event, and 2) the consequence 
severity when it occurs. However, it is worth noting that likelihood and consequence are just 
two considerations among many factors when conducting a risk analysis in practice (Waters, 
2007).  
In this chapter, a questionnaire survey with a Likert scale is used to gather information in 
the MCSC domain due to the lack of accurate industry-specific risk data.  Based on the results 
of the Delphi expert survey, the questionnaire is constructed comprising of six major parts: the 
respondents’ profile, the measurement of risk factors associated with society, the measurement 
of risk factors associated with natural environment, the measurement of risk factors associated 
with management, the measurement of risk factors associated with infrastructure and 
technology,  and the measurement of risk factors associated with operations (see the whole 
questionnaire in Appendix Three). The questionnaire is designed to elicit expert opinions on 
the identified risk factors in terms of occurrence likelihood and consequence severity. In order 
to collect data suitable for a 7×4 risk matrix as suggested by IMO (2002) in maritime-related 
research, different categories of occurrence likelihood and consequence severity are applied in 
this thesis, illustrated as follows. 
 The occurrence likelihood  
The occurrence likelihood of a risk factor means how likely it is that the risk factor will 
occur, represented by the frequency of it occurring at a certain time period or the probability it 
occurs, according to the certain circumstance under investigation. Thus, the value of occurrence 
likelihood is located between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that it will never happen while 1 means 
it will definitely happen. However, it is not always possible to propose an accurate numerical 
value for the occurrence likelihood of each risk factor in practice, and thus the linguistic terms 
are usually used to describe the occurrence likelihood. In this thesis, a questionnaire with a 
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Likert seven-point scale is used to collect the occurrence likelihood of a risk factor within the 
MCSCs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are used to represent the likelihood of occurrence of a risk factor 
in an increasing order, in which 1 is for “Extremely Rare”, 2 for “Rare”, 3 for “Unlikely”, 4 for 
“Possible”, 5 for “Likely”, 6 for “Frequent”, and 7 for “Very Frequent”. The definition of the 
occurrence likelihood of a risk factor is further illustrated in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Definitions of the occurrence likelihood of a risk factor (Alyami et al., 2014) 
Likelihood Likert scale Definition 
Extremely Rare 1 Has never or rarely happened 
Rare 2 
Not expected to occur for a few years; 
May only occur in exceptional circumstances 
Unlikely 3 Trivial likelihood, however, could occur at some time 
Possible 4 
Might occur at some time; 
Expected to occur every few months 
Likely 5 
Will probably occur in most circumstances; 
Expected to occur at least monthly 
Frequent 6 Expected to occur at least weekly 
Very Frequent 7 
Can be expected to occur in most circumstances; 
Occur daily 
 
 The consequence severity  
The consequence severity refers to the magnitude of the possible effect when a risk event 
occurs. It can be measured from a variety of aspects such as health impacts, service 
interruptions, reputation issues, objective failures, etc. For example, the consequence of a risk 
event in engineering domains is usually estimated involving injuries/fatalities, property loss, 
and/or environmental damage. While, in the risk management of a supply chain, the 
consequence is normally measured considering time, cost, and quality (Vilko and Hallikas, 
2012). To describe the degree of consequence, different categories of linguistic terms have 
been proposed such as “no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic” (Cox, 
2008), “negligible, marginal, moderate, critical, and catastrophic” (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 
2008), and “low impact, medium impact, and high impact” (Alyami et al., 2014). In this thesis, 
a questionnaire with Likert four-point scale is used to collect judgements on the consequence 
severity of each risk factor, and the four linguistic grades are represented with a score of 1, 2, 
3, and 4, respectively. The definition of different levels of risk consequence is illustrated in 
Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3. Definitions of the consequence severity when a risk factor occurs (Hu et al., 2007) 
Consequence 
severity 
Likert 
scale 
Definition 
Minor 1 
Cause some inconvenience with minor impacts such as small 
cost/schedule increase. 
Moderate 2 
Cause some disruptions with medium impacts such as moderate cost 
increase, delay, and minor environmental damage. 
Severe 3 
Cause some disruptions, or sometimes failures with severe impacts 
such as major cost increase, major environmental damage or injuries 
Catastrophic 4 
Cause complete and irrecoverable failures (thus the minimum 
requirements cannot be achieved), long-term environmental damage, 
or death 
 
The questionnaires for the measurement of risk factors are developed in English at the early 
stage and translated into Chinese. The target sample for the questionnaire survey is selected 
from the top ten shipping companies in China (and their branch companies worldwide), 
shipping agencies, freight forwarders, maritime safety administrations, port authorities, and 
other organisations related to the container shipping industry. Several questionnaires are sent 
to the relevant departments of each company in person or through emails. The questionnaire is 
also coded to an online questionnaire via e-survey creator 
(https://www.diaochapai.com/survey2539536) to ensure that more validated participants can 
be involved in the questionnaire survey easily. 
3.3.3 Data Analysis and Validation  
3.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
After having collected all data needed for the measurement of risk factors, a descriptive 
statistics analysis will be conducted to present the respondents’ profile of the questionnaire. 
Descriptive statistics analysis is a method to quantitatively describe or summarise features of a 
collection of data, and present the processed data in the form of a table or chart, so that the 
meaningful information we need can be revealed. Attributes that are commonly used in 
descriptive statistics analysis include, but are not limited to, the minimum and maximum values, 
standard deviation (SD), mean value, percentage, and frequency. Moreover, there are also tools 
that can be used to present the statistics in a more intuitive way, such as histogram, polygon, 
pie chart, etc. In this thesis, the percentage, mean value, and standard deviation are the three 
main features used in the descriptive statistics analysis, and these features are shown by using 
tables. 
3.3.3.2 Risk Scale Analysis 
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 Risk calculation 
In practice, it is necessary and important to know which risk factors are the most serious so 
as to optimise the risk management with limited resources. The level of risk can be calculated 
by the following formula (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Chang, Xu and 
Song, 2015): 
Risk = probability × consequence    Eq. 3.1 
In which, the probability may also be presented as frequency or likelihood, while the 
consequence may be expressd using severity, impact, or loss. In this thesis, the risk scale of 
each risk factor in MCSCs is defined as: 
Risk = occurrence likelihood × consequence severity  Eq. 3.2 
As a key step to perform risk analysis, calculating the risk level for each risk factor over all 
respondents enables the comparison of their relative importance. Given that the risk level is 
determined by the likelihood and the consequence, there are two main methods that can be 
considered to calculate the risk level with multiple expert judgements (Chang, Xu and Song, 
2015). The first method is to multiply the average value of likelihood over all respondents with 
that of consequence for each risk factor, while, the second method is to average the risk levels 
of each risk factor obtained from each individual over all the respondents.  
Three pieces of resulting information can be obtained from the first method, which are an 
average likelihood, an average consequence, and the risk level calculated based on the previous 
two. These results are easy to be applied and mapped in the risk matrix as all three are necessary. 
However, one major disadvantage of this method lies in the way of approaching the final risk 
level of each risk factor. In the first method, the likelihood from one respondent is multiplied 
by the consequence from other respondents, which may distort the results. Compared to that, 
the second method is more reliable and reasonable in terms of the calculation of risk level, as 
the risk level is obtained firstly considering each respondent’s judgement independently, and 
then finalised by averaging the results from all respondents. However, it suffers from the 
deficiency that it only provides the overall results of risk levels without the corresponding 
information on risk likelihood and consequence. Therefore, a risk matrix approach is applied 
in this thesis in order to benefit from both of the risk calculation methods by introducing 
logarithms into the measurement of likelihood and consequence. 
 Risk matrix  
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A risk matrix has been widely used in various areas to evaluate risk factors in a quantitative 
way. A risk matrix table is composed of two dimensions - one vertical dimension consisting of 
several likelihood categories, and one horizontal dimension made up of several consequence 
categories. In this thesis, seven categories are developed for likelihood, and four for 
consequence, which are associated with the Likert scales set in the risk factor questionnaire, as 
shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, respectively. Based on that, a 7×4 risk matrix can be 
constructed. As recommended by the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2002), the 
likelihood and consequence indices are defined on a logarithmic scale to facilitate the ranking 
and validation of ranking. Consequently, Eq. 3.3 can be obtained. 
Log (Risk) = Log (occurrence likelihood) + Log (consequence severity)   Eq. 3.3 
Then, the Risk Index (RI) is established by adding the Likelihood Index (LI) and 
Consequence Index (CI) (Wang and Foinikis, 2001). 
Risk Index = Likelihood Index + Severity Index    Eq. 3.4 
In this way, the average risk level of each risk factor obtained from either of the above-
mentioned methods will be the same due to the associative law of addition (which can be seen 
from Eq. 3.5.). To classify the risk levels and quantitatively compare the importance of each 
risk factor, the Average Risk Index (ARI) is defined in this paper, which can be calculated using 
Eq. 3.5. 
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Where, M is the number of risk factors, and N is the number of the respondent. rLI is the 
average Likelihood Index of the rth risk factor, and rSI is the average Severity Index of the rth 
risk factor. LIri is the Likelihood Index of the r
th risk factor by the ith respondent, while SIri is 
the Severity Index of the rth risk factor by the ith respondent. Both of them are obtained through 
questionnaires as described in Section 3.3.2.  
According to the numerical risk outcomes, identified risk factors can generally be classified 
into three or four different risk categories (Markowski and Mannan, 2008). In this work, four 
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risk categories are defiend to support a more flexible and reasonable decision-making process 
in risk management. The risk levels can be determined according to the ARI value of each risk 
factor. They are, a) low-risk level, in which ARI∈ [1, 4) and is coloured in green. Risk factors 
of this level have a minor impact on an MCSC which can be ignored, and thus no further action 
needs to be taken by managers; b) low-moderate level, ARI ∈ [4, 6), in yellow colour; c) high-
moderate level, ARI ∈ [6, 8), in orange colour. Both levels belong to a moderate risk level, to 
which certain attention needs to be paid. According to the ALARP principle, risk reduction 
measures are needed until they are no longer reasonable according to the cost-benefit analysis; 
and d) high-risk level, where ARI∈ [8, 10], and it is represented in red colour. Risk factors 
falling into this region have high occurrence likelihood with serious consequences, which will 
severely influence the whole supply chain. Thus, they have to be either forbidden or reduced 
to an acceptable risk level. The risk matrix method and the associated risk classifications are 
employed in a combined way in this work, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
SI
LI
ARI
 
Figure 3.3. Category of risk levels in the risk matrix 
Source: Developed by authors based on Wang and Foinikis (2001) 
3.3.3.3 Validity and Reliability Test 
A validity test aims to examine whether the study measures what it purports to measure, 
which normally can be improved by, for example, conducting an exhaustive literature review, 
incorporating expert opinions, and modifying the questionnaire according to the results of pilot 
test survey (Davis, 2000). Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of the results 
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obtained. It is important to the validity of a questionnaire, but not a sufficient condition. The 
reliability test of the collected data can be carried out by using Cronbach's Alpha method with 
Eq. 3.6 (Cohen and Swerdlik, 2010). 
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Where, the K indicates the number of questions in the survey, 2
X   means the variance of 
the total sample, 2
iY
 is the variance of the current question, and i represents the ith question. 
Examination of the Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardised Items can be achieved by Eq. 3.7. 
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Where,   indicates the mean of the non-redundant correlation coefficients. 
3.4 Risk Factor Classification and Identification  
3.4.1 Framework for Risk Classification in Maritime Container Supply Chains 
Based on a systematic review of the previous studies (e.g., Shashank and Goldsby, 2009; 
Acciaro and Serra, 2013; Ho et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2016) and an in-depth discussion with 
domain experts through the Delphi survey,  the framework for risk factors classification is 
proposed, as shown in Figure 3.4. It is a top-down structure framework, which helps to clarify 
the relationships among different risk sources step by step. It provides the basis for the 
identification of risk factors. It is composed of four levels (Level I, II, III, and IV). Level I, as 
the starting point, presents the purpose of this study, that is, to classify risk factors within 
MCSCs rationally. Level II divides all possible risk factors into two general categories, which 
are external risks and internal risks. The external risks usually result from an interaction 
between a supply chain and its environment, while internal risks arise due to improper 
coordination among different levels within a supply chain. In the next level, five main risk 
perspectives are identified from external and internal environments respectively, which are 
society, natural environment, management, infrastructure and technology, and operations. 
However, society offers a relatively broad concept comprising of a variety of human-related 
activities which may not be enough to support a specific risk factor identification. In view of 
this, society is further subdivided as economic environment (Heckmann et al., 2015), political 
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environment (Yang, 2011), and security (Yang, 2010). Similarly, management and operations 
are also expanded, making up Level III. Such new developments in MCSC risk classification 
are supported by the Delphi expert group. Finally, 64 risk factors in Level IV are identified 
with respect to the risk perspectives (which will be discussed group by group in detail in Section 
3.4.2) based on all risk sources identified from the upper level. 
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Figure 3.4. Framework for risk classification in MCSCs
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3.4.2 Identification of Risk Factors in Maritime Container Supply Chains 
Based on the framework proposed in the last section, the identification of risk factors in 
MCSCs was achieved through two main steps in this thesis. Firstly, a systematic review of 
relevant literature on risks associated with the MCSC processes was conducted to provide 
critical insights into the investigated risk factors in previous studies. In order to make the risk 
identification comprehensively, apart from the existing studies on risks in container shipping, 
the risks in a general supply chain were also included to be the background of risk identification. 
After that, a Delphi expert survey was conducted (as described in Section 3.3.1) to facilitate 
proper and comprehensive risk factor identification from industry practice. With the assistance 
of experience and knowledge from domain experts, all the risk factors identified in the literature 
review were confirmed. In addition, a number of risk factors that have not been addressed in 
previous studies were suggested by them. All the identified risk factors are discussed according 
to the sources in the following subsections. 
3.4.2.1 Risk Factors Associated with Society 
In this thesis, society belongs to a kind of external environment an MCSC relies on, where 
human activities are usually involved. In general, it can be divided into three categories, which 
are economic environment, political environment, and security. Each of them influences the 
performance and safety of MCSCs in different aspects. 
The economic environment consists of factors in a business market that can influence a 
container shipping business directly or indirectly. Some factors may affect the business 
decision making on the part of the participants, such as turbulent shipping markets, and 
competition (Notteboom, 2004; Vilko et al., 2016). While, some will affect an entire economy 
and all of the participants invloved in an MCSC, such as the financial crisis, interest rates, and 
exchange rates (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Samvedi, Jain and Chan, 2013; Chang, Xu and Song, 
2015). These factors will affect the price and investment, which increase the uncertainties in 
MCSC operations. Oil price is also an important risk factor to be considered, as bunker fuel 
makes up more than 75 per cent of the operating cost (Chang, Xu and Song, 2015).  
The political environment is a critical concern for global trade, as government actions will 
inevitably affect the operations of a company or business on different levels. In this category, 
four main risk factors are identified, which are trade policy instability, maritime security 
initiatives, regulations and measures, and regional political conflicts (Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011; Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Samvedi, Jain and Chan, 2013; Vilko et al., 2016). 
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Security mainly refers to the potential threats to MCSCs, which may result from malicious 
acts or other unpredictable events. Security risks not only worry supply chain managers, but 
also bring trouble to the public. Terrorism is one of the factors that has been studied by most 
of the researchers, especially after the 9/11 event. Piracy is also an important risk factor that is 
attracting attention from both industry and academia. Other relevant risk factors include 
sabotage, smuggling, spying/espionage, and epidemics (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Vilko and 
Hallikas, 2012; Acciaro and Serra, 2013; Chang, Xu and Song, 2015; Zhao, Yan and Zhang, 
2016). It should be noted that the refugee immigrant is a factor that has been less investigated 
in previous studies, but it is recognised as a risk factor by some industry experts due to the 
increasing number of refugee immigrants in European countries in recent years. A summary of 
the above-identified risk factors can be found in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Risk factors associated with society 
Risk sources Risk factors References 
Society 
Economic 
environment 
Financial crisis 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
Change of interest rates 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008);  
Samvedi, Jain, and Chan (2013) 
Change of exchange rates 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); 
Samvedi, Jain, and Chan (2013); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Fluctuation of fuel price 
Cucchiella and Gastaldi (2006); 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008) 
Unattractive markets Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
Fierce competition 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Samvedi, Jain, and Chan (2013) 
Monopoly  Vilko et al. (2016) 
Political 
environment 
Trade policy instability 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); 
Samvedi, Jain, and Chan (2013);  
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Maritime security 
initiatives 
Yang (2010);  
Acciaro and Serra (2013) 
Regulations and measures Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
Regional political conflicts Vilko et al. (2016) 
Security 
Terrorism 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Acciaro and Serra (2013); Chang, 
Xu and Song (2015); Vilko et al. 
(2016) 
Piracy/maritime robbery 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Acciaro and Serra (2013); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Sabotage Manuj and Mentzer (2008) 
Smuggling Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
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3.4.2.2 Risk Factors Associated with Natural Environment 
It is another major component contributing to the external environment with a focus on the 
natural phenomena that could impair MCSC operations in the affected areas. The Changeable 
weather conditions are the one that has been experienced by most of the maritime container 
transportation. The complex navigation environment such as changeable weather, sea current, 
and wave, will impair the stability and safety of container ships, thus causing potential dangers 
to both cargos and seafarers. As the Earth’s weather is becoming more active, an increase in 
risks and catastrophic losses has been observed in maritime transport in recent years resulting 
from the natural hazards such as typhoons, storms, and other extreme weather events (Lam and 
Lassa, 2017). Meanwhile, global climate change has also emerged as a rising issue in the recent 
year, and its potential impact on the maritime transportation has been studied as early as in 
2012 (Benamara and Asariotis, 2012). All the above-identified risk factors are summarised in 
Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5. Risk factors associated with the natural environment 
 
3.4.2.3 Risk Factors Associated with Management 
Management in the proposed framework consists of two major parts, i.e. human resource 
and working environment. The former is primarily concerned with the management of people 
within organisations, such as the number, structure, quality, health (both physical and mental 
health), and wages of employees, while the latter involves not only the physical condition of 
the working environment including equipment, location, and surroundings, but also the 
atmosphere such as the culture of safety and teamwork within an enterprise. Among all risk 
factors, human error, which is claimed to be the main cause of maritime accidents according to 
Zhao, Yan and Zhang (2016) 
Spying/espionage Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
Epidemic 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Refugee immigrants Identified from the expert survey 
Risk sources Risk factors References 
Natural 
environment 
Changeable weather conditions 
Notteboom (2006); Vilko and 
Hallikas (2012); Chang, Xu and 
Song (2015); Vilko et al. (2016) 
Natural hazards  
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Samvedi, Jain and Chan (2013); 
Ho et al. (2015) 
Climate change Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
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the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), should not be ignored. Another 
potential risk factor arising from the expert survey is ergonomics. Ergonomics aims to match 
the user with equipment and environment so as to optimise the overall system performance. It 
is especially important for those who work on board. Table 3.6 summarises the risk factors 
associated with management in an MCSC. 
Table 3.6. Risk factors associated with the management 
 
3.4.2.4 Risk Factors Associated with Infrastructure and Technology 
Infrastructure and technology are the backbones supporting the sustainable development of 
a supply chain, as well as its operations in a reliable and efficient way. As a crucial node 
connecting different transportation modes of containers, lack of intermodal equipment will 
reduce the cargo handling capacity in terms of containers loading/unloading, and short-term 
transportation, and thus increase the waiting time of ships at ports. Other elements such as 
storage ability, berthing capability, entrance channels of a port, and ground access systems are 
also important to maximise port productivity. Regular maintenance helps to ensure the 
equipment (whether port machinery or equipment on board) runs efficiently. It is important to 
increase equipment’s service life so that the total cost of investment during a life cycle can be 
Risk sources Risk factors References 
Management 
Human 
resource 
Lack of skilled workers 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Mateusz and Świeboda (2014); 
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Lack of motivation 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Mental health of seafarers 
Hetherington, Flin and Mearns, 
(2006); Mateusz and Świeboda 
(2014) 
Human errors 
Hetherington, Flin and Mearns, 
(2006);   expert survey 
Unreasonable salary and 
welfare 
Identified from the expert 
survey 
Working 
environment 
Language and cultural 
diversity 
Hetherington et al. (2006); 
Lack of cooperation 
among departments 
Yang et al. (2008) 
Poor safety 
culture/climate 
Lu and Shang (2005); 
Hetherington et al. (2006) 
Low degree of safety 
leadership 
Lu and Yang (2010) 
Poor ergonomics at the 
workplace  
Identified from the expert 
survey 
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reduced. Technical reliability indicates how much a technique fits the daily operations, and 
how long the applications of this technique can maintain a safe condition. The risk factors 
associated with infrastructure and technology are summarised in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7. Risk factors associated with infrastructure and technology 
 
3.4.2.5 Risk Factors Associated with Operations 
Regarding the operations of maritime container logistics, three main flows which have been 
widely studied are information flows, financial flows, and physical flows (Chopra and Meindl, 
2010). 
Information flow mainly includes the transfer of data, knowledge or documents among 
different partners in a supply chain. The process of a supply chain relies heavily on information 
flows in terms of the product or service life cycle. Information flow can promote value-added 
activities and enhance the operational efficiency of supply chains. The speed and accuracy are 
two fundamental and key factors in existing methods of information transfer such as telephones 
calls, face-to-face meetings, emails, and Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), which may 
increase time in information transmission due to the usage of different information formats. 
Moreover, the effects of delay and inaccuracy may be amplified in a global supply chain 
network with more participants being involved. The lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility, as well as poor information sharing, will also reduce the quality and value of 
information, and thus lead to improper decision-making. During the Delphi survey, some 
experts also pointed out that “hide cargo information” can be a risk factor in terms of the 
information inaccuracy, although it may be different for the above reasons if considering how 
the inaccuracy is caused. IT vulnerability contains both hardware issues such as IT 
infrastructure breakdown and crash, and software issues including system failure, and other 
Risk sources Risk factors References 
Infrastructure  
& 
technology 
Lack of intermodal equipment Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
Poor entrance channels of a port 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012);  
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Limited storage ability Yang et al. (2008) 
Low technical reliability Ho et al. (2015) 
Undeveloped ground access 
system of a port 
Hsieh, Tai and Lee (2014) 
Lack of regular maintenance of 
equipment 
Identified from the expert survey 
Insufficient berthing capability Identified from the expert survey 
 65 
 
technical problems. With the rapid development of e-business in recent years, the wide usage 
of the internet also brings risks to information safety such as intrusion and fraud. 
Financial flow refers to the economic-related activities in a supply chain, such as the 
payment for either goods or services, cash in and cash out of an enterprise, business cooperation 
with other partners within a supply chain, etc. Although there is no specific literature on risks 
associated with financial flow in container shipping, several related risk factors in the general 
supply chain context have been identified in previous studies. Tummala and Schoenherr (2011) 
stated that unrealised contracts with partners might lead to payment delay, and bankruptcy or 
having partners with bad credit may lead to non-payment. However, one expert from the Delphi 
survey pointed out that the impact of shippers going into bankruptcy may vary due to different 
international contracts of sale used in the container shipping business. According to the Delphi 
expert survey, ship charter rates also matter in terms of cost control. But, it is difficult to predict 
the trend of ship charter rates during the period of a contract, thus leading to uncertainties. 
Another risk factor that should be considered is cash flow, which is essential to keep a business 
afloat. Unfortunately, it is not rare in practice, and the problem is particularly prominent for 
small business owners. 
The physical flow refers to the movement of container cargos in an MCSC, and it is perhaps 
the most important section during the whole process of container logistics as a type of 
transportation industry. From the perspective of a container shipping network, activities related 
to both port operations and maritime transportation of containers are taken into consideration 
in this thesis. Forecasting is the basis for supply chain members to make suitable plans of all 
kind of operational activities. However, it is not easy to capture changes arising from market 
or downstream members in order to make accurate forecasts, and the “bullwhip effect” in 
supply chain makes it even harder (Samvedi, Jain and Chan, 2012), thus damaging the 
competitiveness of a supply chain. This is also related to the management of containers, which 
will partly result in either the container shortage or transport of empty containers (in which 
trade imbalance on container shipping routes is another important contributor). In terms of the 
port operations, risk factors of port strikes, port/ terminal congestion, problems with customs 
clearance, improper container terminal operations, and improper management of container 
storage areas are identified (Notteboom, 2006; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011; Chang, Xu 
and Song, 2015). While, risk factors of transportation of dangerous goods, lack of flexibility 
of designed schedules, electricity failure, bottlenecks/ restriction in the transportation routes, 
incorrect container packing, and transport accidents (such as ship contract, grounding, sinking, 
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collision on quay, and oil spill) are considered with respect to the maritime transportation 
process (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; Chang, Xu and Song 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Vilko et al., 
2016). Among them, electricity failure is recognised to be an extremely severe risk factor in 
cold chain transportation, and transportation of dangerous goods is regarded as a special risk 
factor in the transportation industry supply chains compared to other general supply chains 
because explosions may cause huge damage to cargos, ships and even the nearby ports. For a 
container ship, the weight and centre of gravity of the hull itself are usually fixed, which 
however will change significantly after loading the cargo. The proper packing of cargos helps 
to maintain the stability of a ship during its sailing in the sea, thus having a greater impact on 
the safety of shipping. This risk factor contributed to more than half of the damaged cargo in 
2017. Risk factors identified from the three main flows in MCSCs are summarised in Table 
3.8. 
Table 3.8. Risk factors associated with operations 
Risk sources Risk factors References 
Operations 
Information  
flows 
Information delay 
Cucchiella and Gastaldi (2006);  
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
Information inaccuracy 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011);  
Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
IT vulnerability 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); Chang, 
Xu and Song (2015); Vilko et al. (2016) 
Internet security Wu, Blackhurst and Chidambaram (2006) 
Poor information sharing Vilko et al. (2016) 
Lack of information 
standardisation and compatibility 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011);  
Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
Financial 
flows 
Payment delay from partners 
Seyoum (2014); 
Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
Break a contract Chang, Xu and Song (2015) 
Shippers going into bankruptcy 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011);  
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Partners with bad credit 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Charter rates rise Identified from the expert survey 
Cash flow problem Identified from the expert survey 
Physical  
flows 
Inaccurate demand forecast 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008); Samvedi, Jain, 
and Chan (2013); Ho et al. (2015) 
Transportation of dangerous 
goods 
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Container shortage Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Port strikes 
Notteboom (2006); 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Port/ terminal congestions 
Notteboom (2006); 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Lack of flexibility of designed 
schedules 
Tang and Nurmaya Musa (2011);  
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015); 
Ho et al. (2015); Vilko et al. (2016) 
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3.5 Screening of Risk Factors in MCSCs  
A statistic of global trade shows that in 2016, China was ranked the first in terms of the 
merchandise exports and ranked the second in terms of merchandise imports. According to 
another recent statistics report (WSC, 2017b), among the top ten world's busiest container ports 
by the total number of actual twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) transported through the port, 
seven of them are in China. Given the fact3, the data is collected from the maritime stakeholders 
in China, including the COSCO SHIPPING Lines Co., Ltd and its branches (such as COSCO 
Beijing International Freight Co., Ltd., COSCO Tianjin Shipping Agency Co., Ltd., COSCO 
shipping Logistics Co., Ltd., and COSCO SHIPPING Development Co., Ltd.), local maritime 
safety administrations (such as Changjiang Maritime Safety Administration), and major 
container ports in China (such as the Port of Shanghai), it is believed that the findings are 
meaningful in the region and can also be representative and provide insights for other regions 
given the involved fleets and ports in China are world leading, involving global MCSCs.     
Table 3.9. Top three countries by imports and exports in 2016 
Rank Importers USD (millions) Exporters USD (millions) 
1 Unites States 2,248,209 China 2,097,637 
2 China 1,587,921 Unites States 1,450,457 
3 Germany 1,060,672 Germany 1,340,752 
Source: International trade statistics (http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/trade-
statistics/) 
                                                 
3 It is also to improve the efficiency of data collection and address language barriers in the questionnaire design, 
timeliness of this research, and consensus issues of the primary data. 
Problems with customs clearance 
Tummala and Schoenherr (2011);  
Vilko and Hallikas (2012); 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Electricity failure 
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015); 
Vilko et al. (2016) 
Bottlenecks/ restriction on 
transportation routes 
Notteboom (2006); Vilko and Hallikas 
(2012); Vilko et al. (2016) 
Improper container terminal 
operations 
Moon and Nguyen (2014) 
Incorrect container packing 
Mateusz and Świeboda (2014);  
Chang, Xu, and Song (2015) 
Transport accidents 
Yang et al. (2005); Ellis (2011);  
Vilko and Hallikas (2012) 
Trade imbalance on container 
shipping routes 
Identified from the expert survey 
Improper management of 
container storage area 
Identified from the expert survey 
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To systematically identify and analyse the risk factors in MCSCs, several methods are 
utilised in this chapter in a combined way. A Delphi expert survey is conducted to develop a 
risk classification framework, to validate the risk factors identified from the literature review, 
and to explore the emerging ones, which are not available from the current literature. A large-
scale questionnaire survey is conducted to collect data for measuring the occurrence likelihood 
and consequence severity of each identified and validated risk factor. Finally, the risk matrix 
method is applied to analyse the relative importance of each risk factor. 
3.5.1 Respondents' Profile in the Risk-Factor Survey  
In this section, domain experts in container maritime logistics from 44 organisations (such 
as shipping companies, maritime safety administrations, customs, port authorities, and 
maritime university, etc.) are contacted using the university membership directories on 
maritime container logistics in Liverpool John Moores University, and Wuhan University of 
Technology. Also, domain experts with knowledge on risk management of any parts of the 
process of MCSCs had been contacted to elicit their opinions. 
In total, 267 questionnaires were sent out in April 2017, and 101 replies were received by 
13 June 2017. There were 71 valid questionnaires and 30 invalid ones (containing incomplete 
or conflicting information). The overall valid return rate is 26.59% (with a valid return rate of 
64.10% for in-person distribution, and that of 20.18% for email distribution). To ensure the 
involvement of more validated experts, the questionnaire was also converted to an online 
edition via an e-survey creator. The website link to the online questionnaire was distributed to 
all potential participants (including those who did not reply to the email questionnaires) through 
instant messaging apps for the ease of finishing the questionnaire. The contacted researchers 
could sign in the e-survey creator and view the given answers when they completed it. 61 more 
valid replies were received by the end of June 2017. As a result, in total 132 valid responses 
were collected from the questionnaire survey. These data are firstly used to provide statistics 
of the likelihood and the consequence of each risk factor and then used to compute their ARIs. 
The summary of the questionnaire replies detail is shown in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10. A summary of questionnaire replies detail 
 
Questionnaire 
distributed 
Questionnaire 
returned 
Invalid 
replies 
Valid 
replies 
Valid reply 
rate 
In-person 39 37 12 25 64.10% 
By email 228 64 18 46 20.18% 
Online - 63 2 61 - 
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More than 75% of the respondents have worked in the container shipping industry for more 
than 10 years (11-15 years: 12.12%; 16-20 years: 35.61%; over 20 years: 28.79%), and 
meanwhile, more than 90% of respondents hold a middle-class job title or above, which reveals 
that the majority of the respondents have long professional working experience and abundant 
knowledge reserves in the container shipping business, contributing to the reliability of the 
results of this questionnaire survey. 
In this survey, “academia” refers to researchers who work in, for example, maritime 
universities and research institutes with experience in conducting research projects on container 
shipping safety related issues. Most of the respondents from industry work in container 
shipping companies, while the rest work in companies including container shipping agencies, 
freight forwarding companies, and container terminals, which play important roles in maritime 
container logistics. Governmental bodies in this study represent maritime transportation 
authorities, including maritime safety administrations, shipping administrations, and port 
authorities. The category of “other” includes non-governmental organisations (NGO) in 
relation to the shipping industry such as China Logistics Association (CLA), and China Ship-
owners’ Association (CSA). As an empirical study, respondents from industry (80.30%) hold 
a dominant position. The others, however, which account for nearly one-fifth of the total 
respondents (academia: 5.30%; governmental body: 12.12%; other: 2.27%), also provide a 
complementary view on the overall understanding of the whole MCSC from different 
perspectives. Among all the respondents, 8.33% and 31.82% of them take part in port 
operations and maritime transportation, respectively. The rest of them (59.85%) are involved 
in the whole process of MCSCs. 
In terms of the size of the participating organisations, only 15.91% of the respondents work 
in small companies/organisations (fewer than 50 employees). More than 60% of the 
respondents work for companies/organisations with more than 200 employees, as the target 
sample is mainly selected from super-giant enterprises in the maritime shipping industry of 
their branches or agencies worldwide. The profile of 132 respondents in the survey is presented 
in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11. A summary of respondents’ profile 
Respondent Profile Number % 
What is the type of your 
organisation? 
Academia 7 5.30% 
Industry 106 80.30% 
Governmental body 16 12.12% 
Other 3 2.27% 
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Which part of the process of a 
maritime container supply 
chain are you involved in? 
Port operations 11 8.33% 
Maritime transportation 42 31.82% 
Whole process 79 59.85% 
What is your job title/ 
position? 
Primary (technical) job title4 10 7.58% 
Middle (technical) job title5 44 33.33% 
Advanced/Senior (technical) job 
title6 78 59.09% 
For how many years have you 
worked in the container 
shipping or related industry? 
1-5 years 12 9.09% 
6-10 years 19 14.39% 
11-15 years 16 12.12% 
16-20 years 47 35.61% 
Over 20 years 38 28.79% 
How many employees are in 
your company/ organisation? 
1-50 people 21 15.91% 
51-100 people 17 12.88% 
101-200 people 6 4.55% 
201-500 people 36 27.27% 
Over 500 people 52 39.39% 
 
3.5.2 Validity and Reliability Test for Risk-Factor Survey  
The validity and reliability of the results obtained from the questionnaire survey are of high 
concern to questionnaire builders, as they are the basis of obtaining a reasonable and 
convincing result in the follow-up analysis.  
The questions of the risk-factor survey are developed from previous studies conducted in 
container shipping and general supply chain management, and have been validated through a 
Delphi expert survey from domain experts with rich experience in different aspects of maritime 
container shipping. Moreover, a pilot test was carried out to improve the questionnaire on both 
questions and response options before its distribution to a large scale. Besides, most of the 
respondents in the survey come from famous container shipping companies with professional 
working experience and knowledge in the field of container shipping. Therefore, this survey is 
believed to have a high level of validity. 
The reliability of the questionnaire survey is measured using Cronbach's alpha method, as 
described in Section 3.3.3. A total of 124 questions were tested, including occurrence 
likelihood (64 questions), and risk consequence (64 questions). The results of reliability tests 
for the whole survey, the questions of likelihood, and questions of consequence are presented 
                                                 
4 Such as research assistant, assistant lecturer, assistant customs supervisor, and clerk. 
5 Such as research associate, lecturer, engineer, customs supervisor, and captain. 
6 Such as professor, senior engineer and above, senior customs supervisor, senior captain, and manager. 
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in Table 3.12. The Cronbach's alpha of the whole survey is 0.955 and Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardised Items is 0.956. According to the criteria by Cohen and Swerdlik (2010), the 
result is acceptable when it is between 0.7 and 0.8, and the collected data is reliable when it is 
over 0.8. Therefore, this survey achieves a high level of reliability. 
Table 3.12. Reliability test for the questionnaire survey 
 Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based 
on Standardised Items 
Number of 
questions 
Whole survey 0.955 0.956 128 
Occurrence likelihood 0.930 0.932 64 
Consequence severity 0.948 0.951 64 
 
3.5.3 Analysis of Survey Results and Screening of Risk Factors 
The results of the risk-factor questionnaire survey are firstly described from the aspects of 
risk likelihood and risk consequence, respectively. Then, the risk levels of each risk factor are 
analysed and presented using the risk matrix method, in order to identify the most significant 
ones. 
3.5.3.1 Results in Relation to the Occurrence Likelihood of Risk Factors 
Based on the risk matrix introduced in Section 3.3.2, occurrence likelihood is also divided 
into four levels in this thesis, which are 1) low level (in green colour), with a mean value of LI 
∈ [1, 2), 2) low- moderate level, which is represented in yellow colour with a mean value of 
LI ∈ [2, 3.5), 3) high-moderate level, mapped in orange colour with a mean value of LI ∈ 
[3.5, 5), and 4) high level (in red colour), with a mean value of LI ∈ [5, 7]. Although a seven-
point scale has been used in the survey to measure the likelihood, no risk factor falls into scale 
1, 6, and 7 after all respondents’ opinions are averaged, which means the occurrence likelihood 
of no risk factor is under low level (below scale 2). 
Among the five main risk sources, risk factors associated with management have the highest 
likelihood (mean value: 4.25), which indicates that the human factor (and the working 
environment provided for daily operations) is a principal source bringing risks into container 
shipping industry in practice. It is followed by the likelihood of risk factors associated with 
operations (mean value: 3.99), and society (mean value: 3.79). Among all risk factors of all 
risk sources, the top ten risk factors in terms of likelihood are “fierce competition” (HS/EE_6: 
5.58), “fluctuation of fuel price” (HS/EE_4: 5.13), “change of exchange rates” (HS/EE_3: 4.98), 
“trade imbalance on container shipping routes” (Op/PF_13: 4.86), “unattractive markets” 
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(HS/EE_5: 4.83), “port/ terminal congestions” (Op/PF_5: 4.59), “mental health of seafarers” 
(Man/HR _3: 4.55), “transportation of dangerous goods” (Op/PF_2: 4.53), “unreasonable 
salary and welfare” (Man/HR _5: 4.50), and “lack of motivation” (Man/HR _2: 4.42). These 
risk factors are mainly generated from human society, management, and operations. Moreover, 
the top three of them belong to economic environment risks under the category of human 
society, revealing the more often emerging uncertainties faced by entrepreneurs and managers 
in economic environment and activities.  
In the category of economic environment, “fierce competition” and “fluctuation of fuel price” 
are two most likely happened risk factors, and also, they are the only two risk factors among 
all that fall into the high level of occurrence likelihood (with a mean value over 5). Another 
risk factor worth noting is “monopoly”. Although its occurrence likelihood is not outstanding 
(mean value: 4.02), its Standard Deviation (SD) is the greatest one among all identified risk 
factors. This indicates the deviations in the understanding and definition of monopoly among 
all respondents. The monopoly can be a problem according to some respondents (e.g. those 
from port/terminal operators and shipping companies), while other respondents (e.g. those from 
port authorities and universities) may care less about this problem. Table 3.13 summarises the 
data acquired from the questionnaire survey on the occurrence likelihood of all risk factors. 
Table 3.13 Likelihood of risk factors  
Risk factors associated with society Mean S.D. Rank 
Economic Environment (EE) L G 
1. Financial crisis HS/EE_1 3.70 1.71 7  
2. Change of interest rates HS/EE_2 4.38 1.34 5  
3. Change of exchange rates HS/EE_3 4.98 1.30 3 3 
4. Fluctuation of fuel price HS/EE_4 5.13 1.34 2 2 
5. Unattractive markets HS/EE_5 4.83 1.38 4 5 
6. Fierce competition HS/EE_6 5.58 1.38 1 1 
7. Monopoly HS/EE_7 4.02 1.78 6  
Mean value of EE 4.66 
Political Environment (PE) 
1. Trade policy instability  HS/PE_1 3.50 1.26 4  
2. Maritime security initiatives HS/PE_2 3.75 1.13 2  
3. Regulations and measures HS/PE_3 3.83 1.42 1  
4. Regional political conflicts  HS/PE_4 3.52 1.54 3  
Mean value of PE 3.65 
Security (SE) 
1. Terrorism HS/SE_1 2.56 1.36 7  
2. Piracy /maritime robbery HS/SE_2 3.04 1.35 2  
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3. Sabotage HS/SE_3 2.63 1.13 6  
4. Smuggling HS/SE_4 4.06 1.31 1  
5. Spying /espionage HS/SE_5 2.94 1.61 4  
6. Epidemic HS/SE_6 2.98 1.15 3  
7. Refugee immigrants HS/SE_7 2.73 1.19 5  
Mean value of SE 2.99 
Mean value of risks associated with society 3.79 
Risk factors associated with natural environment 
1. Changeable weather conditions NE_1 4.43 1.61 1  
2. Natural hazards  NE_2 2.92 1.19 3  
3. Climate change NE_3 3.19 1.57 2  
Mean value of risks associated with natural environment 3.51 
Risk factors associated with management 
Human Resource (HR) 
1. Lack of skilled workers Man/HR _1 4.15 1.15 5  
2. Lack of motivation Man/HR _2 4.42 1.28 3 10 
3. Mental health of seafarers Man/HR _3 4.55 1.37 1 7 
4. Human errors Man/HR _4 4.37 1.09 4  
5. Unreasonable salary and welfare Man/HR _5 4.50 1.44 2 9 
Mean value of HR 4.40 
Working Environment (WE) 
1. Language and cultural diversity Man/WE_1 4.08 1.55 3  
2. Lack of cooperation among departments Man/WE_2 4.30 1.29 1  
3. Poor safety culture/climate Man/WE_3 4.22 1.33 2  
4. Low degree of safety leadership Man/WE_4 3.88 1.32 5  
5. Poor ergonomics at workplace  Man/WE_5 4.02 1.19 4  
Mean value of WE 4.10 
Mean value of risks associated with management 4.25 
Risk factors associated with infrastructure and technology 
1. Lack of intermodal equipment I & T _1 3.45 1.21 6  
2. Poor entrance channels of a port I & T _2 3.88 1.30 3  
3. Limited storage ability I & T _3 3.33 1.18 7  
4. Low technical reliability I & T _4 3.50 1.10 5  
5. Undeveloped ground access system of a port I & T _5 3.53 1.15 4  
6. Lack of regular maintenance of equipment I & T _6 3.94 1.09 2  
7. Insufficient berthing capability I & T _7 4.07 1.14 1  
Mean value of risks associated with infrastructure and technology 3.67 
Risk factors associated with operations 
Information Flow (IF) 
1. Information delay Op/IF_1 4.31 1.41 1  
2. Information inaccuracy Op/IF_2 4.28 1.27 2  
3. IT vulnerability Op/IF_3 3.81 1.31 4  
4. Internet security Op/IF_4 3.70 1.45 5  
5. Poor information sharing Op/IF_5 3.86 1.33 3  
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6. Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
Op/IF_6 3.70 1.28 5  
Mean value of IF 3.95 
Financial Flow (FF) 
1. Payment delay from partners Op/FF_1 4.25 1.21 1  
2. Break a contract Op/FF_2 3.98 1.24 4  
3. Shippers going into bankruptcy Op/FF_3 3.50 1.36 6  
4. Partners with bad credit Op/FF_4 3.91 1.33 5  
5. Charter rates rise Op/FF_5 4.14 1.18 2  
6. Cash flow problem Op/FF_6 4.04 1.43 3  
Mean value of FF 3.97 
Physical Flow (PF) 
1. Inaccurate demand forecast Op/PF_1 4.36 1.24 4  
2. Transportation of dangerous goods Op/PF_2 4.53 1.44 3 8 
3. Container shortage Op/PF_3 3.88 1.33 9  
4. Port strikes Op/PF_4 3.34 1.17 14  
5. Port/ terminal congestions Op/PF_5 4.59 1.37 2 6 
6. Lack of flexibility of designed schedules Op/PF_6 4.02 1.23 6  
7. Problems with customs clearance Op/PF_7 3.91 1.29 8  
8. Electricity failure Op/PF_8 3.59 1.11 13  
9. Bottlenecks/restriction on transportation routes Op/PF_9 3.66 1.29 12  
10. Improper container terminal operations Op/PF_10 4.03 1.32 5  
11. Incorrect container packing Op/PF_11 3.69 1.33 10  
12. Transport accidents Op/PF_12 3.67 1.21 11  
13. Trade imbalance on container shipping routes Op/PF_13 4.86 1.32 1 4 
14. Improper management of container storage area Op/PF_14 4.00 1.11 7  
Mean value of PF 4.01 
Mean value of risks associated with operations 3.99 
S.D. = Standard Deviation 
Rank L means the local rank of each risk factor under its category (main risk source). 
Rank G means the global rank of each risk factor among all (only the top 10 are shown.) 
 
3.5.3.2 Results in Relation to the Consequence Severity of Risk Factors 
Four levels of consequence in this thesis are 1) low level, in green colour, with a mean value 
of SI ∈ [1, 2), 2) low-moderate level, in yellow colour, with a mean value of SI ∈ [2, 2.5), 3) 
high-moderate level, in orange colour, with a mean value of SI ∈ [2.5, 3), and 4) high level, 
in red colour, with a mean value of SI ∈ [3, 4]. It can be seen from the consequence severity 
of all identified risk factors that the majority of the risk factors fall into the scale between 2 and 
3. 
Among all risk sources, risk factors associated with human society are identified to have the 
greatest influence in terms of consequence severity, with a mean value of 2.31. As an important 
component of the external environment, it is crucial for managers to pay attention to the related 
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risk factors in order to reduce their negative impacts on the operation of a business. The 
category of risk factors associated with operations (mean value: 2.30) ranks second, and that 
associated with management (mean value: 2.25) is in the third place. 
Among all the identified risk factors, the top ten in terms of consequence severity are 
“terrorism” (HS/SE_1: 3.23), “piracy /maritime robbery” (HS/SE_2: 3.08), “financial crisis” 
(HS/EE_1: 3.02), “regional political conflicts” (HS/PE_4: 2.95), “shippers going into 
bankruptcy” (Op/FF_3: 2.77), “transportation of dangerous goods” (Op/PF_2: 2.72), “transport 
accidents” (Op/PF_12: 2.69), “natural hazards” (NE_2: 2.59), “Low degree of safety leadership” 
(Man/WE_4: 2.53), “break a contract” (Op/FF_2: 2.53), “port strikes” (Op/PF_4: 2.53), and 
“change of exchange rates” (HS/EE_3: 2.52). It should be noted that risk factors Man/WE_4, 
Op/FF_2, and Op/PF_4 hold the same mean value of 2.53, ranking the 9th place at the same 
time, and that is the reason why altogether twelve risk factors are mentioned here. Human 
society and the operations are identified as the main sources (7 out of 10) where these risk 
factors come from. 
There are three risk factors which have been identified as high-level risks in terms of 
consequence severity, which are a financial crisis, terrorism, and piracy/maritime robbery. For 
example, the financial crisis in 2008 led to the economic downturn of many countries 
worldwide, and the container shipping industry has been seriously affected for a long time due 
to the fact that its development heavily depends on the prosperity of global trade. Security 
issues such as terrorism and piracy have been emphasised and received a lot of attention in 
both industry and academia in recent years. According to Ewence (2011), more than 7 billion 
dollars could be the cost per year to shipping companies and governments to deal with the 
Somalia piracy. Apart from the risk factors such as change of interest rates, maritime security 
initiatives, and refugee immigrants, which belong to low-level risks in terms of consequence 
severity, the rest fall into the moderate level. A summary of all the data on risk factors in terms 
of consequence severity is listed in Table 3.14. 
Table 3.14. Estimated consequence severity of risk factors  
Risk factors associated with society Mean S.D. Rank 
Economic Environment (EE) L G 
1. Financial crisis HS/EE_1 3.02 0.68 1 3 
2. Change of interest rates HS/EE_2 1.86 0.77 7  
3. Change of exchange rates HS/EE_3 2.52 0.73 2 10 
4. Fluctuation of fuel price HS/EE_4 2.47 0.59 3  
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5. Unattractive markets HS/EE_5 2.43 0.60 4  
6. Fierce competition HS/EE_6 2.41 0.77 5  
7. Monopoly HS/EE_7 2.38 0.83 6  
Mean value of EE 2.44 
Political Environment (PE) 
1. Trade policy instability  HS/PE_1 2.25 0.64 2  
2. Maritime security initiatives HS/PE_2 1.92 0.74 4  
3. Regulations and measures HS/PE_3 2.13 0.65 3  
4. Regional political conflicts  HS/PE_4 2.95 0.81 1 4 
Mean value of PE 2.31 
Security (SE) 
1. Terrorism HS/SE_1 3.23 1.12 1 1 
2. Piracy /maritime robbery HS/SE_2 3.08 1.09 2 2 
3. Sabotage HS/SE_3 2.38 1.00 3  
4. Smuggling HS/SE_4 2.00 0.87 5  
5. Spying /espionage HS/SE_5 1.94 0.83 6  
6. Epidemic HS/SE_6 2.14 0.89 4  
7. Refugee immigrants HS/SE_7 1.83 0.79 7  
Mean value of SE 2.37 
Mean value of risks associated with society 2.39 
Risk factors associated with natural environment 
1. Changeable weather conditions NE_1 2.08 0.76 2  
2. Natural hazards  NE_2 2.59 1.00 1 8 
3. Climate change NE_3 1.80 0.74 3  
Mean value of risks associated with natural environment 2.16 
Risk factors associated with management 
Human Resource (HR) 
1. Lack of skilled workers Man/HR _1 2.47 0.77 1  
2. Lack of motivation Man/HR _2 2.14 0.75 4  
3. Mental health of seafarers Man/HR _3 2.26 0.78 3  
4. Human errors Man/HR _4 2.32 0.64 2  
5. Unreasonable salary and welfare Man/HR _5 2.09 0.75 5  
Mean value of SE 2.26 
Working Environment (WE) 
1. Language and cultural diversity Man/WE_1 1.80 0.76 5  
2. Lack of cooperation among departments Man/WE_2 2.25 0.71 3  
3. Poor safety culture/climate Man/WE_3 2.23 0.81 4  
4. Low degree of safety leadership Man/WE_4 2.53 0.87 1 9 
5. Poor ergonomics at workplace  Man/WE_5 2.41 0.77 2  
Mean value of WE 2.24 
Mean value of risks associated with management 2.25 
Risk factors associated with infrastructure and technology 
1. Lack of intermodal equipment I & T _1 2.19 0.66 4  
2. Poor entrance channels of a port I & T _2 2.33 0.71 2  
3. Limited storage ability I & T _3 2.08 0.72 6  
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4. Low technical reliability I & T _4 2.22 0.70 3  
5. Undeveloped ground access system of a port I & T _5 2.19 0.71 4  
6. Lack of regular maintenance of equipment I & T _6 2.38 0.72 1  
7. Insufficient berthing capability I & T _7 2.17 0.70 5  
Mean value of risks associated with infrastructure and technology 2.22 
Risk factors associated with operations 
Information Flow (IF) 
1. Information delay Op/IF_1 2.06 0.73 4  
2. Information inaccuracy Op/IF_2 2.36 0.76 2  
3. IT vulnerability Op/IF_3 2.30 0.85 3  
4. Internet security Op/IF_4 2.38 0.86 1  
5. Poor information sharing Op/IF_5 1.94 0.66 5  
6. Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
Op/IF_6 2.06 0.66 4  
Mean value of IF 2.18 
Financial Flow (FF) 
1. Payment delay from partners Op/FF_1 2.31 0.69 4  
2. Break a contract Op/FF_2 2.53 0.69 2 9 
3. Shippers going into bankruptcy Op/FF_3 2.77 0.73 1 5 
4. Partners with bad credit Op/FF_4 2.27 0.74 5  
5. Charter rates rise Op/FF_5 2.23 0.61 6  
6. Cash flow problem Op/FF_6 2.50 0.83 3  
Mean value of FF 2.43 
Physical Flow (PF) 
1. Inaccurate demand forecast Op/PF_1 2.22 0.68 8  
2. Transportation of dangerous goods Op/PF_2 2.72 0.79 1 6 
3. Container shortage Op/PF_3 2.13 0.63 10  
4. Port strikes Op/PF_4 2.53 0.80 3 9 
5. Port/ terminal congestions Op/PF_5 2.33 0.71 7  
6. Lack of flexibility of designed schedules Op/PF_6 1.92 0.80 14  
7. Problems with customs clearance Op/PF_7 2.02 0.77 13  
8. Electricity failure Op/PF_8 2.39 0.81 5  
9. Bottlenecks/restriction on transportation routes Op/PF_9 2.34 0.65 6  
10. Improper container terminal operations Op/PF_10 2.20 0.74 9  
11. Incorrect container packing Op/PF_11 2.42 0.92 4  
12. Transport accidents Op/PF_12 2.69 0.85 2 7 
13. Trade imbalance on container shipping routes Op/PF_13 2.03 0.64 12  
14. Improper management of container storage area Op/PF_14 2.09 0.73 11  
Mean value of PF 2.29 
Mean value of risks associated with operations 2.30 
S.D. = Standard Deviation 
Rank L means the local rank of each risk factor under its category (risk source). 
Rank G means the global rank of each risk factor among all (only the top 10 are shown.) 
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3.5.3.3 Risk Level Analysis of Risk Factors 
Based on the statistics of occurrence likelihood and consequence severity from all 
respondents, ARIs for each risk factor can be calculated using Eq. 3, and then be grouped into 
different risk levels defined in Figure 3 (see Table 3.15). The top ten risk factors in terms of 
the values of ARI are “fierce competition” (HS/EE_6: 6.98), “fluctuation of fuel price” 
(HS/EE_4: 6.59), “change of exchange rates” (HS/EE_3: 6.50), “unattractive markets” 
(HS/EE_5: 6.26), “transportation of dangerous goods” (Op/PF_2: 6.25), “port/terminal 
congestions” (Op/PF_5: 5.92), “trade imbalance on container shipping routes” (Op/PF_13: 
5.89), “mental health of seafarers” (Man/HR _3: 5.81), “financial crisis” (HS/EE_1: 5.72), and 
“human errors” (Man/HR _4: 5.69). Among them, the top five risk factors are located in the 
high-moderate level, while the rest belong to the low-moderate level. The macroeconomic 
environment plays a crucial role that can influence a container shipping business both directly 
and indirectly. Some factors partially affect the business decision making, including turbulent 
shipping markets, and competition (Notteboom, 2004; Vilko et al., 2016). Some will affect the 
entire economy and all of the participants, such as the financial crisis (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012; 
Samvedi et al., 2013; Chang, Xu and Song, 2015). These factors will affect the price and 
investment, which increases the uncertainties in MCSC operations. Transportation of 
dangerous good is regarded as a special risk factor in the container transportation compared to 
other general supply chains because accidents such as explosions, leakage of hazardous 
chemical materials, and fire during the transportation of dangerous good can cause huge 
damage to cargos, ships, and even the nearby ports. Port/terminal congestion will increase the 
waiting time of a ship in port areas, thus making it difficult to keep to the fixed schedule. 
Appropriate and effective management of empty containers caused by trade imbalance is also 
a major issue, which contributes to both financial savings and environment protection (Song 
and Carter, 2009). Due to the harsh working environment on board a ship, seafarers usually 
suffer from mental health problems such as fatigue, stress, and anxiety, which will negatively 
affect their behaviour and increase the risks at sea. Human error is recognised as one of the 
main causal factors in up to 80% of accidents across various industries (Stewart and Chase, 
2010). It is interesting to note that although the terrorism and piracy are of great significance 
in terms of severity, they are only ranked at 51st (HS/SE_1: 4.79) and 36th (HS/SE_2: 5.12) in 
terms of ARI respectively when taking into account their relatively low frequency of occurrence. 
Although some of the factors were analysed in previous studies to have high risk levels, they 
were tackled only with reference to the limited investigated scope (often a segment of a chain) 
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and thus have received relatively low ARIs in this systematic analysis within the context of the 
whole MCSCs. The facts that 1) there are few studies presenting and comparing the risk factors 
influencing container shipping chains as a whole, and 2) fewer providing quantitative risk index 
to reveal their safety prioritisation empirically, reveal the new findings and contributions of 
this work. The ARIs, as well as the risk levels of all identified risk factors, are summarised in 
Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15. ARI values and risk level of all risk factors 
Risk sources Risk factors ARI Risk level 
Human society 
ARI: 6.17 
HS/EE_1 5.72 Low-moderate 
HS/EE_2 5.23 Low-moderate  
HS/EE_3 6.50 High-moderate  
HS/EE_4 6.59 High-moderate  
HS/EE_5 6.26 High-moderate  
HS/EE_6 6.98 High-moderate  
HS/EE_7 5.40 Low-moderate   
HS/PE_1 4.75 Low-moderate  
HS/PE_2 4.67 Low-moderate  
HS/PE_3 4.95 Low-moderate  
HS/PE_4 5.47 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_1 4.79 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_2 5.12 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_3 4.00 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_4 5.06 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_5 3.88 Low 
HS/SE_6 4.13 Low-moderate  
HS/SE_7 3.56 Low 
Natural environment 
ARI: 5.67 
NE_1 5.51 Low-moderate  
NE_2 4.52 Low-moderate  
NE_3 3.98 Low 
Management 
ARI: 6.50 
Man/HR _1 5.62 Low-moderate  
Man/HR _2 5.56 Low-moderate  
Man/HR _3 5.81 Low-moderate  
Man/HR _4 5.69 Low-moderate  
Man/HR _5 5.59 Low-moderate  
Man/WE_1 4.88 Low-moderate  
Man/WE_2 5.55 Low-moderate  
Man/WE_3 5.45 Low-moderate  
Man/WE_4 5.41 Low-moderate  
Man/WE_5 5.42 Low-moderate  
Infrastructure & technology 
ARI: 5.89 
I & T _1 4.64 Low-moderate  
I & T _2 5.20 Low-moderate  
I & T _3 4.41 Low-moderate  
I & T _4 4.72 Low-moderate  
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I & T _5 4.72 Low-moderate  
I & T _6 5.32 Low-moderate  
I & T _7 5.24 Low-moderate  
Operations 
ARI: 6.28 
Op/IF_1 5.38 Low-moderate  
Op/IF_2 5.64 Low-moderate  
Op/IF_3 5.11 Low-moderate  
Op/IF_4 5.08 Low-moderate  
Op/IF_5 4.80 Low-moderate  
Op/IF_6 4.77 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_1 5.56 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_2 5.52 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_3 5.27 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_4 5.17 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_5 5.38 Low-moderate  
Op/FF_6 5.54 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_1 5.58 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_2 6.25 High-moderate  
Op/PF_3 5.00 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_4 4.88 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_5 5.92 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_6 4.94 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_7 4.92 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_8 4.98 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_9 5.00 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_10 5.23 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_11 5.11 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_12 5.36 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_13 5.89 Low-moderate  
Op/PF_14 5.09 Low-moderate  
 
It is notable that almost all risk factors except for “Spying /espionage” (HS/SE_5:3.88), 
“Refugee immigrants” (HS/SE_7:3.56), and “Climate change” (NE_3:3.98), fall into the 
moderate risk level with an ARI ∈ [4, 8), which is in harmony with the experience of domain 
experts. According to the survey results, the spying/espionage risk is recognised to be 
acceptable, which may be partly due to the fact that business espionage is not a common issue 
in the container shipping industry. The refugee immigrant is a factor that has been less 
investigated in previous studies, but it is recognised as a risk factor by more and more experts 
due to the increasing number of refugee immigrants in European countries in recent years. 
However, its impact on the container shipping industry has not been evidenced currently, 
compared to other high-risk factors. It is also probably due to the limitation of this study by 
having less response from the EU, which will be further addressed in future by conducting a 
global survey. Regarding the global climate change, which has been an emerging research topic 
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in recent years, especially in the area of transportation resilience and port operations (e.g. 
Brown et al., 2012; Wan et al., 2017), although there is less direct evidence compared to other 
risk factors of a moderate risk in terms of negative effect, its risk index value (3.98) is the 
highest in non-moderate risk factors. It well reflects the observation from the survey in which 
experts are aware of and pay increasing attention to the impact of climate change to container 
transport logistics (particularly ports), however high uncertainty in terms of the frequency of 
climate disasters made them conservative when evaluating its likelihood. It looks likely that 
with more evidence collected from climate accidents (e.g. hurricanes in The Gulf of Mexico in 
2016), the risk index of climate change within the context of MCSCs will increase in future. 
3.6 Conclusion  
Identification of risk factors provides the foundation for supply chain risk analysis and 
accident prevention. In this Chapter, a new risk factor classification framework is developed, 
including five main risk sources namely society, natural environment, management, 
infrastructure and technology, and operations. The first two are external risk sources, whereas 
the rest three belong to internal ones. It integrates different classification methods and 
incorporates them in a logical hierarchy suitable for modelling the risk factors influencing 
MCSCs. Its development is validated by a Delphi expert group of 10 persons through three-
round verification process. Based on that, 64 risk factors are identified through a critical review 
of previous studies, along with an exploration and validation process using a Delphi expert 
survey. These risk factors are assessed from the aspects of occurrence likelihood and 
consequence severity by conducting a questionnaire survey, and they are further categorised 
into different risk levels and ranked according to their ARIs calculated through the risk matrix 
analysis. The results show that “fierce competition”, “fluctuation of fuel price”, “change of 
exchange rates”, “unattractive markets”, “transportation of dangerous goods”, “port/ terminal 
congestions”, “trade imbalance on container shipping routes”, “mental health of seafarers, 
“financial crisis”, and “human errors” are the top ten risk factors influencing the safe and 
effective operations of an MCSC.  
Furthermore, the research results based on empirical data further not only prove the relevant 
findings from previous studies but also involve new contributions by providing quantitative 
risk prioritisation information. In Lam and Bai’s (2016) research, risks associated with the IT 
system, operational risks, and human resource management risk were identified as the top three 
risks. In our research, management (which is composed of the management of human resource 
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and working environment) is the main risk source with an ARI of 5.50, while risk factors related 
to operations are ranked the second with an ARI of 5.28. In line with the research findings of 
Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009) and Chang, Xu and Song (2014), our research discloses 
that the fluctuation of fuel price (specifically, fuel price rise) is an important risk factor. It ranks 
the second of all risk factors with high likelihood and consequence. Thus it deserves the 
attention of carriers as bunker fuel accounts for more than three quarters of the operating cost 
(Ronen, 2011). Our research findings also emphasise that the transportation of dangerous goods 
is an important risk factor (Chang, Xu and Song, 2015). It ranks the first among operational 
risk factors, and ranks the fifth among all, belonging to a high-moderate risk level with an ARI 
of 6.25.  
Although the risk matrix method provides a clear framework for systematic review of 
individual risk factors and convenient documentation for the rationale of risk rankings (Cox, 
2008), it suffers from some mathematical limitations that should not be ignored such as weak 
consistency and ambiguous outputs (Cox, 2008). For specific, risk matrices show limited 
ability to correctly reproduce the risk ratings implied by quantitative models, especially for 
categorizing black swan events (i.e. the incidents that occur in a very low probability but with 
severe and wide-spread influence). Errors may occur when comparatively ranking risk factors 
under such situation. This suggests that risk matrices should be used with caution. In view of 
this, a novel risk assessment method will be proposed in the next chapter to further investigate 
the identified risk factor in order to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the risk factors 
in MCSCs.
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CHAPTER 4 - AN ADVANCED APPROACH FOR RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF MARITIME CONTAINER 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
Summary 
This chapter, as a follow-up study of Chapter 3, illustrates an efficient and powerful belief rule-
based Bayesian network (BR-BN) method to deal with the in-depth assessment of identified 
risk factors and prioritise them under uncertain environment. The proposed method is mainly 
composed of two parts. The first one is the belief rule base (BRB) which is particularly 
established for evaluating the container maritime logistics risks in this study. A BRB is a 
collection of fuzzy rules with belief structure which are made up of an antecedent part and a 
consequent part. Then the relationships of attributes between the two parts are modelled in the 
Bayesian network (BN) so that all relevant rules can be aggregated for evaluating and 
prioritising risk factors. A case study of one Chinese container shipping company is conducted 
to illustrate the application of the proposed model.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research work in Chapter 3 mainly dealt with the identification and classification of risk 
factors in MCSCs, in which the risk factors identified were broadly classified into four different 
levels according to their ARIs with the careful usage of risk matrix analysis. It offers an 
effective and straightforward screening tool for managers to focus their attention on the initial 
phase of supply chain risk management (Cox, 2008). However, when an in-depth analysis of 
risk factors is required, the traditional risk analysis method introduced in Chapter 3 may not be 
able to provide sufficient safety management information.  
In the past decade, numerous methods (either qualitative or quantitative) have been 
proposed in terms of their applications in the different stages of supply chain risk management, 
especially for risk identification and assessment. They are, for example, the analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) method (Gaudenzi and Borghesi, 2006), TOPSIS method (Samvedi, Jain, and 
Chan, 2013), and the Failure Mode, Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Pujawan and Geraldin, 2009). 
These traditional risk analysis and decision making tools are popular due to their easiness and 
visibility when conducting quantitative risk evaluation. However, under many circumstances, 
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they have shown inherent drawbacks and incapability of providing accurate and real-time risk 
estimate in their practical applications. The high uncertainty in risk data in container supply 
chains also constrains their application in risk analysis of MCSCs (Alyami, 2016). Thus, new 
models based on advanced uncertainty methods have been developed to overcome the 
deficiencies, including fuzzy logic, Dempster-Shafer theory, Bayesian Networks (BNs), and 
Monte Carlo simulation (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008).  
A review of 224 journal papers by Ho et al. (2015) revealed that most of the previous 
research on supply chain risk assessments paid special attention to the occurrence probability 
of an event. Few studies assessed the severity of the consequences, leaving the other features 
of risk not being fully explored. Although supply chain risks have already been assessed from 
the two aspects of likelihood and consequence, the existing studies have not addressed more 
risk parameters for advanced risk analysis of complicated supply chain systems. Therefore, it 
is necessary to understand better the risk management of MCSCs involving multimodal 
transport and develop flexible risk approaches capable of tackling uncertainties for precise risk 
assessment. 
In light of this research need, an effective risk assessment tool should at least have the 
following two characteristics. First, the method should be able to process different types of 
information (e.g. quantitative and qualitative, subjective and objective) from multiple sources 
in a consistent manner. Second, the method should be able to provide accurate results while 
maintaining a certain degree of visibility, transparency, as well as easiness to operate. In this 
paper, we propose an advanced risk modelling approach by incorporating the fuzzy rule base 
(FRB) with BNs to evaluate and prioritise risk events in MCSCs. FRB is used to elicit expert 
judgments and to rationalize the configuration of subjective probabilities. The Bayesian 
marginalization rules are employed to accommodate all relevant IF-THEN rules with belief 
structures and to calculate risk priority values of all identified risk events. The novelty of this 
chapter is threefold. First, the study incorporates new risk parameters which can be used to 
better model risks of MCSCs. Second, it introduces a new method to rationalize the degrees of 
belief (DoB) distribution in fuzzy IF-THEN rules by taking the weight of each risk parameter 
into account when constructing the BRB. Third, it systemically identifies and analyses the risk 
events relating to MCSCs from multiple dimensions of operations, environmental and 
economic.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 detailed information of the 
selected risk parameters is discussed, along with the development and application of fuzzy rule 
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bases. Section 4.3 elaborates the risk analysis and inference framework step by step. The 
application and validation of the method are carried out in Section 4.4 with a real case study. 
The calculation of the risk assessment results and the validation process are achieved by using 
a user-friendly software package, which enables the end users to collect raw data from the real 
observations and perform calculation easily. Finally, this chapter is concluded in Section 4.5. 
4.2 Background information  
4.2.1 Extensions of Risk Parameters in Maritime Supply Chains 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, such studies often argue that having two basic risk parameters 
(i.e. P and C) will sometimes lead to the loss of useful information in risk analysis. However, 
considering more risk parameters is not necessarily better. This is particularly true for industrial 
cases as more resources (e.g., data, time, and expert knowledge) are usually required to support 
an in-depth risk assessment, increasing risk management costs. It is, therefore, crucial to strike 
a good balance between the number of risk parameters/accuracy of risk analysis results and the 
cost of carrying out a risk estimate. In this study, two main extensions are considered to 
rationalise the risk assessment of MCSCs. The first one is the visibility of risk in a supply chain 
(Vilko, Ritala, and Hallikas, 2016), and the other is the decomposition of consequence into 
three categories, based on different types of impacts. They are time delay/disruption, 
additional cost/financial loss, and quality damage (Vilko and Hallikas, 2012). They are 
discussed in detail as follows.  
 Visibility 
Both academia and industry have identified that the visibility of risk is a major consideration 
in supply chain risk management (Caridi et al., 2014). This is because good visibility in a 
supply chain will benefit operational efficiency, productivity, and effective planning (e.g. 
Smaros et al., 2003; Petersen, Ragatz, and Monczka, 2005; Yu and Goh, 2014), as well as 
enhance supply chain stability and mitigate the bullwhip effect (Ouyang, 2007). Furthermore, 
case studies conducted by Harland, Brenchley, and Walker (2003) indicated that more than half 
of the risks influencing the studied companies were associated with the lack of sufficient 
visibility in the supply chains, and the situation becomes more worrisome given the increasing 
use of “virtual” supply chains. Enslow (2006) found that more than three quarters of the large 
companies in a global survey identified the lack of supply chain visibility as their top concern.  
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Visibility can be treated as the outcome of external integration. To some extent, it reflects 
co-operation among partner firms, in terms of information/knowledge within a supply chain 
(Vilko, Ritala, and Hallikas, 2016). Internet of things (IoT) technologies (e.g., electronic 
product code (EPC), and radio frequency identification (RFID)) have facilitated information 
sharing among actors in a supply chain. This enables the monitoring of the status of cargo 
shipments, improving the visibility and connectivity of the entire supply chain (Zhou et al., 
2009). These tools significantly contribute to reducing supply chain uncertainty, facilitating 
more stringent control of product inventory. 
Risk visibility is also expressed in other forms. Cats, Yap and van Oort (2016) explored the 
role of exposure in risk analysis in the context of transport networks. The results showed that 
including exposure allows forecasting network link criticality, so the assessment of disruption 
effects can be embedded in a cost-benefit analysis. In an FMEA model, risk visibility is 
measured using an indicator called “detection”: the means or methods by which a failure is 
detected, and the time it needs (Pentti and Atte, 2002). In this paper, the risk visibility indicates 
the level of awareness of the risk factors to be estimated, and how easily managers can detect 
them during regular risk checks.  
 Consequence 
In recent research of risk analysis in container shipping operations, Chang, Xu, and Song 
(2015) considered three types of risk consequences when developing risk maps: financial loss, 
reputation loss, and safety and security incident related loss. Vilko and Hallikas (2012) also 
described three types of risk consequences in the field of supply chain risk management: time-
based, finance-based, and quality-based effects. Time-based effects included the delay and 
disruption of material or information flows of a supply chain; finance-based effects usually 
influenced financial flows, leading to cost increases or lost profits; and the quality-based effects 
referred to the damaged quality of cargo, service, or equipment. In this thesis, the risk 
consequence is subdivided into three categories based on the nature of its impact, which are 
time delay/disruption, additional cost, and quality damage (or damage to quality). 
Delays cause pressure on the schedule flexibility of liner shipping and decrease liner service 
reliability. Due to the complex and variable navigation environment, maritime transportation 
can be delayed for days or even a week without serious consequences (Vilko and Hallikas, 
2012). Generally, there is no clear time limitation on delays, and the severity of time delays 
varies significantly, depending on the cargo being transported. For example, a shipping delay 
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of time- and temperature-sensitive products will have more severe consequences than that of 
normal goods. Here, disruption is identified as a breakdown in a maritime supply chain, where 
minimum requirements cannot be achieved. The parameter time delay/disruption has been 
widely studied in the context of container shipping (e.g. Chang, Xu and Song, 2014; Notteboom, 
2006; Vilko, Ritala and Hallikas, 2016). Additional costs include costs associated with 
additional operations and management (such as additional inventory costs and production 
costs), and fees attributable to risk drivers. For example, these costs include fees spent to hire 
armed guards on ships to protect cargo on routes with a high possibility of piracy attack (Willis, 
2011). Quality damage refers to the damage to any component within an MSC, including 
transported goods, port infrastructure, and container vessels. 
In spite of the clear differences as discussed among the consequence-related risk parameters, 
it should be noted that there are still overlaps among them, and thus they are not completely 
exclusive and independent from each other. For example, a maritime traffic incident such as a 
ship collision may cause damage to ships or even cargo, and at the same time, there is a high 
probability that the influenced shipping will be delayed.  
4.2.2 Fuzzy Rule-based Systems  
A rule-based system is composed of a set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules that relate input to output 
variables, and the rules are usually defined relative to the context and situation of problems 
(Khuankrue et al., 2017). The kth IF-THEN rule in a conventional rule base can be expressed 
in the following form (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008): 
1 2:  IF  and  and...and ,  THEN 
k k k
k M kR A A A D    Eq. 4.1 
where 𝐴𝑖
𝑘(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑀) is a referential value of the ith antecedent attribute in the kth rule, 
and M is the number of the antecedent attributes used in the kth rule. Dk (∈D, the set of all 
consequents) is the consequent in the kth rule. Obviously, the IF-THEN rules consist of two 
parts: an antecedent part that responds to the input variable(s) and a consequent part describing 
the corresponding values of the outputs. These fuzzy rules can be derived from both experts’ 
reasoning and domain knowledge.  
As shown in Eq.4.1, the case of single output is usually considered in a classical fuzzy rule-
based system. While the traditional rule base is constructed to represent fuzziness, this kind of 
fuzzy system composed of such simple IF-THEN rules has been criticised due to the fact that 
the consequent part lacks sensitivity against the antecedent part in real-world applications. In 
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other words, it means that the consequence may sometimes not be able to respond to slight 
changes of linguistic variables occurring in the antecedents. A good example to illustrate this 
deficiency can be found in its application in the FMEA for safety assessment, shown as follows  
(Yang, Bonsall, and Wang, 2008):  
R1: IF occurrence likelihood of a risk factor is “very low” (L1) AND consequence 
severity is “negligible” (C1) AND probability of failures being undetected is “highly 
unlikely” (P1), THEN the safety level is “good” (S1).  
R2: IF occurrence likelihood of a risk factor is “very low” (L1) AND consequence 
severity is “negligible” (C1) AND probability of failures being undetected is “unlikely” 
(P2), THEN the safety level is “good” (S1). 
It can be seen that a slight input change from P1 to P2 cannot be reflected in the output. In 
addition, in a traditional IF-THEN rule base, inputs and outputs are usually expressed with 100% 
certainty, resulting in other obvious deficiencies including the limited power of representing 
knowledge in the real world and not being able to deal with other types of uncertainties such 
as ignorance and incompleteness. Thus, a new knowledge representation scheme in a rule base 
has been proposed to enhance its ability of processing uncertainties in a complex system, which 
will be elaborated in the following section. 
4.2.3 Belief Rule-based Methods and Its Application 
4.2.3.1 FRB with a belief structure 
In order to model a complex environment and handle uncertain information in the risk 
management of supply chains, the classical fuzzy rule-based systems are extended by 
incorporating the concept of DoB into the consequent parts of traditional IF-THEN rules (Yang 
et al., 2006). The belief rule expressions in a fuzzy rule-based system can provide a better 
compact framework for expert knowledge representation, enabling it to deal with the situation 
where evidence available is not enough or experts are not 100% certain of their judgements but 
possess only degrees of belief or credibility regarding a hypothesis (Yang et al., 2006).  
Three important concepts that should be taken into account to support such an extension are 
the distribution of DoB in a consequent, attribute weights, and rule weights. DoB in a 
consequent indicate the experts’ opinions on the extent to which a consequence value may be 
within the set of all consequents; the weight of an attribute expresses its relative importance 
regarding its influence on the consequence of a rule; and the weight of rule represents its 
relative importance to the associated conclusions, reflecting the reliability of the rule (Tang et 
al., 2011). Based on that, the simple rule as expressed in Eq.4.1 can be extended to a so-called 
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belief rule with all possible consequents associated with belief degrees, as shown in Eq. 4.2 
(Yang et al., 2006). 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2
1
:  IF  and  and...and ,  
       THEN {( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )}
       1
k k k
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   Eq. 4.2 
where, 𝛽𝑗
𝑘(𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁) is the DoB to which Dj is believed to be the consequent in the kth 
packet rule, when the input satisfies the antecedents 𝐴𝑘 = {𝐴1
𝑘, 𝐴2
𝑘, … , 𝐴𝑀
𝑘 }. N is the number of 
all possible consequents. If ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑘𝑁
𝑗=1 = 1, the kth rule is considered to be complete; otherwise, 
it is incomplete. A belief rule base (BRB) is a collection of such belief rules. For comparison 
purpose, similar rules as described in Section 4.2.2 are presented as follows to show the 
advantages of belief rules (Yang, Bonsall, and Wang, 2008):  
R1: IF occurrence likelihood of a risk factor is “very low” (L1) AND consequence severity 
is “negligible” (C1) AND probability of failures being undetected is “highly unlikely” 
(P1),  
       THEN the safety level is {(good (S1), 1), (average (S2), 0), (fair (S3), 0), (poor (S4), 0)}. 
R2: IF occurrence likelihood of a risk factor is “very low” (L1) AND consequence severity 
is “negligible” (C1) AND probability of failures being undetected is “unlikely” (P2),  
       THEN the safety level is {(good (S1), 0.91), (average (S2), 0.09), (fair (S3), 0), (poor (S4), 
0)}. 
where {(good, 0.91), (average, 0.09), (fair, 0), (poor, 0)}is a DoB distribution representation 
for safety level consequent, indicating that it is 91% sure that the safety level is good and 9% 
sure that the safety level is poor. In this example of belief rule, the total DoB is 0.91+0.09=1, 
so that the assessment is complete. 
4.2.3.2 Application of BRB systems 
The BRB methodology is described as being capable of capturing the relationships between 
system inputs and outputs that could be discrete or continuous, complete or incomplete, linear 
or nonlinear, linguistic or numerical, or their mixture (Yang et al., 2006). Some major 
advantages of a BRB over traditional rule-based systems are, for example, in a BRB, the 
consequence of a rule is presented in the form of belief degrees distribution so that any changes 
in antecedent attributes can be clearly reflected in the consequence part. Besides, with the help 
of input transformation techniques (Yang, 2001), different types of inputs collected from multi 
 90 
 
sources with different features can be handled in a consistent manner in a BRB. Thus, the BRB 
model will be more informative, more flexible, and closer to the reality (Tang et al., 2011). 
However, due to the special structure of belief rules, traditional fuzzy logic reasoning methods 
developed based on the fuzzy set operations, are no longer suitable for the inference in BRB 
systems. In view of this, other approaches are introduced and incorporated into the BRB system 
to facilitate its application.   
Zhou et al. (2010) combined the BRB with the hidden Markov model (HMM) to achieve 
the real-time prediction of hidden failures of a system, in which the BRB is used to model the 
relationships between the environmental factors and the transition probabilities of the hidden 
states of the system, while the HMM is used to capture the relationships between the hidden 
failures and observations of a system. Based on a BK-tree, Su et al. (2016) proposed a structure 
optimization framework to improve the reasoning efficiency and decision accuracy of the 
extended BRB system. In another research, Aminravan et al. (2013) employed a novel 
proposed networked fuzzy BRB system to design decision support tools for relative water 
quality assessment in the distribution network. A learning algorithm was also incorporated to 
find the locally optimum parameters of the networked fuzzy BRB system. Among them, one 
of the widespread applications of the BRB that is worth mentioning is the generic rule-based 
inference methodology using the evidential reasoning (RIMER) approach, which is short for 
the Rule-base Inference Methodology using the Evidential Reasoning approach (Yang et al., 
2006). The inference procedure the RIMER approach is basically composed of three main steps, 
which are input transformation, activation of rule weights, and rule inference using evidential 
reasoning approach (Chen et al., 2011). Owing to the superiorities in dealing with complex 
reasoning problems under uncertainty, its related application can be found in a variety of fields 
such as environmental impact assessment, multi-attribute decision (Xu, Yang and Wang, 2006), 
engineering failure detection (Zhou et al., 2009), and risk analysis in offshore and maritime 
engineering (Ren et al., 2009), etc. However, one possible disadvantage of the RIMER 
approach that may hinder its development in practice is the complex calculation process it 
involves, which is argued to be not friendly to mathematically unsophisticated users (Yang, 
Bonsall and Wang, 2008). Therefore, Bayesian networks (BNs), another important and popular 
method for modelling uncertainties, are introduced to BRB systems in order to enhance their 
applicability in risk analysis and decision making without compromising the easiness and 
transparency.  
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An important application of BNs in BRB was conducted by Yang, Bonsall and Wang (2008). 
In the research, a new hybrid methodology was proposed to deal with some of the drawbacks 
regarding the use of conventional fuzzy rule-based methods in FMEA. The BN was 
incorporated into FRB risk inference in a complementary way, in which the subjective belief 
degrees were assigned to the consequent part of the rules to model the incompleteness 
encountered in establishing the knowledge base, and a Bayesian reasoning mechanism was 
then used to aggregate all relevant rules for assessing and prioritising potential failure modes. 
The new approach is tested by using a benchmarking technique with the RIMER approach, and 
its applicability was demonstrated by a series of case studies of collision risk in offshore 
engineering. After that, the proposed method has also led to many new applications including 
the selection of suitable steaming speed of container ships (Rahman et al., 2012), pipeline leak 
detection (Hu et al., 2011), risk analysis of academic research laboratories (Plüss, Groso and 
Meyer, 2013), supplier selection in a global sourcing environment, and assessing and 
prioritising risk factors in ports (Yang, Ng and Wang, 2013; Alyami et al., 2014), to name but 
a few. 
4.3 Use of BN to Model BRB for Risk Assessment of MCSCs 
Due to the lack of objective data on risk management in the container shipping industry, a 
novel subjective knowledge-based approach is proposed to conduct in-depth risk evaluation in 
MCSCs, which is called a belief rule-based Bayesian network (BR-BN) approach. In the BR-
BN approach, the relationships between risk parameters and risk status are modelled and 
represented in the form of a rule base with belief structure, and the belief degrees in the rule 
base are then transformed into subjective conditional probabilities in Bayesian networks, so 
that the advantages of both fuzzy rule-based systems and BN techniques in modelling and 
processing multi-source information under uncertain environment can be effectively taken. The 
proposed methodology consists of six major components, which outline all the necessary steps 
required for risk assessment (as shown in Figure 4.1). They include: 
Step 1. Identification of risk factors in MCSCs; 
Step 2. Establishment of the BRB for risk assessment; 
Step 3. Risk factors estimation and data collection; 
Step 4. Risk inference using a BN technique; 
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Step 5. Prioritisation of risk factors with utility functions; and 
Step 6. Validation of the results. 
 
Identification of risk 
factors in MCSCs
Establishment of the 
BRB to model risk 
parameters
Prioritisation of the 
risk factors using 
utility functions 
Risk inference 
using a BN 
technique
Risk factor 
estimation and 
data collection
Validation of the 
results
Document/
literature review
Expert survey
 
Figure 4.1.  The research methodology of risk factors prioritisation in MCSCs 
 
4.3.1 Identification of Risk Factors in MCSCs 
Identification of risk factors is normally recognised as a starting point of the risk assessment 
process, and it is critical to the success of supply chain risk management. The MCSC in the 
research refers to the part of a supply chain in relation to the business of maritime logistics of 
containers, which is mainly composed of container port/terminal operations and seaborne 
transportation. Besides, external and internal influence from the upstream/downstream of the 
sections is also considered. The risk factors are identified with respect to different risk types 
originated from various sources. Detailed information of risk identification and classification 
can be found in Chapter 3 for reference. The top ten risk factors selected with a consideration 
of both their occurrence likelihood and consequence severity are considered for a case study in 
this chapter.  
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4.3.2 Establishment of the BRB for Risk Assessment of MCSCs 
This step is to construct the BRB for risk assessment of MCSCs using Eq. 4.2. To construct 
such systems, five risk parameters are considered as the antecedent attributes in fuzzy rules 
(the IF part), which are risk occurrence likelihood (L), visibility (V), consequence severity in 
terms of time delay/disruption (CT), consequence severity in terms of additional cost (CC), and 
consequence severity in terms of quality damage (CQ). Risk status (R) is presented as the 
consequent attribute (the THEN part). DoBs are assigned to the linguistic variables used to 
describe the consequent attribute R in the BRB. To facilitate subjective data collection and 
representation of judgements on the five antecedent attributes and conclusion, a set of suitable 
linguistic variables are defined. The linguistic variables for describing each attribute are 
decided according to the situation of the case of interest. A literature survey suggests that the 
linguistic variables employed to describe risk parameters L, V, CT, CC, and CQ in the container 
shipping industry may be defined as follows (Alyami et al., 2014; Alyami et al. 2016; Vilko, 
Ritala, and Hallikas, 2016). To estimate L, one may often use variables (Li, i =1, 2, 3) like 
“unlikely”, “occasional”, and “frequent”. Variables (Vj, j =1, 2, 3) used to estimate V are often 
“poor”, “normal”, and “good”; variables (CTk, k =1, 2, 3) used to estimate CT are often “low”, 
“medium”, and “high”; variables (CCl, l =1, 2, 3) used to estimate CC are often “low”, 
“medium”, and “high”; and variables (CQm, m =1, 2, 3) used to estimate CQ are often 
“negligible”, “moderate”, and “critical”. Similarly, the risk status can be described using such 
linguistic variables (Rh, h =1, 2, 3) as “low”, “medium”, and “high”. The definitions of 
linguistic variables of all risk parameters are obtained taking into account the knowledge from 
both literature and domain experts, as summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Definitions of linguistic grades of each risk parameter 
Parameter 
Linguistic 
grades 
Definition 
Likelihood 
Unlikely Occurs less than once per year 
Occasional Expected to occur every few months 
Frequent Expected to occur at least monthly 
Visibility 
Poor 
Impossible or difficult to be detected through intensive 
risk checks 
Normal Possible to be detected through intensive risk checks 
Good Possible to be detected through regular risk checks 
Time delay/ 
disruption 
Low A delay less than 24 hours in total 
Medium A delay but no more than 20% of the original schedule 
High A delay of more than 20% of the original schedule 
Additional cost 
Low An additional cost no more than 10% of the total cost  
Medium An additional cost between 10% and 50% of the total cost 
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High An additional cost of more than 50% of the total cost 
Quality damage 
Negligible 
Slight cargo, equipment, or system damage but fully 
functional and serviceable 
Moderate  
Minor incapability of systems or equipment and a small 
portion of goods may be damaged 
Critical 
Damage/loss of major systems or equipment, and serious 
damage to the transported goods 
 
The number of linguistic grades for each risk parameter should not necessarily be the same, 
and more linguistic variables can also be applied according to the requirement under different 
circumstances (examples can be found in the research by Yang, Bonsall and Wang (2008)). 
However, it is worth noting that the number of rules in a BRB is directly proportional to the 
number of linguistic variables of each antecedent attribute, indicating that the rule number will 
be multiplied with the increase of variable number, which may largely weaken its practicability 
in industrial application. 
Regarding the conclusion part of a BRB, the DoB of the rules can be assigned based on 
knowledge accumulated from past events (Alyami et al., 2014) or directly by using multiple 
expert knowledge (Yang et al., 2009). However, in practice, it is difficult to determine all the 
DoBs of rules accurately in a BRB by using only experts’ subjective knowledge, especially for 
a large-scale BRB with hundreds or even thousands of rules. In view of this, a proportion 
method was proposed by Alymai et al. (2014) to rationalise the distribution of DoB. It provides 
a logical and straightforward way to calculate the DoB in the THEN part. However, one major 
deficiency of the research is the ignorance of the weight of risk parameters when calculating 
the DoB. This may impair the accuracy of the results, as any change in an attribute weight may 
lead to significant changes in the performance of the BRB systems. Thus, the relative 
importance of the antecedent attributes should be appropriately considered in the process of 
developing a rule representation. In this research, the weight of each risk parameter is 
calculated by using an AHP method, and the results are shown in Table 4.2 (the sample 
questionnaire used to collect expert opinions on the relative importance of each risk parameter 
is listed in Appendix Four). The relative importance of each risk parameter is taken into 
consideration when approaching the DoB distribution on the basis of the proportion method. 
Observing that all attributes in both IF part and THEN part are described by variables with 
three grades, thus, for any specific conclusion attribute, its DoB belonging to a particular grade 
can be calculated by summing up the normalised weights of all risk parameters that receive the 
“same” grade. Take Rule 2 as an illustration: 
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 Rule #2: If L is Unlikely, V is Good, CT is Low, CC is Low, and CQ is Moderate, 
then R is Low with a 69% DoB, Medium with a 31% DoB and High with a 0% DoB. 
The total weights of all risk parameters holding the Low (or equivalent) and the Medium (or 
equivalent) grades are 0.69 (0.18+0.08+0.35+0.08) and 0.31 (CQ, 0.31), respectively. The 
DoBs belonging to Low and Medium in the R are therefore 69% and 31%, respectively. 
Similarly, the BRB used in risk assessment of MCSCs containing 243 (3 × 3 × 3 × 3× 3) rules 
has been developed and listed in Appendix six (such a rule base represents functional mappings 
between antecedents and conclusions). 
Table 4.2. The weight of each risk parameter in the BRB 
Risk parameters (antecedent attribute) Local weight 
Global 
weight 
Occurrence likelihood (L) 0.18 0.18 
Visibility (V) 0.08 0.08 
Consequence 
severity 
Time delay (CT) 
0.74 
0.47 0.35 
Additional cost (CC) 0.11 0.08 
Quality damage (CQ) 0.42 0.31 
 
4.3.3 Risk Factors Estimation and Data Collection 
This step is to estimate the risk parameters in the antecedents in terms of each identified risk 
factor by using the defined linguistic variables, collect subjective data from experts, and 
transform them into a unified form if needed, so that they can be appropriately used in a BRB 
system for risk inference. In a traditional FRB system, membership functions are generally 
used to model linguistic variables. Some typical inputs (e.g. a single deterministic value, a 
triangular distribution, and a trapezoidal distribution) may be encountered due to the possible 
uncertainties involved (Eleye-Datubo, 2004) and they are usually represented using fuzzy 
membership functions based on historical data or experts’ experience (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 
2008). A mapping function method (Liu et al., 2004) is usually incorporated to transform the 
inputs into probability distributions of linguistic variables in antecedents. However, some 
researchers argued that such observation transformation operations might be debatable given 
that the risk analysis results are sensitive to the qualitative judgment of the linguistic variables 
used (e.g. Braglia, Frosolini and Montanari, 2003; Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008). Thus, a 
subjective probability method is employed in this study to overcome the possible weakness, in 
which the linguistic variables are treated as independent value sets without fuzzy membership 
functions being involved. 
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Subjective probability is a probability derived from an expert’s judgment about the degrees 
of a specific linguistic variable that one risk parameter belongs to. It reflects one’s opinions 
and past experience. In the subjective probability method, risk parameters are estimated and 
represented using the probability distribution of the linguistic variables, which can be given by 
experts directly. For example, the L of one risk factor is estimated by experts as “Unlikely” 
with 0.7 subjective probability, and “Occasional” with 0.3 subjective probability. The 
subjective probability distribution from multiple expert judgments can be merged using a 
weighted average based on the relative importance of each expert. In this study, a questionnaire 
survey is conducted to collect experts’ judgement of risk parameters in terms of the selected 
MCSC. The questionnaire used is listed in Appendix Five. 
4.3.4 Risk Inference Using a BN Technique 
Once all the data needed has been collected and prepared, a BN technique can be applied to 
conduct risk inference. Since multiple rules will be used in risk assessment for a particular risk 
factor, BN can serve as an appropriate tool to synthesise the DoBs of different rules involved 
due to its ability in capturing non-linear causal relationships (Alymai et al., 2104). To achieve 
the rule aggregation, the BRB developed in Section 4.3.2 is firstly represented in the form of 
conditional probabilities. For example, Rule 2 in Appendix Six can be displayed using Eq. 4.2 
as the following: 
R2: IF Unlikely (L1), Good (V1), Low (CT1), Low (CC1), and Moderate (CQ2),     
THEN {(Low (R1), 0.69), (Medium (R2), 0.31), (High (R3), 0)}. 
It can be further represented in the form of conditional probability as follows. 
Given L1, and V1, and CT1, and CC1, and CQ2, the probability of Rh (h = 1, 2, 3) is (0.69, 
0.31, 0), or 
p (Rh∣L1, V1, CT1, CC1, CQ2) = (0.69, 0.31, 0)              Eq. 4.3 
where “∣” symbolizes conditional probability. 
Using a BN technique, the BRB constructed in Section 4.3.2 can be modelled and converted 
into a converging connection consisting of six nodes- five parent nodes, which are NL, NV, NCT, 
NCC, and NCQ (Nodes L, V, CT, CC and CQ); and one child node, which is NR (Node R). Having 
transferred the BRB into a BN, the rule-based risk inference for the risk assessment will be 
simplified as the calculation of the marginal probability of the node NR. To marginalize R, the 
required CPT of NR, p (R ∣ L, V, CT, CC, CQ) can be obtained using Eq. 4.3, and the BRB is 
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shown in Appendix Six. It indicates a 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 × 3 table containing values p (Rh∣Li, Vj, 
CTk, CCl, CQm) (h, i, j, k, l, m = 1, 2, 3), as shown in Table 4.3. 
Risk assessment of each risk factor can be realised using subjective judgments from experts 
based on real observations with respect to the five risk parameters and associated linguistic 
grades as presented in Table 4.1. Subjective probabilities 𝛽𝑖 obtained from observations can be 
considered as the prior probabilities of node NL, p (Li). Similarly, the prior probabilities of all 
parent nodes, NV, NCT, NCC, and NCQ, can be computed as p (Vj) = 𝛽𝑗, p (CTk) = 𝛽𝑘, p (CCl) = 
𝛽𝑙, and p (CQm) = 𝛽𝑚, respectively. Then, the marginal probability of NR can be calculated 
using Eq. 4.4 (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). 
3 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1,2,3)
i j k l m
p Rh p Rh Li Vj CTk CCl CQm p Li p Vj p CTk p CCl p CQm
h
    



 Eq. 4.4 
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Table 4.3. The conditional probability table of NR 
L L1 
V V1 
… 
V3 
CT CT1 
… 
CT3 CT1 
… 
CT3 
CC CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 
     CQ 
R CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 
R1 1 0.69 0.92 0.61 0.65 0.34 0.57 0.26 0.92 0.61 0.84 0.53 0.57 0.26 0.49 0.18 
R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R3 0 0.31 0.08 0.39 0.35 0.66 0.43 0.74 0.08 0.39 0.16 0.47 0.43 0.74 0.51 0.82 
. 
. 
. 
L L3 
V V1 
… 
V3 
CT CT1 
… 
CT3 CT1 
… 
CT3 
CC CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 CC1 
… 
CC3 
     CQ 
R CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 CQ1 
… 
CQ3 
R1 0.82 0.51 0.74 0.43 0.47 0.16 0.39 0.08 0.74 0.43 0.66 0.35 0.39 0.08 0.31 0 
R2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R3 0.18 0.49 0.26 0.57 0.53 0.84 0.61 0.92 0.26 0.57 0.34 0.65 0.61 0.92 0.69 1 
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4.3.5 Prioritisation of Risk Factors with Utility Functions 
In order to prioritise the risk factors, appropriate utility values URh are required so that the 
DoBs of risk status can be transformed into crisp values for the comparison purpose. The utility 
values can be defined based on the combination of some specific fuzzy rules (Wang, Yang and 
Sen, 1995) and risk scores by satisfying the following conditions. 
    1) IF Unlikely (L1), Good (V1), Low (CT1), Low (CC1), and Negligible (CQ1),  
THEN {(Low (R1), 1), (Medium (R2), 0), (High (R3), 0)}. 
    2) IF Occasional (L2), Normal (V2), Medium (CT2), Medium (CC2), and Moderate (CQ2),  
THEN {(Low (R1), 0), (Medium (R2), 1), (High (R3), 0)}. 
    3) IF Frequent (L3), Poor (V3), High (CT3), High (CC3), and Critical (CQ3),  
HEN {(Low (R1), 0), (Medium (R2), 0), (High (R3), 1)}. 
The risk score (RS) describes the individual grade of each linguistics term Li, Vj, CTk, CCl, 
or CQm (i, j, k, l, m = 1, 2, 3) using a number in the scale [1, 3], where 1 indicates the “lowest 
level” (contributing the least to final risk status), and 3 means the “highest level” (contributing 
the most to final risk status). For instance, RS (L1) = 1, RS (V2) = 2, RS (CC3) = 3. Consequently, 
the values of URh can be calculated as, 
    UR1 = RS (L1) × RS (V1) × RS (CT1) × RS (CC1) × RS (CQ1) = 15= 1 
    UR2 = RS (L2) × RS (V2) × RS (CT2) × RS (CC2) × RS (CQ2) = 25= 32 
    UR3 = RS (L3) × RS (V3) × RS (CT3) × RS (CC3) × RS (CQ3) = 35= 243 
Thus, a new risk priority index (RPI) can be developed by Eq. 4.5. 
3
1
( ) Rh
h
RPI p Rh U

       Eq. 4.5 
where the larger the value of RPI, the higher the risk status of a risk factor. 
4.3.6 Validation Using Sensitivity Analysis 
When a new model is developed, a careful test is required to test its soundness. It is 
especially important and desirable when subjective elements are involved in the evaluation 
process based on the proposed model.  In this study, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to test 
the accuracy of the belief structures, and logicality of the BR-BN method proposed. Sensitivity 
analysis provides an analytical judgment for RPI. It refers to checking how sensitive the outputs 
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(the risk assessment results or RPI) are to minor changes in inputs (judgments of the risk 
parameters). If the BRB is reliable and the proposed model is sound, then the sensitivity 
analysis must at least follow the following three axioms (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008; 
Alyami et al., 2014). 
Axiom 1. A slight increase/decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each input node 
should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the posterior probability 
values of the output node.  
Axiom 2. Given the same variation of subjective probability distributions of each risk 
parameter in the antecedents, its influence magnitude to the RPI will keep consistency with 
their weight distributions. 
Axiom 3. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from x attributes (evidence) on the RPI should always be greater than the one from the set of x 
− y (y ∈ x) attributes (sub evidence). 
4.4 Case study 
In this section, an anonymous container shipping company (one of the top three container 
shipping companies in China) was selected to conduct the risk assessment on one of its MCSCs 
as a case study in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method. 
4.4.1 Selection of Major Risk Factors 
In Chapter 3, altogether 64 risk factors in MCSCs were identified and classified into four 
distinguishing groups according to the values of their ARIs by using a risk matrix analysis. 
Those risk factors which are recognised to have a relative high ARI value are selected for 
further risk assessment in this chapter. They are “fierce competition”, “fluctuation of fuel price”, 
“change of exchange rates”, “unattractive markets”, and “transportation of dangerous goods”.  
4.4.2 Establishment of the Appropriate BRB 
The detailed information on the construction of the BRB can be found in Section 4.3.2, and 
it is used in the case study. It is noteworthy that such a rule base provides a standard, generic 
belief structure. It is obvious that the DoBs of each individual rule can be reassigned with some 
flexibility to suit various specific applications in different supply chains. However, the inputs 
from multiple domain experts, as well as appropriate verification would be necessary and 
significant to ensure practical and non-biased belief functions (Yang, Bonsall and Wang, 2008). 
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4.4.3 Use of Questionnaire Survey to Estimate the Major Risk Factors 
A questionnaire was designed (see Appendix Five) to collect risk assessment information 
on the five major risk factors from three experienced staff, who work cooperatively for the safe 
and efficient operation of the investigated shipping route. The three experts have been actively 
working at the investigated shipping line for more than ten years, and their basic information 
is described as the following. 
 Expert No.1: Senior captain, head of technical safety department, who has been 
working on board ships at the investigated shipping line for more than 12 years. 
 Expert No.2: Senior officer, head of marine operations centre, involved in the safety 
and security management of global container fleets in the shipping company with 
12 years’ experience. 
 Expert No.3: Senior manager, deputy director of the operations and emergency 
services division, who has been working for more than 15 years in the shipping 
company. 
The feedback received from the three experts is combined using a weighted average. 
Referring to the similar seniority of the three experts selected for the case study, the relative 
weight of every expert is assigned equally when merging their judgments of risk parameters in 
terms of each risk factor. The average inputs will be used in the BR-BN method to rank the 
five major risk factors. Taking the “fierce competition” as an illustration, the assessment values 
of the five risk parameters are obtained and calculated, as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. Experts evaluation results of “fierce competition” 
Risk 
parameters 
Experts 
Combined DoBs 
No.1 No.2 No.3 
L 
10% Unlikely 
30% Occasional 
60% Frequent 
0% Unlikely 
20% Occasional 
80% Frequent 
0% Unlikely 
35% Occasional 
65% Frequent 
3.3% Unlikely 
28.3% Occasional 
68.4% Frequent 
V 
40% Good 
40% Normal 
20% Poor 
70% Good 
30% Normal 
00% Poor 
60% Good 
40% Normal 
0% Poor 
56.6% Good 
36.7% Normal 
6.7% Poor 
CT 
80% Low 
20% Medium 
0% High 
80% Low 
20% Medium 
0% High 
0% Low 
80% Medium 
20% High 
53.3% Low 
40.0% Medium 
6.7% High 
CC 
30% Low 
60% Medium 
10% High 
20% Low 
80% Medium 
0% High 
30% Low 
50% Medium 
20% High 
26.7% Low 
63.3% Medium 
10.0% High 
CQ 
80% Negligible 
20% Moderate  
0% Critical 
100% Negligible 
0% Moderate  
0% Critical 
70% Negligible 
30% Moderate  
0% Critical 
83.3% Negligible 
16.7% Moderate  
0% Critical 
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Estimation results of all risk parameters in terms of each risk factor can be transformed into 
the format of prior probability by using Eq. 4.3, and the BR-BN method can then be applied to 
conduct risk inference. 
4.4.4 Use of BR-BN Method for Risk Inference 
Still, taking the risk factor “fierce competition” as an example, the risk status of “fierce 
competition” can be calculated using Eq. 4.4 as p(Rh) = (51.7%, 32.3%, 16%), in which 162 
out of 234 rules in the established BRB are fired during the particular calculation process. The 
result can also be expressed as {(Low, 51.7%), (Medium, 32.3%), (High, 16%)}, and explained 
as that the risk status associated with the “fierce competition” is low with a 51.7% DoB, 
medium with a 32.3% DoB, and high with a 16% DoB. The calculation can be modelled using 
GeNle 2.0 software to facilitate BN computation, see an example in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Risk assessment of “fierce competition” using GeNle 2.0 software 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2, any risk input related to the five risk parameters can trigger a change 
in the output node, which helps to realise the automation of instant risk assessment of any target 
risk factors within an MCSC. In a similar way, the risk status of other risk factors can be 
obtained, listed as follows. 
The risk status of “fluctuation of fuel price”  
= {(Low, 58%), (Medium, 27.3%), (High, 14.7%)}; 
The risk status of “change of exchange rates”  
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= {(Low, 62.6%), (Medium, 20.8%), (High, 16.6%)}; 
The risk status of “unattractive markets”  
= {(Low, 62.8%), (Medium, 21.1%), (High, 16.1%)}; 
The risk status of “transportation of dangerous goods”  
= {(Low, 32.9%), (Medium, 52.7%), (High, 14.4%)}. 
 
4.4.5 Prioritisation of the Major Risk Factors 
The risk status of risk factors expressed by linguistic variables with DoBs requires further 
analysis by assigning them appropriate utility values for the prioritisation. By using Eq. 4.5 and 
the utility values obtained in Section 4.3.5, the RPI of risk factor “fierce competition” can be 
calculated as the following. 
3
 
1
( )
                         = 0.517 1+0.323 32+0.16 243
                         = 49.73
fierce competition Rh
h
RPI p Rh U


  

 
The RPI of other risk factors can be obtained in a similar way. The RPI values of “fluctuation 
of fuel price”, “change of exchange rates”, “unattractive markets”, and “transportation of 
dangerous goods” are 45.04, 47.62, 46.50, and 52.19, respectively. Therefore, the 
transportation of dangerous goods in the investigated container shipping line requires more 
attention in the supply chain risk management compared to other risk factors. RPI value of all 
risk factors and their rankings are summarised in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. RPI values of major risk factors 
Risk factors RPI value Rank 
Fierce competition 49.73 2 
Fluctuation of fuel price 45.04 5 
Change of exchange rates 47.62 3 
Unattractive markets  46.50 4 
Transportation of dangerous goods 52.16 1 
4.4.6 Validation of the Results 
The sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the robustness of the proposed BR-BN model 
and the logicality of the established BRB according to three axioms introduced in Section 4.3.6. 
Firstly, it is required to clarify the relationship between the risk status (or RPI) of risk factors 
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being investigated and the five risk parameters attributes (i.e. the L, V, CT, CC and CQ). As 
the linguistic variables of all risk parameters hold a positive correlation with the RPI value, the 
relationship can be easily identified and described as that the RPI value is higher, if the 
linguistic variables of each risk parameter is worse (here, “worse” means, for example, a higher 
likelihood, time delay, additional cost, quality damage, and poorer visibility). Next, a 
subjective probability of 10% is reassigned in each risk parameter and moved toward the 
maximal increment of RPI. If the model reflects the logical reasoning, the RPI should increase 
accordingly. For example, if the subjective probability of the likelihood of the risk factor 
“transportation of dangerous goods” belonging to “frequent” increases by 0.1, and 
correspondingly, the subjective probability of it belonging to “unlikely” decreases by 0.1, then 
the RPI of this risk factor increases from 52.16 to 56.15. If the subjective probability of its 
visibility belonging to “poor” increases by 0.1, and correspondingly, the subjective probability 
of it belonging to “good” decreases by 0.1, then the RPI of this risk factor increases from 52.16 
to 54.09. The similar studies have been conducted to investigate the variation between any two 
linguistic variables of the five risk parameters, and all the results obtained keep harmony with 
Axiom 1 in Section 4.3.6. Regarding the same axiom, the consistency of the BRB can also be 
tested and validated by investigating the RPI values associated with each rule. If the BRB 
established in this study is sound, the value of each rule does not change abruptly with respect 
to variation between two neighbouring linguistic variables of each risk parameter. For example, 
given a set of rules in which all L belong to “unlikely,” V belong to “good,” CT belong to “low,” 
and CQ belong to “negligible,” the minor state variation between two neighbouring states of 
the risk parameter CC from the bottom level state “low” to the top level state “high” will deliver 
changes of the RPI values from 1 to 3.48, and then to 20.36. In a similar way, the values of all 
the rules in the BRB have been checked with the assistance of GeNle 2.0 software, and the 
consistency and logicality of the BRB have been proved. 
Such a sensitivity study reveals that the RPI values are sensitive to the risk parameters. 
However, the study based on point changes instead of interval variation (i.e. [0, 0.1]) does not 
well disclose the influence magnitude of the subjective probability changes of the risk 
parameters to the RPI values. To study such influence magnitude, a sensitivity analysis based 
on an interval [0, 0.1], where the change of a subjective probability from 0 to 0.1 with a step 
of 0.02 is used for each risk parameter toward the maximal increment of the RPI. From Figure 
4.3, it is clear that the influence magnitudes of the subjective probability changes of the risk 
parameters to the RPI are significantly different. Such influence magnitudes closely follow the 
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weight ratio among the five attributes L, V, CT, CC and CQ when developing the BRB, which 
is 0.18:0.08:0.35:0.08:0.31 (as shown in Table 4.2). This is consistent with Axiom 2 introduced 
in Section 4.3.6, indicating that the rule base is reliable. 
 
Figure 4.3. Sensitivity analysis of influence magnitudes from different attributes  
  
While the discussion above mainly focuses on the subjective probability, in the next step, 
an analysis will be carried out on the effect of the variation of the risk parameters to the RPI 
values. The variation indicates the various combinations of the risk parameters. There should 
be altogether 31 combinations (𝐶5
1 + 𝐶5
2 + 𝐶5
3 + 𝐶5
4 + 𝐶5
5) of the five risk parameters in five 
groups.  According to Axiom 3 described in Section 4.3.6, if the model reflects the reality, then 
the influence magnitude of the five groups to values will always vary in an 
ascending/descending order among these groups. This can be examined by comparing the 
individual effects of such variations to the RPI values. For the illustration purpose, the 
assessment results of  risk factor “transportation of dangerous goods” is taken as an example 
and a 10% subjective probability is reassigned in each risk parameter towards a maximal 
increment of RPI values. RPI values in terms of the influence from every combination of risk 
parameters along with the variations are calculated and summarised in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Sensitivity analysis of the influence magnitude of different combinations  
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RPI values 
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of RPI 
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#1      52.16 - 
#2 O     56.51 4.35 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
In
fl
u
en
ce
 m
ag
n
it
u
d
e 
to
 R
P
I 
v
al
u
es
Varition of subjective probability
L V CT CC CQ
 106 
 
#3  O    54.09 1.93 
#4   O   60.63 8.47 
#5    O  54.09 1.93 
#6        O 59.66 7.50 
#7 O O    58.45 6.29 
#8 O  O   64.98 12.82 
#9 O   O  58.45 6.29 
#10 O    O 64.01 11.85 
#11  O O   62.56 10.40 
#12  O  O  56.03 3.87 
#13  O   O 61.59 9.43 
#14   O O  62.56 10.40 
#15   O  O 68.13 15.97 
#16       O O 61.59 9.43 
#17 O O O   66.92 14.76 
#18 O O  O  60.38 8.22 
#19 O O   O 65.95 13.79 
#20 O  O O  66.92 14.76 
#21 O  O  O 72.48 20.32 
#22 O   O O 65.95 13.79 
#23  O O O  64.50 12.34 
#24  O O  O 70.06 17.90 
#25  O  O O 63.53 11.37 
#26     O O O 70.06 17.90 
#27 O O O O  68.85 16.69 
#28 O O O  O 74.42 22.26 
#29 O O  O O 67.89 15.73 
#30 O  O O O 74.42 22.26 
#31   O O O O 71.99 19.83 
#32 O O O O O 76.36 24.20 
 “O”means a 10% reassignment of subjective probability in each attribute moving toward the 
maximal increment of RPI. 
 
The combination #1 indicates a baseline of the RPI, which shows the original assessment 
result of risk factor “transportation of dangerous goods”. The 31 combinations are listed from 
#2 to #32, which can be grouped in five different colours. Taking combination #27 as an 
example (evidence), the effect of this combination on RPI values can be calculated as 16.69 
(=68.85-52.16). Then, the influence magnitude of its sub-evidence to RPI values can be 
calculated and shown as combination #1, #2, #3, #4, #7, #8, #9, #11, #12, #14, #17, #18, #20, 
and #23. Comparing all the relevant inference magnitudes of such evidence and sub-evidence 
to RPI values, 16.69 is the biggest one among all selected combinations. Therefore, it can be 
claimed that for the investigation of the example, the model is validated to be sound. 
Furthermore, more investigation can be conducted in terms of other combinations and risk 
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factors. The reasonable results being in line with Axiom 3 are considered as a piece of evidence 
of the soundness and logicality of the whole model. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines a novel application of a quantitative risk evaluation method in supply 
chain risk management. In the BR-BN method, the BRB is established to model the 
relationships between risk parameters and risk status in a logical way, and the BN technique is 
used to conduct risk inference on the basis of the BRB. An appropriate utility function is 
applied to transform the DoBs of risk status into numerical values for ranking of risk factors. 
The Chinese container shipping company case shows that risk factor “transportation of 
dangerous goods” is identified as the most significant one in terms of the investigated shipping 
route due to its poor visibility, and high additional cost as well as severe damage to both cargo 
and ships if an accident occurs. This is consistency with the real-life situation in the maritime 
industry in China that some shippers try to hide information about the cargo in order to save 
money, as expensive freight and insurance are usually charged by shipping companies for the 
transportation of expensive cargo and dangerous goods. However, the attention being put on 
risk factors associated with maritime container transportation may vary, depending on, for 
example, the unique safety requirements of an individual shipping company, the characteristics 
of shipping routes being selected, and influence from the external policy environment.  
The numerical case study highlights some advantages and meaningful implications of the 
proposed framework for risk assessment. Firstly, on the basis of traditional definitions of the 
risk concept, more attributes are explored to measure risk factors in MCSCs in a comprehensive 
and targeted way. The proper classification of risk consequence into different categories can 
generate useful information for managers in terms of different kinds of requirements during 
decision making. Secondly, the combination of fuzzy rule bases and BNs provides a powerful 
tool to incorporate subjective judgments for risk evaluation and prioritise risk factors when 
historical data is unavailable or incomplete. Besides, representation of inputs as a probability 
distribution on linguistic variables using a brief structure enables different types of information 
with uncertainty to be modelled under a unified form. Thirdly, the consideration of the weight 
of each antecedent attribute allows for more accurate and sound DoBs, while it maintains the 
easiness of proportion method at the same time when establishing the BRB (Alyami et al., 
2014). Finally, the proposed method offers great potential in risk-based designing and 
management due to its ability to instantly rank the risk factors of a container supply chain 
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according to the stakeholders’ needs with updated information, by which the real-time 
requirement in the industry can also be satisfied. However, one limitation of the research which 
should not be ignored is that the risk assessment of the identified risk factors in this chapter is 
mainly conducted from a local level, without consideration of the position of ports in the MCSC. 
Since different ports play a different role in the container shipping network, the disruption of 
them will bring different impact to the whole supply chain. Thus, it is important to identify the 
vulnerabilities of the maritime container transportation network in order to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of port position within the MCSC from a network perspective 
and thus put forward appropriate strategies of risk prevention and preparedness to reduce the 
port risk.
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CHAPTER 5 - MULTIPLE CENTRALITY ASSESSMENT OF 
PORTS IN MARITIME CONTAINER 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS 
Summary 
Chapter 4 has proposed an advanced risk modelling approach for investigating the risk factors 
of MCSCs with respect to likelihood, visibility, and three types of risk consequence. However, 
this kind of risk evaluation was conducted mainly from a local perspective, mainly focusing on 
the MCSC with respect to aspects such as external environment, management, and operations, 
with the analysis of network structure of the container transportation system more or less being 
ignored. In order to generate a deeper understanding of MCSCs, the weight of container 
transportation routes should be taken into consideration. Ports, as the main component, play a 
significant role in connecting the whole maritime supply chain, thus providing a foundation for 
the importance measurement of the MCSC. This chapter analyses the importance of ports 
within an MCSC from a network perspective. Based on the container liner service information 
collected from one of the world’s leading shipping companies, a maritime container 
transportation network (MCTN) is constructed. Both network structure measures (e.g. degree 
distribution, average path length and clustering coefficient) and centrality measures (e.g. 
degree, closeness and betweenness centrality) are applied to investigate the topological features 
of the liner shipping network and identify the positions of different ports in the network. 
Moreover, a novel indicator involving different centrality measures is proposed to assist in 
determining the importance of ports in maritime container transportation. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Ports are the basic elements constituting a maritime supply chain. Thus, the study of ports 
in supply chain systems has been identified as a significant issue (Lam and Wei, 2011), and the 
importance of an MCSC within the global container logistics system can be measured and 
compared from a port perspective, e.g., the number of ports it contains, the relative importance 
of these ports, and the sequence by which the ports are connected by shipping services. 
Empirically, the total throughput, as one of the most available data related to port operations, 
has been widely applied as a principal indicator for measuring and comparing port performance 
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both domestically and internationally (De Langen, Nijdam and Van der Horst, 2007). It is 
analysed together with other indices using various operation and economic modelling tools, 
such as data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis (Cullinane et al., 2006). 
However, these methods are too aggregated (Ducruet, Lee and Ng, 2010), which cannot fully 
reflect the relative position of seaports within maritime networks. Other quantitative studies 
related to the measurement of port importance, including the port selection (Steven and Corsi, 
2012) and the modelling of optimal shipping routes, were mostly conducted from economic 
and operational aspects, without the consideration of network-specific elements. 
The recent decades have witnessed great efforts on the exploration of various complex 
systems from a network point of view. Typical examples are communication systems (Hagen, 
Killinger, and Streeter, 1997), the Internet (Barabasi and Albert, 1999), social systems (Valente 
and Foreman, 1998), biological networks (Jeong et al., 2000), and transportation networks 
including airline (Barrat et al., 2004), bus (Xu, Hu and Liu, 2007), ship (Xu et al., 2007), and 
subway (Latora and Marchiori, 2002) networks. Despite a relatively late application and 
development of the network analysis in the maritime transportation field, it has rapidly gained 
popularity, and a number of studies have verified the rationality and practicality applying 
complex network analysis as a tool to deal with the relational complexity of maritime shipping 
networks (e.g., Ducruet, Lee and Ng, 2010; Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012; Ducruet, 2013; 
Calatayud, Mangan and Palacin, 2017). Bartholdi, Jarumaneeroj and Ramudhin (2016) 
proposed a new index for measuring the connectivity of container ports by incorporating the 
topological information such as the position of a port within the global shipping network. The 
model is able to score for both inbound and outbound container movement in order to support 
more detailed analysis. The study by Ducruet, Lee and Ng (2010) proved that indicators of 
centrality, connectivity, and vulnerability could provide more reference than that from 
traditional traffic statistics for defining the hierarchy of traffic volume by using network 
analysis in the case of Northeast Asian ports. Ducruet (2017) also investigated the multiple 
relations between nodes and the dynamics among the different layers of multiplex networks 
according to six main categories of cargo which vessels carry, that is, containers, general cargo, 
liquid bulks, passengers, solid bulks, and vehicles. 
The development of graph theory and advanced analytical software further facilitated the 
analysis and visualization of networks, especially those of large scale. The literature on the 
application of complex network analysis in the maritime transportation area often addressed 
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three main issues, which are 1) measurement of basic network properties, 2) analysis of 
complex network features and 3) identification of ports’ positions within the shipping network.  
Several basic indices that have been widely studied to measure the configuration of a 
network are degree (degree distribution), path length, clustering coefficient, diameter, and 
network density, etc. The relationships among these indices are also investigated as needed. 
These studies aim to reveal the topological properties of the sample networks or compare the 
difference between various types of networks. The empirical analysis of the structure of the 
worldwide marine transportation network (WMTN) by Deng et al. (2009) indicated that 
WMTN had a relatively short average path length and high clustering coefficient. In terms of 
the cumulative degree distribution, it followed an exponential-like distribution. Hu and Zhu 
(2009) comparatively studied the basic properties of the WMTN under two different 
representations. The results showed that cumulative degree distributions of degree under two 
representations were different, but the clustering coefficients both exhibited similar behaviour 
as functions of degree. Kaluza et al. (2010) highlighted the difference of some basic network 
properties among the networks of cargo movements of container ships, dry bulk carriers and 
oil tankers. 
Some common characteristics shared by networks of many different types have been 
discovered including small-world effect (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), the scale-free feature 
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999), assortative mixing (Newman, 2002), and rich-club phenomenon 
(Shi and Mondragon, 2004). The investigation of these properties and laws in the global 
maritime transport network can help to deepen the understanding of shipping network 
structures. Ducruet and Notteboom (2012) evidenced the properties of scale-free and small-
world in the worldwide container shipping networks constructed according to the movements 
of container vessels in 1996 and 2006, respectively. Similar features were also observed by 
Tovar, Hernández, and Rodríguez-Déniz (2015) in their study on the shipping network of 
Canary Islands. However, research on the WMTN by Hu and Zhu (2009) presented a truncated 
scale-free behaviour only in the space L and an obvious small-world property in the space P7.  
Centrality, as a fundamental concept in network analysis, has already been addressed in the 
maritime transportation sector as an indicator for assessing the relative importance/position of 
ports as early as in the 1990s (Fleming and Hayuth, 1994). In previous studies, the three most 
                                                 
7 The concept of Space L and P will be explained in Section 5.3 
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widely applied centrality measures in the shipping industry are degree, closeness, and 
betweenness centrality. Ducruet, Lee and Roussin (2009) applied betweenness centrality solely 
in identifying the position of South Korean ports in the Asian shipping network, and the results 
recognised Busan as the most central port due to its strong position for regional transhipment. 
In the work of Ducruet, Lee and Ng (2012), both degree and betweenness centralities were 
considered to measure the relative importance of Northeast Asian ports within the regional 
liner networks. The correlations between the two centrality measures and throughput were also 
checked, and the results indicated that centrality performed better reflecting the importance of 
hub functions compared to the conventional throughput index. Wang and Cullinane (2016) 
extended the application of centrality measures in a flow-movement-directed and 
transportation-capacity-weighted network in order to reflect better the characteristics of traffic 
flows in the real shipping networks. The foreland market coverage was also taken into 
consideration to study its influence on the port centralities. 
One major limitation of the existing port centrality research is that there is little or no 
consideration of the difference of contributions made by different centrality measures when 
assessing the importance of a port in the network. This is because most previous research used 
only one or some of these centrality measures, or utilised all of them but with limited 
consideration of their different roles reflecting a port’s position. As each centrality measure has 
its own emphasis on identifying the importance of a node, thus the application of them 
separately will inevitably result in the missing of information, which cannot comprehensively 
reflect the position of a port in the network. This chapter aims to develop a more rational and 
practicable measure to evaluate the importance of ports, in order to provide the basis for the 
overall evaluation of MCSC performance from a global perspective. 
In the following, Section 5.2 outlines the methods used to measure the basic network 
properties and centralities and proposes a new approach for comprehensively evaluating the 
position of a port. The data collection, processing, and construction of the sample network are 
provided in Section 5.3. A case study of one world leading shipping company is used to 
demonstrate the application of the proposed method in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes this 
chapter. 
5.2 Methodology 
Due to the fact that a highly interconnected global maritime container transportation system 
functions with all the features and characteristics of a typical network, it is often abstracted to 
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a graph, in which container ports are viewed as the nodes and liner shipping services as the 
arcs within the network. Therefore, the MCTN provides an excellent fundamental basis for 
analysing its structure by using a complex network approach. In this chapter, the MCTN is 
abstracted as a connected network G = (V, E) by V and E, where V = {vi: i=1, 2,…, n}, n is the 
number of nodes (ports), while E = {ei: i=1, 2,…, m}, m is the number of arcs (links between 
ports). To represent a network, an adjacency matrix An×n is created where an element aij = 1 
when a container liner service exists between port vi and vj, and aij = 0 otherwise. Measures of 
both network structure and centrality are introduced in Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, respectively. 
Based on that, a comprehensive measure of port importance is developed and described in 
Section 5.2.3. 
5.2.1 Measures of Network Structure 
Several basic indices are studied in previous research to measure the statistical properties of 
a network. Among them, three most robust measures that have been widely applied in 
transportation research are degree distribution, average path length and clustering coefficient 
(Wang et al., 2011). 
1) Degree and degree distribution 
The degree is the number of links that a node shares with others. In an MCTN, the degree ki 
represents the number of connections that port vi has to other ports (Tovar, Hernández, and 
Rodríguez-Déniz, 2015). It is a simple yet intuitive indicator showing how important a node is 
within the cargo shipping networks. If a network is directed, then nodes have two different 
degrees: the in-degree, which is the number of incoming arcs; and the out-degree, which is the 
number of outgoing arcs. For an MCTN with n ports, if nk of them have degree k, the degree 
distribution p(k) is defined as the fraction of these k-degree ports, i.e., nk /n. P(k) represents the 
cumulative degree distribution, i.e., the fraction of ports with degrees greater than, or equal to, 
k, written as (Barabási and Albert, 1999): 
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       Eq. 5.1 
In terms of physical interpretation, the degree distribution indicates the number of ports that 
have a certain number of shipping routes. The average degree of a network, denoted as <k>, is 
the average number of directly connected ports that a port has in an MCTN.  
2) Average path length  
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The distance (also known as the geodesic distance, d(vi, vj)) between two ports vi and vj in 
a graph is defined as the number of edges for the shortest path from i to j. The average path 
length, denoted by <l>, expresses the mean length of all shortest paths in the network. 
Considering an unweighted directed network, it is written as (Watts and Strogatz, 1998): 
1
( , )
( 1)
i j
i j
l d v v
n n 
  

           Eq. 5.2 
It measures the efficiency of the routes that connect any two nodes in the network. The 
smaller the <l> is, the more likely that the two nodes can be linked through a small number of 
steps. The physical interpretation of this measure corresponds to the average length of the 
shipping routes in an MCTN. The diameter of the network, denoted as D, is defined as the 
longest geodesic, i.e., the maximum value of all d(vi, vj). It is a measure of network 
compactness. Thus, the lower the diameter, the more connected a network is (Tsiotas, and 
Polyzos, 2014). 
3) Clustering coefficient 
The (local) clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend 
to cluster together. The clustering coefficient (Ci) of a node (vi) is the portion of actual links 
(Ei) between the nodes within its neighbourhood divided by the maximal possible links 
between them. For a directed graph, there are ki (ki-1) links that could exist among the nodes 
within the neighbourhood. Thus, the clustering coefficient of a node is written as (Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998): 
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     Eq. 5.3 
A large Ci value means that the node has a more compact system of connections with its 
neighbours. In a fully-connected network, Ci of all nodes equals 1. For an MCTN, it expresses 
the probability of meeting shipping connections among the neighbours of a port. The average 
clustering coefficient C of the whole network is the average of all Ci over all nodes, written as: 
1
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       Eq. 5.4 
The larger the value of C is, the more likely nodes are to reach one another within a short 
topological distance (i.e., transhipment). It is worth noting that a network is considered to be a 
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small-world network if its average clustering coefficient is significantly higher than a random 
network constructed on the same node set, and meanwhile it has a small average path length. 
The small-world property has been revealed in many real-world networks including Internet 
connectivity, electric power grids, and gene networks (Wang et al., 2011). 
5.2.2 Measures of Centrality 
Centrality indices were first developed in social network analysis (Newman, 2010) to study 
the characteristics of those crucial nodes within a graph, so that the most important ones can 
be identified based on their rankings. In this chapter, we adopt the three most widely applied 
centrality measures to investigate the importance of individual ports in an MCTN. They are 
degree centrality (CD), closeness centrality (CC), and betweenness centrality (CB).  
5.2.2.1 Degree Centrality  
As the simplest centrality index, degree centrality of a node is defined as the number of links 
directly connected to it. It symbolises the importance of the node in a network (Freeman, 1979) 
based on the idea that important nodes have the largest number of links to other nodes in the 
network (Crucitti, Latora and Porta, 2006). Degree centrality of port vi is defined as: 
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where, ki is the degree of port vi, and j represents all other ports within the MCTN. The 
index reflects the connectivity of a port in the maritime shipping network. As discussed in 
Section 5.2.1, two separate measures of degree centrality are further defined in the directed 
network, namely, in-degree (CD-in) and out-degree centralities (CD-out). The former represents a 
port’s popularity, and the latter reflects its activity (Wang and Cullinane, 2016).  
The degree centrality is usually normalised (which is also called the relative degree centrality) 
for the comparison among different networks. This can be done in a directed graph as: 
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where, CD-in (i) denotes the in-degree centrality of port vi, CD-out (i) denotes the out-degree 
centrality of port vi, and n is the number of ports within the MCTN. 
5.2.2.2 Closeness Centrality 
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Closeness centrality measures the extent to which a node is near to all other nodes along the 
shortest path. It indicates how central a node is in the network. In this study, the closeness 
centrality of port vi is calculated as: 
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It can be normalised as: 
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  Eq. 5.8 
The closeness centrality reflects the accessibility (or reachability) of a port, and it can be 
interpreted as a level of convenience that containers be shipped between this port and the others 
in the given MCTN. The larger the value of closeness centrality of a port, the more convenient 
it is to reach other port destinations within the container service network. 
5.2.2.3 Betweenness Centrality  
Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a node falls between pairs of other 
nodes on the shortest paths connecting them in a network (Freeman, 1979). It is based on the 
idea that a node tends to be more powerful if it lies between many other nodes, in the sense that 
it works as an intermediate point controlling connections between these pairs. Thus, it is useful 
to measure the volume at which a port constitutes a transit station against all possible shipping 
routes in the MCTN. The betweenness of port vi is defined as: 
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where, σjk denotes the sum of all shortest paths between port vj and vk, and σjk(i) is the number 
of these shortest paths that pass through port vi. For a directed graph, it can be normalised as 
(Hu and Zhu, 2009): 
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Betweenness centrality reflects the transitivity of a port. The larger the value of 
betweenness centrality, the more frequently a port will occur on the shortest paths between any 
other two ports within the MCTN. 
5.2.3 Comprehensive Measurement of Port Importance 
Although the above mentioned centrality measures have been widely studied and applied in 
the identification of important ports in maritime transportation networks, most of the studies 
are conducted with the consideration of only single centrality (e.g. Ducruet and Zaidi, 2012; 
Hu and Zhu, 2009; Laxe, Seoan and Monte, 2012). This will inevitably result in a relatively 
larger deviation between the computational results and the real industrial situation, as partial 
information provided by the single centrality cannot reflect the whole profile. In order to 
measure the overall impacts of a port and rank them according to the aggregated information 
from different centrality indices, this chapter develops a novel indicator for comprehensively 
scoring ports’ importance, expressed as, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )O D D C C C CS i w S i w S i w S i      Eq. 5.11 
where, SO (i) denotes the overall (total) score of port vi; wD, wC , and wB are the weights of 
score SD (i), SC (i), and SB (i), respectively, representing how much they individually contribute 
to the total score. wD, wC , and wB are determined by the degree of correlation between 
normalised  degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities of a port against its cargo volume, 
which can be calculated as, 
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    Eq. 5.12-1 
where, rD, rC, and rB are correlation coefficients between normalised degree (C’D(i)), 
closeness (C’C(i)), and betweenness centralities (C’B(i)) and annual container throughput (in 
TEU), respectively. It is noted that although container throughput cannot fully reflect the real 
situation of the development of a port, currently there is no other indicator that has been used 
as widely in the global container shipping industry to measure the performance of a port better. 
Thus, the container throughput is considered as a reference in this study for the calculation of 
weights of sores provided by different centrality measures. SD (i), SC (i), and SB (i) represent the 
scores obtained in terms of the normalised degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities, 
respectively. They are computed through the following equation. 
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    Eq. 5.12-2 
where, n is the total number of ports in the network, and RankD(i), RankC(i), and RankB(i) 
are the ranking of port vi within the MCTN in terms of its normalised degree, closeness, and 
betweenness centralities, respectively. Eq. 5.12-2 is based on the idea of Borda Count Method. 
It is an election method in which voters rank options or candidates in order of preference. It is 
able to avoid the subjective bias caused by decision maker preferences, and thus provides a 
rational way for integrating different analysis from various centrality indices as evidenced by 
its implications in recent studies (e.g. Liu et al., 2018). In our case, all ports are the candidates, 
and the above-mentioned three centrality measures are the voters.  
5.3 Construction of the Container Shipping Networks 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, so far there is no unanimity on how the real-life 
transportation system is translated into a network representation. In the container shipping 
industry, two topological representations originating from the research on public bus networks 
(Kurant and Thiran, 2006) have appeared to address this particular problem, which are space-
of stops and space-of-changes representations. In the research by Ducruet, Rozenblat and Zaidi 
(2010), the space-of stops representation was termed as the graph of direct linkages (GDL), in 
which two ports would be directly linked if they are consecutive stops within a shipping route, 
while the space-of-changes representation was termed as the graph of all linkages (GAL), 
where two ports would be linked if they belong to the same liner service or loop, regardless of 
whether they were visited consecutively. Thus, in the GAL, indirect links are also added. In 
other studies, the GDL is also named space L, and the GAL is named space P (Hu and Zhu, 
2009). Many studies have been conducted to compare the difference between the two network 
representations in terms of their basic properties and network features (e.g., Hu and Zhu, 2009; 
Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012; Ducruet and Zaidi, 2012). 
Generally, a container’s journey seldom exactly aligns with the start and end of one service 
due to the influencing factors such as today’s hub-and-spoke design, and the emergence of 
transhipment (Viljoen and Joubert, 2016). Moreover, from a perspective of cargo movement, 
the GAL is expected to be a better representation of liner shipping as in the real-life situation 
it is possible for a container to be transported to any port from the departure port within the 
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same shipping route. Therefore, this study adopts GAL to build the container shipping network, 
that is, all ports in the same service are considered linked either directly or indirectly.  
5.3.1 Data Collection and Processing 
Previous studies revealed that the data used for network analysis is normally obtained from 
two major sources: shipping service information from individual liners’ official websites or 
published in Containerisation International Yearbooks; the automatic identification system 
(AIS) information of actual ship movements collected online or recorded by Lloyd’s Maritime 
Intelligence Unit. The example chosen for illustration in this chapter is a world leading carrier 
- COSCO SHIPPING Lines Co., Ltd. The maritime data was sourced from the service 
information of COSCO published online (http://lines.coscoshipping.com/home/). The schedule 
information from 6th March to 7th May in 2017 was collected, and basic information of a 
specific route includes ports of call (port rotation), time schedule, ship fleet, and ship capacity. 
A time span of two months is considered in this study as this time period can cover the longest 
time a voyage may take. By applying a GAL representation, each shipping route can be 
interpreted as a small network where all ports in the same shipping route are linked together, 
and the merging of all these individual sub-networks results in the complete network.  
This kind of dataset based on individual liner shipping companies is justified because 
available studies (Kivelä et al., 2013; Ducruet, 2017) revealed that the global container 
shipping network could be regarded as a multi-layered structure resulting from the aggregation 
of container shipping networks provided by different container shipping lines, and it has 
already been widely accepted as the basis for analysis of, for instance, relationships and 
dynamics between ports (Ducruet, 2013), centrality of shipping areas (Liu, Xu and Shi, 2015), 
and port centrality in maritime container transportation (Wang and Cullinane, 2016). However, 
as this study mainly focuses on developing new approaches for the rational measurement of 
the importance of ports in the maritime shipping network, service information from only one 
shipping company is collected for a demonstration purpose. It is important to highlight that, 
unlike other previous research, such as Ducruet and Zaidi (2012) and Tovar, Hernández, and 
Rodríguez-Déniz (2015), among others, the direction of cargo flow movements is considered 
in this study, which is of great significance to reflect the phenomena of trade imbalance existing 
in the global trade. Besides, the real maritime transportation networks should be directed and 
asymmetric due to the existence of circular routes (Hu and Zhu, 2009). 
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One limitation the dataset might face is that the links between all pairs of ports within the 
sample network are treated with the same weight due to the lack of availability of actual 
container traffic statistics (the container shipping companies' statistical data on traffic flows 
handled by each pair of ports is supposed to be highly strategic for competition, and this kind 
of data is usually confidential). 
5.3.2 Description of the Sample Shipping Network 
Based on shipping practices and shipping schedules of the shipping company under 
investigation, six main trade lanes are categorised in this research. They are Trans-Pacific 
Trade Lane, Europe Trade Lane, Europe Feeder & Trans-Atlantic Trade Lane, Asian Pacific 
Trade Lane, Latin America&/Africa Trade Lane, and Southeast & South Asia Trade Lane. 
Each trade lane connects certain regions, and specific routes are designed to serve shipping 
demand between these regions. The combination of numerous routes forms the network.  
Based on the information of 123 shipping routes in the dataset, an unweighted and directed 
network is constructed composing of 212 nodes and 3425 arcs. The distribution of these ports 
is listed in Table 5.1 
Table 5.1. Port distributions  
Shipping area 
No. of 
countries 
No. of ports 
% of total 
port No. 
Asia  
Northeast Asia 3 36 17.0% 
Southeast Asia 7 14 6.6% 
South Asia 3 8 3.8% 
West Asia 10 25 11.8% 
America 
North America 8 30 14.2% 
South America 7 19 8.9% 
Africa 16 28 13.2% 
Europe 20 41 19.3% 
Oceania 2 11 5.2% 
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Figure 5.1. Graph of the sample network 
Source: realised by the author based on COSCO service data and NetDraw software. Node's size according to degree centrality (for better 
readability, only the names of the top 15 ports in terms of their throughputs in 2016 are presented)
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In terms of the sample network based on the information collected from COSCO, the Asia 
area holds the highest number of countries, followed by the area of Europe with 20 countries. 
Meanwhile, Asian countries contribute the most in terms of the number of ports in the network, 
accounting for 39.2% of the total number. Although there are only three countries under 
consideration in the Northeast Asia area- China, Japan, and South Korea- 26 out of the 36 ports 
belong to China, taking up 12.3% of the total number. China is the country that contributes the 
most to the network in terms of the port number. The other three countries with at least ten 
ports being involved are the USA, Turkey, and Italy. This is to some extent in accordance with 
their total volume of import and export trade (CIA, 2017), and it is also part of the reflection 
of the shipping company's marketing strategy. A graph representation of the sample network 
is shown in Figure 5.1. 
5.4 Empirical Application and Analysis 
By the end of February 2018, COSCO had a total of 343 container ships (including 53 ships 
with a capacity equal to or above 10,000 TEUs), with a total carrying capacity of 1.86 million 
TEUs (8.5 per cent of the world total container shipping capacity), ranking the fourth place in 
the world (first place in China) for the scale of the container fleet (Alphaliner, 2018). Thus, we 
believe that COSCO is a suitable selection for the case study of the maritime network analysis 
considering both the representative role in shipping companies worldwide and the convenience 
of data collection. Within the context of this study, the sample MCTN consists of 212 container 
ports from 76 countries. This section aims to show the characteristics of the sample shipping 
network and demonstrate the applicability of the proposed methods on the measurement of 
ports’ importance.  
5.4.1 Statistical Properties of the Sample MCTN 
1)  Degree and degree distribution 
The ports with a relatively high number of connections (with a degree of 40 at least) in the 
sample network in terms of their in-degree and out-degree are listed in Table 5.2. It can be seen 
that Singapore, Port Klang (Malaysia), and Shanghai are the three most popular ports as more 
ports tend to connect to them, while the top three active ports are recognised as Shanghai, 
Ningbo, and Singapore, due to the large number of outgoing shipping routes they possess. Most 
of these ports are in Asia (except for Piraeus and Rotterdam), and their roles as a transport hub 
can be classified into two main types: either as a gateway hub (e.g., Shanghai, Ningbo, and 
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Rotterdam) which is crucial in connecting the inland and overseas market or as a transhipment 
hub (e.g., Singapore, and Busan) being able to attract a large number of cargos from 
neighbouring ports owing to their superior geographical locations for transhipment. 
Table 5.2. List of most connected ports (k≥40) 
Port In-degree Rank Port  Out-degree Rank 
Singapore 103 1 Shanghai 152 1 
Port Klang* 102 2 Ningbo 146 2 
Shanghai 89 3 Singapore 127 3 
Hong Kong 81 4 Busan 106 4 
Qingdao 73 5 Qingdao 98 5 
Busan 56 6 Hong Kong 96 6 
Piraeus 54 7 Shekou** 87 7 
Jeddah 54 8 Yantian** 83 8 
Rotterdam 50 9 Kaohsiung 72 9 
Xiamen 45 10 Xiamen 68 10 
Khor Fakkan 44 11 Port Klang* 65 11 
Kaohsiung 42 12 Nansha 53 12 
Yantian** 41 13 Piraeus 51 13 
Colombo 41 14 Jebel Ali 46 14 
* It refers to Port Klang north and south 
combined. 
** They all belong to Shenzhen Port. 
*** It refers to the Tianjin-Xingang Port. 
Rotterdam 45 15 
Antwerp 43 16 
Xingang*** 42 17 
Chiwan** 42 18 
Nhava Sheva 40 19 
In order to reduce the statistical errors arising from the limited sample size, we use the 
cumulative distribution to describe the in-degree and out-degree of ports. The cumulative 
degree distributions are shown in Figure 5.2. 
   
                                         (a)              (b) 
 
Figure 5.2. Cumulative degree distributions of degree. (a) In-degree distribution. (b) Out-
degree distribution. Source: realised by authors based on the COSCO data 
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The out-degree distribution follows a power-law distribution, and it can be described by the 
power law 𝑝(𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡)~𝑘
−𝑟 with r =1.084. While, the in-degree can be approximated by an 
exponential function as 𝑝(𝑘𝑖𝑛) = 𝑒
−0.056𝑘 with a vertical intercept of 1. They both signify that 
a few main ports at the top dominate the network with a large number of shipping routes, and 
the number of routes to each port declines quickly and levels off towards small ports. For 
example, the top 20% of ports account for a majority (55%) of all shipping routes, and 
numerous ports (around half of the total) at the bottom have only a limited number of 
connections (less than 10). The cumulative distributions of degree approximately follow the 
Pareto principle, that is, about 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes. The power-
law distribution of out-degree is similar to the case of the Northeast Asian liner network in 
2006 (Ducruet, Lee, and Ng, 2010), while the exponential properties of in-degree distribution 
are more consistent with that of the worldwide maritime transportation network case studied 
by Hu and Zhu (2009). They also revealed that the cumulative degree distributions of degree 
in a GAL representation are different from that in a GDL representation. Regarding the fitting 
curves, the high coefficients of determination (R2 > 0.9) in Figure 5.2 indicate that both models 
can almost perfectly describe the variation of the distribution of in-degree and out-degree data. 
2)  Average path length 
The average path length reflects the convenience of transportation of cargos in the sample 
network. Based on Eq. 5.2, the average path length of the sample network can be calculated as 
<l> = 2.28. This generally means, in the world shipping service network of COSCO, it takes 
over one transhipment on average to deliver the container to any destination port. This number 
is slightly larger than a random network (<lr> ≈ 1.93) of the same scale. The diameter of the 
sample network is 5 (at least four transhipments), which exists in connections between the Port 
of Ravenna (Italy) and the Port of Humen (China). The average path length of 2.28 in the 
sample network is very similar to that of the global container shipping network (2.26) 
established also based on a GAL representation by Ducruet and Notteboom (2012). It is noted 
that the network of GAL representation is generally more efficient than that of GDL 
representation because the inclusion of indirect links facilitates the circulation of flows in the 
network, as reflected by its shorter average path length. 
3)  Clustering coefficient 
Clustering coefficient is used as an indicator to reflect the local cohesiveness of the network 
in the neighbourhood of the node. The sample network’s clustering coefficient is 0.62, much 
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larger than that for a random network (Cr ≈ 0.076) of the same size. A larger clustering 
coefficient confirms the high-degree of concentration identified earlier and also implies a high 
probability for containers being transported to the destination with fewer transhipments in the 
network. With a high clustering coefficient (0.62) as well as a small average shortest path 
length (2.28) of the sample network, we conclude that the MCTN of COSCO has a small-world 
property as shown in other maritime shipping networks (e.g., Hu and Zhu, 2009; Ducruet and 
Notteboom, 2012; Zong and Hu, 2017). A comparison of the statistical properties between the 
sample network in this chapter and that of other maritime transportation network cases is 
summarised in Table 5.3. 
The comparison shows that, despite the fundamental differences in size and structure, these 
networks share similar features such as the close average path length, relative high clustering 
coefficient, and an apparent small-world phenomenon, indicating the rationality of the data, 
and the representative role of the sample network in this study evidenced by the similar 
topological features compared with other global maritime shipping networks. Thus, the sample 
network also can be treated as a kind of complex network, and the centrality measures will be 
applied to the port-related analysis in the following section. 
Table 5.3. Comparison of characteristics of different networks 
Author Type of network n m <k> <l> C 
Network 
structure 
Xu et al. (2007)* Ship-transport network of China 162 61060 8.27 3.87 0.83 
Truncated 
SF; SW** 
Hu and Zhu 
(2009)* 
Worldwide maritime 
transportation network 
878 24967 28.44 2.66 0.71 SW 
Kaluza et al. 
(2010) 
Network of global container 
ships 
378 - 32.4 2.76 0.52 SW 
Ducruet and 
Notteboom 
(2012)* 
Global container shipping 
network 
1205 51057 87.52 2.22 0.73 SF; SW 
In this chapter 
Global container shipping 
network of COSCO 
212 3425 16.16 2.28 0.62 SW 
* Although statistical properties of the networks in both GDL and GAL were investigated by the authors, we only 
focus on the comparison of GAL results. 
** SF denotes scale-free, and SW refers to the small-world network. 
 
5.4.2 Centralities of Ports in the MCTN 
In order to identify the relative positions of container ports within the shipping network, port 
centralities have been examined from the perspective of their direct connectivity (degree 
centrality), reachability to other ports (closeness centrality), and transitive position on other 
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pairs of ports (closeness centrality). Computational results of all ports are listed in Appendix 
Seven. 
1) Degree centrality 
Degree centrality is a local level measure indicating the number of direct connections linking 
the port with others. Based on Eq. 5.5 and 5.6, normalised degree centralities of all ports can 
be obtained, and the top 20 are listed in Table 5.4. Among them, 16 out of 20 are Asian ports 
(ten of them are Chinese ports), and the other four are European ports (i.e., Piraeus, Rotterdam, 
Antwerp, and Hamburg) 
Table 5.4. Top 20 ports in terms of normalised degree centrality 
Rank Port 𝐂𝑫
′ (𝒊) Rank Port 𝐂𝑫
′ (𝒊) 
1 Shanghai 0.5711 11 Xiamen 0.2678 
2 Singapore 0.5450 12 Piraeus 0.2488 
3 Ningbo 0.4265 13 Rotterdam 0.2251 
4 Hong Kong 0.4194 14 Jeddah 0.2180 
5 Qingdao 0.4052 15 Nansha 0.2156 
6 Port Klang 0.3957 16 Jebel Ali 0.1967 
7 Busan 0.3839 17 Antwerp 0.1825 
8 Yantian 0.2938 18 Hamburg 0.1706 
9 Shekou 0.2844 19 Colombo 0.1706 
10 Kaohsiung 0.2701 20 Xingang 0.1635 
 
In terms of the situation in the whole network, there are only two ports (Shanghai and 
Singapore) that have a relative degree centrality value more than 0.5, which means that they 
are directly connected to more than half of the ports in the sample network, revealing their 
strategic positions with respect to the service offered by COSCO. The total number of ports 
with a relative degree centrality above 0.1 is 40 (apart from Shanghai and Singapore, it consists 
of 25 ports between 0.1 and 0.2; 8 ports between 0.2 and 0.3; 2 ports between 0.3 and 0.4, and 
3 ports between 0.4 and 0.5), accounting for 18.87% of the total number of ports in the sample 
network. The remaining 172 ports are less connected with a relative degree centrality below 
0.1. Geographical distribution of the most connected ports (with a relative degree centrality 
above 0.2) is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3. Ports with a degree centrality above 0.2 
 
2) Closeness centrality 
Closeness centrality is a global level measure relating to the distance of a port to all others 
in the network. Based on Eq. 5.7 and 5.8, normalised closeness centralities of all ports can be 
obtained, and the top 20 are listed in Table 5.5. Shanghai, Ningbo, and Singapore are still 
among the top three places. However, Ningbo surpasses Singapore in terms of the relative value 
of closeness centrality, ranking the second. This means that Ningbo locates in a more central 
position compared to Singapore in the sample network, though it has relatively fewer direct 
connections with neighbouring ports. 
Table 5.5. Top 20 ports in terms of normalised closeness centrality 
Rank Port 𝐂𝑪
′ (𝒊) Rank Port 𝐂𝑪
′ (𝒊) 
1 Shanghai 0.8023 11 Kaohsiung 0.6063 
2 Ningbo 0.7701 12 Nansha 0.5960 
3 Singapore 0.7456 13 Piraeus 0.5910 
4 Hong Kong 0.6873 14 Jeddah 0.5813 
5 Busan 0.6785 15 Rotterdam 0.5765 
6 Port Klang 0.6763 16 Antwerp 0.5734 
7 Qingdao 0.6573 17 Colombo 0.5672 
8 Yantian 0.6394 18 Hamburg 0.5672 
9 Shekou 0.6394 19 Khor Fakkan 0.5642 
10 Xiamen 0.6280 20 Jebel Ali 0.5642 
 
In terms of the situation in the whole network, Shanghai is the only one that has a relative 
closeness centrality value of more than 0.8, showing its most central position in the network. 
The total number of ports with a relative closeness centrality above 0.5 is 61 (apart from 
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Shanghai, it consists of 50 ports between 0.5 and 0.6, 8 ports between 0.6 and 0.7, and 2 ports 
between 0.7 and 0.8), accounting for 28.77% of the total number of ports in the sample network. 
A relative closeness centrality value higher than 0.5 indicates that container transportation 
between these pairs of ports can be achieved directly or depending on one other intermediary 
port. Geographical distribution of those most central ports (with a relative closeness centrality 
equal to or above 0.5) is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4. Ports with a closeness centrality above (or equal to) 0.5 
 
3) Betweenness centrality 
As another global level measure, betweenness centrality indicates the potential of ports to 
be utilized as an intermediate transhipment station for completing the delivery of containers 
between pairs of ports. Based on Eq. 5.9 and 5.10, normalised betweenness centralities of all 
ports can be obtained, and the top 20 are listed in Table 5.6. Singapore ranks the first in terms 
of betweenness centrality, surpassing Shanghai for the first time. It reflects the difference of 
this indicator when identifying important ports, which emphasizes more on the transhipment 
function on a port. This can be evidenced by the improved performance of Busan and 
Rotterdam in terms of betweenness centrality, which play the important role of regional 
transhipment centre in the Northeast Asia area and Western Europe area, respectively. 
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Table 5.6. Top 20 ports in terms of normalised betweenness centrality 
Rank Port 𝐂𝑩
′ (𝒊) Rank Port 𝐂𝑩
′ (𝒊) 
1 Singapore  0.1608 11 Xiamen 0.0312 
2 Shanghai 0.1560 12 Kaohsiung 0.0267 
3 Hong Kong 0.0794 13 Piraeus 0.0242 
4 Busan 0.0728 14 Fangchenggang 0.0235 
5 Qingdao 0.0699 15 Felixstowe 0.0196 
6 Port Klang 0.0693 16 Genoa 0.0185 
7 Rotterdam 0.0615 17 Jeddah 0.0180 
8 Yantian 0.0458 18 Shekou 0.0176 
9 Ningbo 0.0349 19 Jebel Ali 0.0137 
10 Nansha 0.0317 20 Algeciras 0.0108 
 
In terms of the situation in the whole network, there are only 20 ports which have a relative 
betweenness centrality value more than 0.01 (it consists of 9 ports between 0.01 and 0.03, 4 
ports between 0.03 and 0.06, 5 ports between 0.06 and 0.1, and 2 ports above 0.1), accounting 
for 9.43% of the total number of ports in the sample network. Normalised betweenness 
centrality values of all ports are relatively low compared to the values of the other two centrality 
measures, which reveals that the “control” effects of these ports being identified as 
transhipment hubs are still limited to a regional level rather than global level. Geographical 
distribution of those ports (with a relative betweenness centrality above 0.01) is shown in 
Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5. Ports with a betweenness centrality above 0.01 
The top 20 ports with respect to different centrality measures are summarised in Table 5.7. 
It can be seen that the ranking of ports varies according to the different indicators. However, 
some ports maintain relatively high importance and their names appear in the ranking list 
repeatedly, such as Shanghai, Singapore, Ningbo, Hong Kong, Busan, to name just a few. 
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Table 5.7. Top 20 ports by normalised degree, closeness, and betweenness. 
Rank Degree Closeness Betweenness Rank Degree Closeness Betweenness 
1 Shanghai Shanghai Singapore  11 Xiamen Kaohsiung Xiamen 
2 Singapore Ningbo Shanghai 12 Piraeus Nansha Kaohsiung 
3 Ningbo Singapore Hong Kong 13 Rotterdam Piraeus Piraeus 
4 Hong Kong Hong Kong Busan 14 Jeddah Jeddah Fangchenggang 
5 Qingdao Busan Qingdao 15 Nansha Rotterdam Felixstowe 
6 Port Klang Port Klang Port Klang 16 Jebel Ali Antwerp Genoa 
7 Busan Qingdao Rotterdam 17 Antwerp Colombo Jeddah 
8 Yantian Yantian Yantian 18 Colombo Hamburg Shekou 
9 Shekou Shekou Ningbo 19 Hamburg Khor Fakkan Jebel Ali 
10 Kaohsiung Xiamen Nansha 20 Xingang Jebel Ali Algeciras 
Source: Own elaboration based on Appendix Seven. 
5.4.3 Measuring the Overall Importance of Ports 
This section comprehensively estimates the importance of each port considering both its 
topological features in the network and its real development situation in the global shipping 
industry. According to the statistics report by Lloyd's List (2017), the top 20 busiest ports in 
terms of their container throughput are listed in Table 5.8. The throughput of the top 20 ports 
contributes to 57.4% of the total world throughput in 2016. 
Table 5.8. The world’s 20 busiest container ports in 2016 
Rank Port Country Throughput (million TEU) 
1 Shanghai China 36.54 
2 Singapore Singapore 30.92 
3 Shenzhen China 24.20 
4 Ningbo-Zhoushan China 20.62 
5 Hong Kong S.A.R., China 20.11 
6 Busan South Korea 19.47 
7 Guangzhou China 17.62 
8 Qingdao China 17.51 
9 Dubai United Arab Emirates 15.59 
10 Tianjin China 14.10 
11 Rotterdam Netherlands 12.24 
12 Port Klang Malaysia 11.89 
13 Kaohsiung Taiwan, China 10.26 
14 Antwerp Belgium 9.65 
15 Dalian China 9.45 
16 Xiamen China 9.18 
17 Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 9.12 
18 Hamburg Germany 8.82 
19 Los Angeles The U.S.A. 8.16 
20 Long Beach The U.S.A. 7.19 
Source: Lloyd's List 8 
                                                 
8 https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports-2016?pg=1 
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Due to the relative stability of the scheduled service network of a container shipping 
company during a certain period of time, the data collected from March 2017 basically reflects 
the development of world container shipping industry in the year of 2016. Thus, the correlation 
coefficients between the throughput of the port and its degree, closeness, and betweenness 
centralities are calculated respectively. The results show that rD = 0.832, rC = 0.822, and rB = 
0.862 (correlations between port throughputs and degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality 
values are depicted in Figure 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, respectively). Based on Eq. 5.12-1, the weights 
of each centrality measure can be computed, which are wD = 0.331, wC = 0.326, and wB = 0.343.  
 
Figure 5.6. Correlations between port throughputs and degree centralities 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Correlations between port throughputs and closeness centralities 
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Figure 5.8. Correlations between port throughputs and betweenness centralities 
The scores of each port in terms of degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities are 
developed based on the Borda Count method using Eq. 5.12-2. For example, there are 
altogether 212 ports in the sample network, and the normalised degree centrality of Hong Kong 
ranks fourth, so it gets the point of SD = 209; the normalised closeness centrality of this port 
also ranks fourth, and it gets SC = 209; the normalised betweenness centrality of this port ranks 
third, so it has SB = 210 points. Then, the total score of Hong Kong can be calculated as the 
following using Eq. 5.11,  
(  ) 0.331 209 0.326 209 0.343 210 209.343OS Hong Kong         
Similarly, overall scores of all ports are calculated and ranked. Based on the results, the top 
20 ports are shown in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9. Ranking of top 20 most important ports in terms of their overall scores 
Rank Port 𝐒𝑶(𝒊) Rank Port 𝐒𝑶(𝒊) 
1 Shanghai 211.657 11 Rotterdam 201.406 
2 Singapore 211.017 12 Shekou 201.239 
3 Hong Kong 209.343 13 Nansha 200.693 
4 Ningbo 208.268 14 Piraeus 200.331 
5 Busan 207.681 15 Jeddah 197.971 
6 Qingdao 207.348 16 Jebel Ali 194.993 
7 Port Klang 207 17 Hamburg 192.925 
8 Yantian 205 18 Khor Fakkan 191.954 
9 Xiamen 202.326 19 Felixstowe 191.761 
10 Kaohsiung 201.988 20 Genoa 191.097 
 
By comparing the results of Table 5.8 and 5.9, we can find that 15 out of the 20 ports are 
shown in both tables, which reveals a certain degree of consistency of both methods in 
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identifying the important ports. However, the proposed indicator, as a combination of centrality 
measures and port throughput, is able to provide more comprehensive information of a port’s 
position in the shipping network than that provided by either centrality indexes or operational 
indexes.  
5.5 Conclusion 
As the global maritime transportation network can be treated as a combination of individual 
liner shipping companies’ service networks, the vulnerability of such multiplex shipping 
networks can be explored from a local company’s level. Given that use of single centrality is 
arguable to provide suﬃcient information about vulnerability analysis of ports for rational 
decision making, this chapter proposes a novel multi-centrality indicator hybridizing degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality, for comprehensively evaluating the 
importance of a port considering both its topological features within the network and its 
development situation. This can provide insights on the identiﬁcation of vulnerability in 
maritime supply networks, and the proposed method can be applied in the shipping networks 
of other companies. The research results in this chapter will also provide the basis for the 
analysis of MCSC performance from a global perspective. 
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CHAPTER 6 - AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR 
RESILIENCE ANALYSIS OF MCSCS FROM A 
SYSTEMATIC PERSPECTIVE 
Summary 
Analysis of individual risk factors is unable to reveal the overall operational status of the whole 
MCSC, which only provides a limited reference for managers on daily risk management. 
Uncertainties existing in the complex supply chain environment and the lack of statistical data 
make the risk management and decision-making more difficult. In light of this, this chapter, 
for the first time, develops an integrated framework to facilitate a more comprehensive 
evaluation of MCSC performance by taking into consideration both local risk factor 
estimations and their global impacts on the vulnerability of the whole supply network. This is 
achieved by incorporating the risk matrix, the BR-BN method, and network centralities with 
the evidential reasoning (ER) approach in a complementary manner. The BR-BN (Chapter 4) 
provides a flexible and informative method to transform input information of risk parameters 
into risk evaluations of individual risk factors, while the ARI values obtained from risk matrix 
(Chapter 3) and the overall importance scores of ports calculated according to centrality 
measures (Chapter 5) provide a basis to determine the weight of each risk factor within a single 
MCSC, and that of each MCSC in a container shipping supply network, respectively.  Finally, 
the ER algorithm is used to aggregate the estimations of risk factors and risk condition of 
MCSCs collectively, so as to support a dynamic risk-based resilience impact analysis in 
maritime container shipping from a systematic perspective. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
There have been a number of studies addressing the maritime safety issues from different 
perspectives. For example, Zhan, Xu, and Zhang (2009) applied Hazards and Operability 
analysis (HAZOP) to assess the risks of 10,000 TEU container ships. In the research, the risk 
sources of container ships were classified into three categories, which are marine-related risks 
(e.g. boilers, generators, and pressure vessel), navigation-related risks (e.g. lifeboat operation, 
dangerous goods, and piracy), and deck activity-related risks (e.g. welding, grinding, and hoist 
operation). These risk factors were analysed in terms of their probability of occurrence, the 
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severity of the consequence, and the risk rating. In another research on container ships, Kim et 
al. (2013) focused on the hull girder collapse caused by grounding accidents mainly with 
respect to four types of containerships, namely, 3500TEU, 5000TEU, 7500TEU and 
13,000TEU, in order to develop proper safety guidelines for container ships under such 
accidents. For another example, Alyami et al. (2014) identified 24 significant hazards of 
container terminal operations and ranked them according to a newly proposed index calculated 
based on the failure occurrence likelihood, consequence severity, probability of failures being 
undetected, and impact of a failure on the resilience of port operational systems. Other research 
perspectives include technological factors related to ships (Matsumoto, Miyake, and Harada, 
2013; Cui, Wang and Ma, 2017), human factors (Chauvin et al., 2013; Soner, Asan and Celik, 
2015), port operations (Alyami et al., 2016; Wan et al., 2017), and navigation environment 
(Yan et al., 2017). However, most of the previous studies concentrated on one single aspect 
when assessing the MCSC risks. To extend the research of risk analysis in container shipping 
operations, Chang, Xu and Song (2015) provided an overview of all the potential risks 
emerging from the information flow, the physical flow, and the finance flow. Still, the research 
only dealt with the operational risk in container maritime shipping without the consideration 
of other aspects of a complete MCSC. Moreover, the identified risk factors were usually 
analysed from a local perspective, which cannot reveal the global risk condition of MCSCs, let 
alone their impacts on the resilience of the whole shipping network. Therefore, a more 
systematic and inclusive way is in urgent need in order to comprehensively evaluate the overall 
situation of an MCSC considering risk factors from both engineering (or technical) and 
managerial aspects.  
Regarding the resilience analysis of a maritime transportation network, one most commonly 
used method is to compare the variation of certain indexes related to the network performance 
before and after the removal of some nodes/links (Zhao et al., 2011; Azad et al., 2014; Kim, 
Chen and Linderman, 2015; Zhen et al., 2016). These indexes can be generally classified into 
two categories, which reflect either the relative drop of network performance (including 
network average degree, clustering coefficient, average short path length, and network 
efficiency) (Wang et al., 2016), or the relative increase of cost/time of a logistics process (Scott 
et al., 2006). In the maritime container shipping industry, the removal of a node implies the 
shutdown of an entire port, and the removal of a link can be regarded as the changing of service 
configurations of a shipping company (Viljoen and Joubert, 2016). Practically, disruptions of 
a supply chain are initially divided into random disruptions and targeted ones. Random 
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disruptions imply the removal of the components (nodes or links) of a supply network in a 
random manner, which may be caused by, for example, natural disasters (such as hurricane and 
earthquake) and unexpected accidents (such as the explosion that temporarily shut down two 
container terminals at the port of Tianjin, China (Wan et al., 2018). While targeted disruptions 
(e.g., deliberate attack) will prioritise the removal of the components following a special 
strategy such as node degree, link betweenness, and link salience (Viljoen and Joubert, 2016), 
in order to cause the maximal damage (Crucitti, 2000). However, both random and targeted 
disruptions cannot reflect the real situation in practice, which can be regarded as two kinds of 
extremes. In practice, the disruption of an MCSC is neither totally random nor targeted. Instead, 
it is a situation between them as the occurrence of disruption is closely related to the risk 
condition of an MCSC. In other words, a disruption is more likely to occur in the supply chain 
with higher risk level. However, it is worth noting that a higher likelihood of disruption of a 
supply chain does not necessarily mean a higher impact on the supply network resilience, as 
the impact of disruption also depends on the specific role a supply chain plays in the whole 
system.  
Therefore, this chapter tries to propose an integrated framework enabling evaluation of not 
only the individual risk factors within an MCSC but also the risk condition of the MCSC and 
its impact on the resilience of the whole logistics system in order to generate a full risk map of 
the global container supply network. To achieve the above aims, this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 6.2 briefly reviews the models and methods involved in the proposed 
framework. Based on that, Section 6.3 explains in detail how to carry out the evaluation of 
MCSC performance step by step. The reasonability and practicality of the proposed framework 
are validated in Section 6.4 by using the case of a world-leading container shipping company. 
This chapter is concluded in Section 6.5. 
6.2 Background Information 
The integrated approach proposed in this chapter is developed based on a series of models 
and techniques used in the risk management of maritime supply chains, including risk matrices, 
fuzzy brief rules, BNs, centrality analysis, and the evidential reasoning (ER) approach. The 
risk matrix method, fuzzy logic, and BNs have been introduced in Section 2.3.2. In the 
proposed framework of this chapter, the risk matrix is used to determine the relative importance 
of each identified risk factor in MCSCs according to their ARI values. This will support the 
synthesis of risk factors in the assessment of the risk condition of the MCSC. Refer to Chapter 
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3 for detailed information on how to calculate the ARI of each risk factor. Regarding the 
centralities of ports obtained in Chapter 5, they will be used in the proposed framework to assist 
in calculating the importance of MCSCs. Refer to Chapter 5 for more information on the 
calculations and applications of different centrality measures in the maritime industry. 
Introduction and application of other methods involved in the integrated framework are 
presented in the following subsections. 
6.2.1 Belief rule-based Bayesian network approach 
In 2008, Yang, Bonsall and Wang (2008) proposed a novel and advanced risk analysis 
method by incorporating the fuzzy logic, belief rule base (BRB), and Bayesian reasoning 
mechanism into the traditional failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for efficiently 
prioritizing failures, which is named fuzzy rule-based Bayesian reasoning approach (FuRBaR). 
Compared to the traditional risk assessment methods, the proposed approach shows some 
superiorities such as the flexibility of using human knowledge, the ability to deal with 
uncertainties in the information, and improved accuracy of risk analysis results. Necessary 
steps required for applying the FuRBaR approach to the risk assessment includes (Yang, 
Bonsall and Wang, 2008): 
1) Establishment of fuzzy BRB within FMEA; 
2) Failure estimation and transformation;  
3) Rule aggregation using a Bayesian reasoning mechanism;  
4) Development of utility functions for failure ranking. 
Many new applications of the approach (or similar) have been seen in different research 
fields. For example, Hu et al. (2011) applied the approach to pipeline leak detection and leak 
size estimation. Yang et al. (2013) adopted the FuRBaR approach to improving the traditional 
cognitive reliability and error analysis method (CREAM) in order to facilitate human reliability 
analysis in the maritime context. Besides, there are also studies trying to improve the FuRBaR 
approach by dealing with some of its limitations. Alyami et al. (2014) proposed a proportion 
method to rationalise belief degree distributions in the BRB and simplify the communication 
between risk input and output, in order to facilitate its implementation in practice. In Chapter 
4, the BR-BN method was further improved from two main aspects: a) the incorporation of 
new risk parameters in order to support more comprehensive and accurate risk analysis, and b) 
the consideration of the weight of each risk parameter which allows for a more sound and 
rational belief degree distribution. 
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This chapter applies the BR-BN approach to evaluate the selected risk factors within 
MCSCs in detail from a local perspective. Refer to Chapter 4 for further information on the 
procedures to carry out the BR-BN approach.  
6.2.2 Evidential Reasoning Approach  
The ER algorithm was developed in the 1990s based on the evidence combination rule of 
the D-S theory and decision theory (Yang and Singh, 1994) in order to support solutions of 
multiple attribute decision making (MADM) problems under uncertainties. After that, it has 
been further developed and improved towards a more rational and pragmatic way by extensive 
research, such as the proposal of the utility-based information transformation techniques within 
the ER framework (Yang, 2001), modification of the ER algorithm with respect to the 
treatment of the unassigned belief degree (Yang and Xu, 2002), the combination with the fuzzy 
theory (Yang et al., 2006), design and application of the multi-criteria decision analysis tool - 
intelligent decision system (IDS) - based on the ER approach (Xu, McCarthy, and Yang, 2007), 
and the establishment a new ER rule considering weighted belief distribution with reliability 
(Yang and Xu, 2013), to name but a few. 
The ER approach is characterised by a distributed modelling framework, an evidential 
reasoning algorithm, and the interval utility for ranking alternatives (Yang et al., 2006). 
Therefore, major advantages of applying the ER approach include (Yang and Xu, 2002; Yang 
et al., 2006; Riahi, 2010; Alyami et al., 2016; Wan et al., 2018):  
 Being able to model both precise data and subjective judgments with uncertainties (e.g. 
incompleteness and vagueness) consistently under the unified framework. 
 Being able to aggregate both complete and incomplete information. 
 Being able to characterise incomplete assessments and rank alternatives. 
 Provide users with the flexibility by allowing them to express their judgements both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 Provide a rational methodology for attribute aggregation based on its hierarchical 
evaluation process. 
In this chapter, the ER approach is used for two purposes: firstly for aggregating the 
estimations of all the identified risk factors (which are obtained by using the BR-BN approach) 
in order to calculate the overall risk condition of every single MCSC, and then for evaluating 
the resilience impact of each MCSC on the maritime supply network with the help of sensitive 
analysis. The ER algorithm will be elaborated along with the research steps in the next section. 
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6.3 Methodology 
The proposed framework for comprehensively evaluating MCSC performance consists of 
four major components, which outline all the necessary steps required for the estimation of risk 
factors at the bottom level of a hierarchical system and synthesis from the bottom level to the 
top level using the ER approach. These steps are described in a stepwise manner as follows: 
Step 1. Develop a hierarchical structure for the performance evaluation of maritime supply 
networks. 
Step 2. Assess the risk condition of MCSCs. 
Step 3. Evaluate the impact of each MCSC on the resilience of the whole supply network 
by using sensitivity analysis. 
Step 4. Validate the proposed approach. 
6.3.1 Develop the Hierarchical Structure 
Supposing there are m different MCSCs serving within the supply network and n risk factors 
being identified for the risk assessment of MCSCs, then the hierarchical structure can be 
developed according to the research purpose, as shown in Figure 6.1. The hierarchy for 
performance evaluation of MCSCs is mainly composed of three levels. The bottom level is 
constructed according to the risk classification framework of MCSCs proposed in Chapter 3. 
It consists of four sub-levels reflecting the relationships among different risk types, sources, 
and specific risk factors. The five major risk sources considered in this research are social risks, 
natural risks, operational risks, infrastructure and technology risks, and managerial risks. There 
are altogether 64 risk factors being selected, and all the risk factors investigated in this 
framework are identified through the combination of document review, field investigation, and 
Delphi expert surveys. The bottom level provides a basis for the risk assessment of MCSCs 
from a local perspective, while the top level reflects the performance of the maritime container 
supply network composed of the MCSCs under investigation. Thus, the top level offers a way 
to study the importance of each MCSC by quantifying its impact on the resilience of the supply 
network from a global perspective. The medium level shows the purpose of the study, aiming 
to comprehensively evaluate the performance of MCSCs and rank them taking into 
consideration both their local risk conditions and global impact on the supply network 
resilience.  
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6.3.2 Assess the Risk Condition of Each Single MCSC  
The estimations of all the risk factors identified in the research can be presented in either 
linguistic variables with DoB or crisp values based on utility functions, as the risk assessment 
results in Chapter 4. The results expressed by linguistics variables will be used as the inputs in 
the ER approach for calculating the risk conditions of MCSCs. The usage of the ER algorithm 
in this research can be explained as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002). 
Let two subsets R1 and R2 present the risk status of two risk factor 1 and 2 (in this research, 
there are three risk status expressions, i.e., Low, Medium, and High), and R be the synthesised 
risk status of the two risk factors. Then, R1, R2, and R can be expressed by: 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1{( , ), ( , ), ( , )}R Low Medium High        Eq. 6.1 
1 2 3
2 2 2 2{( , ), ( , ), ( , )}R Low Medium High        Eq. 6.2 
1 2 3{( , ), ( , ), ( , )}R Low Medium High        Eq. 6.3 
Where, Low, Medium, and High are associated with their corresponding DoBs. The 
estimations R1 and R2 are obtained by using the BR-BN approach proposed in Chapter 4 with 
the risk assessment information collected from the questionnaire survey. 
Suppose the normalised relative weights of risk factors 1 and 2 in the risk assessment process 
are given as w1 and w2, where w1 + w2 = 1. w1 and w2 can be estimated according to the ARI 
values through the following equations. 
1
1
1
l
i
i
ARI
w
ARI



       Eq. 6.4 
2
2
1
l
i
i
ARI
w
ARI



       Eq. 6.5 
where, l indicates the number of risk factors in the risk source under investigation. The ARI 
values of risk factors can be calculated using Eq. 3.5. (Refer to Chapter 3). 
Suppose 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 (m = 1, 2, 3) are individual degrees to which the subsets R1 and R2 
support the hypothesis that risk assessment is confirmed to the three risk status expressions. 
Then 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 can be calculated as follows (Alyami et al., 2016): 
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11 1
m mM w         Eq. 6.6 
22 2
m mM w         Eq. 6.7 
where, m = 1, 2, 3 in this research. 
Suppose H1 and H2 are the individual remaining belief values unassigned for 𝑀1
𝑚 and 𝑀2
𝑚 
(m = 1, 2, 3). Then, H1 and H2 are expressed as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002): 
1 1 1H H H        Eq. 6.8 
2 2 2H H H        Eq. 6.8 
Where ?̅?𝑛(𝑛 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2) represents the degree to which the other risk factors can play role in 
the assessment and ?̃?𝑛(𝑛 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2) is caused by the possible incompleteness in the subsets R1 
and R2. They can be described as follows (Alyami et al., 2016): 
1 11H w         Eq. 6.10 
2 21H w         Eq. 6.11 
3
1 1 1
1
1 m
m
H w 

 
  
 
       Eq. 6.12 
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       Eq. 6.13 
Suppose that 𝛽𝑚
′
(m = 1, 2, 3) represents the non-normalised degree to which the risk 
assessment is confirmed to each of the three risk status expressions as a result of the synthesis 
of the judgements produced by risk factor 1 and 2. Suppose 𝐻𝑈
′  represents the non-normalised 
remaining belief unassigned after the commitment of belief to the three risk status expressions 
resulting from the synthesis of the judgements produced by risk factor 1 and 2. The ER 
algorithm is stated as (Riahi et al., 2012): 
'
2 11 2 1 2( )
m m m m mK M M M H M H         Eq. 6.14 
'
1 2( )UH K H H       Eq. 6.15 
'
1 2 1 2 2 1( )UH K H H H H H H        Eq. 6.16 
Where K is a normalising factor that can be calculated as (Alyami et al., 2016): 
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After all assessments have been aggregated, the combined DoBs are generated by assigning 
?̅?𝑈
′   back to the three risk expressions using the following normalisation process (Yang and Xu, 
2002; Alyami et al., 2016): 
'
'1
m
m
UH

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
   (m = 1, 2, 3)   Eq. 6.18 
'
'1
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       Eq. 6.19 
where HU is the unassigned DoBs representing the extent of incompleteness in the overall 
assessment. 
The above gives the process of combining two subsets representing the assessments of two 
risk factors. If three risk factors are required to be combined, the result obtained from the 
combination of any two sets can be further synthesised with the third one using the above 
algorithm. Similarly, multiple risk factors within the same risk source can be combined. In this 
way, the risk assessment results can be combined level by level from the bottom to the top of 
the hierarchy so as to investigate the risk condition of the whole MCSC. 
6.3.3 Impact Analysis of MCSCs on the Resilience of the Whole Supply Network 
The risk condition of MCSCs will be taken as the inputs in this step, which will be 
synthesised by using the ER algorithm again in order to evaluate the overall performance of 
the maritime supply network. According to the aggregating process introduced in Section 6.3.2, 
the weight of each MCSC within the supply network needs to be determined before 
synthesising them for the performance evaluation of the whole supply network. In this study, 
it is achieved by using the network-based indicators on the basis of the results from Chapter 5. 
From a physical flow viewpoint, ports and shipping routes can be abstracted as nodes and 
links in a maritime transportation network. Under this vein, an MCSC can be regarded as a 
particular shipping route in the maritime transportation network, which is regularly used for 
container ships starting from the port of shipment, going through ports of call in a certain order, 
and ending at the port of destination (can be whether the same as the port of shipment or not, 
depending on the type of certain shipping route under investigation). It was revealed that the 
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weight of a link is strongly correlated with its product degree (Tang and Zhou, 2011), and this 
assumption has been supported by empirical evidence of real weighted transportation networks 
such as air networks (Barrat et al., 2004). Without loss of generality, suppose that the maritime 
supply network is composed of x MCSCs and the MCSC under investigation is composed of y 
ports. Thus, the importance of each route section consisting of an MCSC can be assigned as 
(Holme et al., 2002): 
 ( ) ( )ab O OL S a S b

                Eq. 6.20 
Where 𝜃 is a tuneable weight parameter (which is usually set as 1), and SO(a) and SO(b) are 
the overall importance score of ports a and b (𝑎, 𝑏 = 1, 2,…, y; 𝑎 ≠ 𝑏 ) with respect to their 
individual degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities in the maritime transportation 
network, which can be obtained using Eq. 5.11. Supposing that cargos are transported in a 
sequence from port a to b, the overall importance of the whole MCSC can be calculated as the 
sum of the importance of each section composing the MCSC, expressed as: 
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                  Eq. 6.21 
Therefore the relative weight of each MCSC within the supply network can be calculated 
as: 
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               Eq. 6.22 
It is noted that the synthesised results of the maritime supply network performance obtained 
from the aggregating process are generally presented in the form of linguistic terms with their 
associated DoBs. This will hinder the comparison and ranking of MCSCs in terms of their 
impacts on the resilience of the whole maritime transportation system because linguistic terms 
(e.g., good, average, poor) are not sufficient to show the difference between the results. 
Numerical values, therefore, need to be generated from the obtained distributed results. 
Following the ER algorithm, the concept of expected utility is introduced to obtain a crisp value 
of performance of maritime supply networks. 
Suppose the utility of a performance evaluation grade of maritime supply network Hn is 
denoted by u(Hn) and u(Hn+1) > u(Hn) if Hn+1 is preferable to Hn (Yang, 2001). u(Hn) can be 
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estimated by the decision maker’s preference (Riahi et al., 2012). In this research, there are 
three evaluation grades associated with the performance of a maritime supply network, which 
are Poor, Average, and Good. The utility of each evaluation grade is respectively assigned as 
follows (Yang, Ng and Wang, 2014): 
 
 
 
.
   1
  10
  100
Poor
Avg
Good
u H
u H
u H



    Eq. 6.23 
The utility of the performance of maritime supply networks (top-level) E is denoted by u(E). 
If 𝛽𝐻 ≠ 0  (which means that the assessment is incomplete, 𝛽𝐻 = 1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ), there is a 
belief interval [𝛽𝑛, (𝛽𝑛 + 𝛽𝐻)], providing the likelihood that E is assessed to Hn. Without loss 
of generality, suppose that the least-preferred linguistic term having the lowest utility is 
denoted by u(H1) (e.g., u(HPoor) = 1) and the most preferred linguistic term having the highest 
utility is denoted by u(HN) (e.g., u(HGood) = 100). Then the minimum, maximum and average 
utilities of E are defined as (Riahi et al., 2012): 
 min 1 1
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      Eq. 6.24 
 
1
max
1
( ) ( ( ))
N
n N H Nn
n
u E u H u H  


       Eq. 6.25 
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      Eq. 6.26 
Obviously, if all the assessments are complete, then 𝛽𝐻 = 0, and the maximum, minimum 
and average utilities of E will be the same. Therefore, u(E) can be calculated as (Yang and Xu, 
2002; Wan et al., 2017): 
 
1
( )
N
n n
n
u E u H

                Eq. 6.27 
The above utilities are used only for characterising an assessment and not for criteria 
aggregation.  
After the transformation of the linguistic evaluation results into numerical values, sensitivity 
analysis is required to evaluate MCSCs’ resilience impact by measuring the influence 
magnitude of each MCSC on the performance of the entire supply network. The sensitivity 
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analysis approach proposed in this chapter takes into account the specific risk condition of 
MCSCs (locally) obtained from the structured risk factors and their resilience impact on a 
container maritime supply network simultaneously. Firstly, the performance of the real 
maritime container supply network case is calculated based on the empirical data collected 
from questionnaire surveys. This value reflects the real performance of the targeted supply 
network in a normal situation (SPN), which can be regarded as a baseline of the supply network 
performance. Secondly, the DoBs associated with the linguistic term High of an MCSC of the 
supply network are increased to 100% to check the performance of the supply network in the 
extreme case of risk (SPE). In a similar way, the risk condition of each MCSC within the supply 
network can be reset to the extreme situation one by one. Lastly, the difference between SPN 
and SPE shows the resilience impact (RI) of each MCSC on the entire container shipping 
network and can be calculated as: 
N ERI SP SP                 Eq. 6.28 
The RI reflects the overall importance of an MCSC on a maritime logistics system level. 
6.3.4 Validate the Proposed Method Using Sensitivity Analysis 
Due to the lack of statistics data of container shipping opeartions and the novelty of this 
model, so far it is not possible to find any proven benchmark results for its full validation. 
Given the situation, a proper way to achieve the full validation of the model may be by using 
an incremental process, through conducting more industrial case studies so that the developed 
model can be refined and applied in real industrial applications. Based on the above, the model 
is partially validated using sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis refers to analysing how 
sensitive the conclusions (i.e. model outputs) are to a minor change in the inputs. It is worth 
noting that the integrated approach proposed in this chapter is actually a two-layer model, and 
the validation of both layers of the model will be carried out together. If the integrated model 
is sound and the aggregation and inference processes are logical, then the sensitivity analysis 
must at least pursue the following two axioms (Alyami et al., 2016). 
Axiom 1. A slight increment/decrement in the DoB associated with any assessment grades 
of a selected risk factor (lowest level) will certainly result in the effect of a relative 
increment/decrement in the risk condition of an MCSC and that of a relative 
decrement/increment in the performance of the entire supply network.  
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Axiom 2. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the risk condition variations 
from x MCSCs (evidence) on the performance of the entire maritime network should always 
be greater than the one from the set of x − y (y ∈ x) MCSCs (sub evidence). 
It is noteworthy that it is possible to define other axioms for further research. 
6.4 Case Study: From A Shipping Company’s Perspective 
COSCO, a world-leading container shipping company in China, was selected to conduct a 
real case study to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed method in the comprehensive 
evaluation of MCSC performance. It is considered to be a representative selection for the case 
study owing to the important role it plays in the container shipping industry. More detailed 
information about COSCO in terms of its global ranking, shipping capacity, and market share 
can be found in Section 5.4. The service on Asia/Africa Trade Lane offered by COSCO will 
be taken as an illustration. The case study will focus on risks associated with MCSC operations, 
as operational risk has been recognised as a crucial part in container logistics attracting 
attention from both industry and academia, e.g., Drewry (2009), Chang, Xu, and Song (2014), 
and Luo and Shin (2016). 
6.4.1 Hierarchical Structure for Operational Performance of MCSCs in Africa 
According to the schedule information of container shipping service, COSCO’s Africa 
regional container supply network is composed of five major MCSCs, namely, FAX Service, 
ASA Service, AEF Service, ASEA Service, and FWAS Service. There are altogether 36 
container ships serving 41 port pairs, which covers the eastern, western, and southern parts of 
Africa. The port rotation of these MCSCs is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
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FAX Service ASA Service
ASEA Service
FWAS Service AEF Service  
Figure 6.2. Liner services associated with Africa region 
Source: COSCO’s website (http://lines.coscoshipping.com/home/Services/route) 
 
Based on the service information and the 26 identified operational risk factors, the 
hierarchical structure for the operational evaluation of MCSCs in Africa region can be 
constructed, as shown in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. The hierarchical structure for the operational performance evaluation of MCSCs associated with Africa 
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6.4.2 Local Assessment of Risk Condition of MCSCs 
A questionnaire was designed (see Appendix Eight) to collect risk assessment information 
on the 26 identified operational risk factors with respect to the MCSCs. For the risk assessment 
of each MCSC, seven respondents were selected who have been involved in the operational 
aspects related to the investigated MCSC, such as the shipping route design, ship scheduling, 
operations management, and voyaging on the investigated MCSCs. Thus, altogether 35 
respondents participated in the questionnaire survey, and they all have rich working experience 
in the container shipping industry (at least ten years). Regarding the assessment of risk factors 
with respect to each MCSC, the feedback received from the seven experts is combined using a 
weighted average. Since the knowledge and experience of the experts selected for the case 
study are considered as equivalent, the normalised relative weight of every expert is equally 
assigned while merging their judgments on the risk factors. Taking the risk factor “information 
delay” as an illustration, if three experts agree that on the targeted MCSC, the occurrence 
likelihood of information delay is Low, and the feedback from the other four indicates an 
assessment of Medium, then, the DoB distribution of assessment on the information delay in 
terms of its likelihood can be expressed as {(Low, 42.9%), (Medium, 57.1%), (High, 0%)}, 
which can be simplified as (0.429, 0.571, 0). In a similar way, the judgements of every 
operational risk factor in terms of different risk parameters were collected and combined. Based 
on that, the risk status of each risk factor can be calculated by using Eq. 4.4, and the results 
with respect to different MCSCs are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Combined DoBs of risk factors with respect to different MCSCs 
Operational 
risk factors 
Associated 
with FAX 
Associated 
with ASA 
Associated 
with AEF 
Associated 
with AESA 
Associated 
with FEAS 
Op/IF_1 (0.71, 0.25, 0.04) (0.65, 0.31, 0.04) (0.68, 0.29, 0.03) (0.69, 0.28, 0.03) (0.73, 0.23, 0.04) 
Op/IF_2 (0.66, 0.32, 0.02) (0.7, 0.28, 0.02) (0.6, 0.35, 0.05) (0.64, 0.33, 0.03) (0.68, 0.27, 0.05) 
Op/IF_3 (0.58, 0.35, 0.07) (0.57, 0.36, 0.07) (0.59, 0.3, 0.11) (0.52, 0.36, 0.12) (0.59, 0.16, 0.25) 
Op/IF_4 (0.59, 0.34, 0.07) (0.52, 0.41, 0.07) (0.48, 0.34, 0.18) (0.49, 0.34, 0.17) (0.54, 0.24, 0.22) 
Op/IF_5 (0.56, 0.24, 0.2) (0.46, 0.28, 0.26) (0.47, 0.27, 0.26) (0.37, 0.37, 0.26) (0.41, 0.34, 0.25) 
Op/IF_6 (0.65, 0.27, 0.08) (0.72, 0.18, 0.1) (0.78, 0.12, 0.1) (0.74, 0.16, 0.1) (0.75, 0.13, 0.12) 
Op/FF_1 (0.86, 0.14, 0) (0.85, 0.15, 0) (0.72, 0.28, 0) (0.78, 0.22, 0) (0.81, 0.19, 0) 
Op/FF_2 (0.79, 0.21, 0) (0.73, 0.27, 0) (0.62, 0.38, 0) (0.59, 0.41, 0) (0.52, 0.48, 0) 
Op/FF_3 (0.63, 0.25, 0.12) (0.55, 0.22, 0.23) (0.49, 0.3, 0.21) (0.49, 0.26, 0.25) (0.54, 0.22, 0.24) 
Op/FF_4 (0.54, 0.41, 0.05) (0.55, 0.41, 0.04) (0.58, 0.38, 0.04) (0.51, 0.49, 0) (0.6, 0.37, 0.03) 
Op/FF_5 (0.56, 0.33, 0.11) (0.56, 0.3, 0.14) (0.66, 0.19, 0.15) (0.64, 0.21, 0.15) (0.59, 0.27, 0.14) 
Op/FF_6 (0.4, 0.42, 0.18) (0.34, 0.48, 0.18) (0.23, 0.48, 0.29) (0.23, 0.49, 0.28) (0.34, 0.45, 0.21) 
Op/PF_1 (0.6, 0.27, 0.13) (0.61, 0.27, 0.12) (0.58, 0.27, 0.15) (0.51, 0.3, 0.19) (0.58, 0.14, 0.28) 
Op/PF_2 (0.17, 0.34, 0.49) (0.17, 0.32, 0.51) (0.1, 0.26, 0.64) (0, 0.25, 0.75) (0.05, 0.24, 0.71) 
Op/PF_3 (0.38, 0.42, 0.2) (0.4, 0.42, 0.18) (0.36, 0.44, 0.2) (0.3, 0.47, 0.23) (0.4, 0.34, 0.26) 
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Op/PF_4 (0.23, 0.4, 0.37) (0.3, 0.26, 0.44) (0.22, 0.26, 0.52) (0.18, 0.25, 0.57) (0.25, 0.27, 0.48) 
Op/PF_5 (0.35, 0.37, 0.28) (0.34, 0.39, 0.27) (0.38, 0.31, 0.31) (0.41, 0.26, 0.33) (0.31, 0.22, 0.47) 
Op/PF_6 (0.51, 0.47, 0.02) (0.51, 0.48, 0.01) (0.46, 0.52, 0.02) (0.41, 0.58, 0.01) (0.49, 0.49, 0.02) 
Op/PF_7 (0.55, 0.3, 0.15) (0.51, 0.35, 0.14) (0.4, 0.28, 0.32) (0.33, 0.37, 0.3) (0.55, 0.2, 0.25) 
Op/PF_8 (0.27, 0.45, 0.28) (0.34, 0.36, 0.3) (0.14, 0.59, 0.27) (0.12, 0.61, 0.27) (0.3, 0.38, 0.32) 
Op/PF_9 (0.51, 0.39, 0.1) (0.44, 0.45, 0.11) (0.42, 0.43, 0.15) (0.39, 0.46, 0.15) (0.31, 0.42, 0.27) 
Op/PF_10 (0.27, 0.58, 0.15) (0.24, 0.59, 0.17) (0.14, 0.61, 0.25) (0.14, 0.61, 0.25) (0.27, 0.46, 0.27) 
Op/PF_11 (0.49, 0.48, 0.03) (0.43, 0.54, 0.03) (0.5, 0.47, 0.03) (0.54, 0.43, 0.03) (0.53, 0.44, 0.03) 
Op/PF_12 (0.37, 0.31, 0.32) (0.31, 0.34, 0.35) (0.39, 0.29, 0.32) (0.36, 0.31, 0.33) (0.25, 0.44, 0.31) 
Op/PF_13 (0.7, 0.24, 0.06) (0.71, 0.21, 0.08) (0.63, 0.31, 0.06) (0.71, 0.22, 0.07) (0.71, 0.14, 0.15) 
Op/PF_14 (0.58, 0.41, 0.01) (0.45, 0.54, 0.01) (0.42, 0.58, 0) (0.46, 0.54, 0) (0.44, 0.54, 0.02) 
 
According to the ARI values presented in Table 3.16, the weight of each risk factor at the 
same level can be calculated by using Eq. 6.4. Taking the risk factors associated with the 
information flow as an illustration:   
Op/IF_1
Op/IF_1
Op/IF
6.38
= =0.173
6.38+6.64+6.11+6.08+5.8+5.77
ARI
w
ARI

  
Similarly, the weights of every operational risk factors can be obtained and summarised in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. The weight of risk factors at different levels 
Item Weight Item Local weight 
Information flow 0.325 
Op/IF_1 0.173 
Op/IF_2 0.181 
Op/IF_3 0.166 
Op/IF_4 0.165 
Op/IF_5 0.158 
Op/IF_6 0.157 
Financial flow 0.340 
Op/FF_1 0.171 
Op/FF_2 0.170 
Op/FF_3 0.163 
Op/FF_4 0.160 
Op/FF_5 0.166 
Op/FF_6 0.170 
Physical flow 0.335 
Op/PF_1 0.075 
Op/PF_2 0.082 
Op/PF_3 0.068 
Op/PF_4 0.067 
Op/PF_5 0.079 
Op/PF_6 0.067 
Op/PF_7 0.067 
Op/PF_8 0.068 
Op/PF_9 0.068 
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Op/PF_10 0.071 
Op/PF_11 0.069 
Op/PF_12 0.072 
Op/PF_13 0.078 
Op/PF_14 0.069 
 
Once the estimations and relative weights of individual risk factors have been obtained, the 
risk condition of MCSC operations can be assessed by synthesising the estimations of all risk 
factors in the hierarchical structure using the ER algorithm (i.e. Eqs. 6.6 to 6.19). A detailed 
synthesis process of risk factors “information delay” and “information inaccuracy” with respect 
to FAX can be found in Appendix Nine. It is noted that the results can also be achieved by 
using the IDS software package which was developed by Yang and Xu (2013) to realise the 
fast calculation.  Accordingly, the estimations of risk factors at the bottom level can be 
combined and then the aggregating process is conducted upwards from the bottom level. Then, 
the risk condition of each MCSC can be obtained. An example of the evaluation results of FAX 
by using the IDS software package is shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4. A screenshot of the evaluation result of FAX 
 
 By using the utility functions as described by Eq. 6.23, where u(HLow) = 1, u(HMedium) = 10, 
and u(HHigh) = 100, the excepted risk values of each MCSC can be calculated. The risk 
conditions of shipping routes and their risk values are summarised in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Operational risk condition of MCSCs 
MCSCs Risk condition associated with operations Utility values 
FAX {(Low, 63.1%), (Medium, 28.6%), (High, 8.3%)} 11.791 
ASA {(Low, 60.2%), (Medium, 30.2%), (High, 9.6%)} 13.222 
AEF {(Low, 56.1%), (Medium, 31.7%), (High, 12.2%)} 15.931 
ASEA {(Low, 53.6%), (Medium, 33.6%), (High, 12.8%)} 16.696 
FWAS {(Low, 59.0%), (Medium, 26.7%), (High, 14.3%)} 17.560 
 
It is noteworthy to mention that, in terms of the utility values of the risk condition of MCSCs, 
the higher the value, the higher the risk level of the MCSC. 
6.4.3 Resilience Analysis of MCSCs’ performance 
In this step, the weight of each MCSC will be calculated, and the risk condition of MCSCs 
will then be aggregated in order to evaluate the overall performance of the supply network. 
According to the shipping route information of each MCSC and the overall scores of every port 
(refer to Appendix Seven for more information) being involved in the targeted MCSC, the 
weights of MCSCs can be obtained by using Eqs. 6.20, 6.21, and 6.22, as summarised in Table 
6.4. 
Correlation analysis shows that the correlation coefficient between the importance of an 
MCSC and the container shipping capacity deployed on the MCSC is 0.88. The close 
relationship indicates that the proposed model for calculating MCSCs’ structural importance 
reflects the reality to a large extent. Once the relative weight of each MCSC is obtained, the 
performance of the entire supply network can be evaluated by applying the ER algorithm again, 
through which the risk conditions of MCSCs are aggregated. 
Table 6.4. Relative weight and shipping capacity of MCSCs in Africa 
No. MCSCs Relative weight Shipping capacity 
1 FAX 0.147 6 × 4200 TEU 
2 ASA 0.288 7 × 4200 TEU 
3 AEF 0.134 5 × 2800 TEU 
4 ASEA 0.130 6 × 2600 TEU 
5 FWAS 0.301 12 × 3500 TEU 
 
Next step is to quantify the resilience impact of each MCSC on the container shipping supply 
network in Africa and identify the most significant one using the sensitivity analysis approach. 
In order to test the resilience impact of each MCSC, five different extreme scenes are set in the 
sensitivity analysis, where the DoB belonging to the linguistic variable High is increased to 
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100% in turn with respect to each MCSC. The variations of performance between the normal 
situation and those extreme ones are calculated using Eqs. 6.23 and 6.27. For example, as the 
performance of the supply network under normal situation is estimated to be {(Poor, 10.1%), 
(Average, 27.2%), (Good, 62.7%)}, its expected value can be calculated as: 
 
3
1
( ) 0.101 1 0.272 10 0.627 100 65.521n n
n
NS HPu u

       
 
It is worth noting that three linguistic variables used to assess the risk condition of MCSCs 
are Low, Medium, and High (which are as same as the ones used for risk factors assessment), 
while the performance of the supply network (in the top level of the hierarchy) is expressed by 
linguistic variables Poor, Average, and Good. Thus, a mapping process is required to transform 
the different types of linguistic terms in different levels into the same plate (Yang, Ng and 
Wang, 2014). Observe that there is a negative correlation between the two sets of variables, 
which means that the lower the risk condition/level an MCSC is, the better the performance the 
network will be. Both the levels apply three assessment grades, and the relationship between 
them is elucidated in Figure 6.5.  
Fuzzy output
Fuzzy input
Risk condition of 
a MCSC
Safety performance 
of a supply network
β 
Low Medium High
Good Average Poor
1.0 1.0 1.0
 
Figure 6.5. Mapping from risk condition to operational performance 
 
Explanations of different scenes along with the excepted utilities under various risk 
scenarios are summarised in Table 6.5. It can be seen that the broken of different shipping 
routes leads to different degrees of deterioration of the supply network performance, among 
which the shutdown of FWAS route influences the most. However, it is also worth noting that 
the whole network can still remain the operational function to a large extent even under the 
most severe risk scenario, showing its resilience in the face of external disturbance. 
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Table 6.5. Performance of the supply network under different scenarios 
Normal situation  SPN Extreme scenario 1 SPE-FAX 
FAX  (0.631, 0.286, 0.083) 
65.521 
FAX  (0, 0, 1) 
53.497 
ASA (0.602, 0.302, 0.096) ASA (0.602, 0.302, 0.096) 
AEF (0.561, 0.317, 0.122) AEF (0.561, 0.317, 0.122) 
ASEA (0.536, 0.336, 0.128) ASEA (0.536, 0.336, 0.128) 
FWAS (0.590, 0.267, 0.143) FWAS (0.590, 0.267, 0.143) 
Extreme scenario 2 SPE-ASA Extreme scenario 3 SPE-AEF 
FAX  (0.631, 0.286, 0.083) 
52.228 
FAX  (0.631, 0.286, 0.083) 
56.683 
ASA (0, 0, 1) ASA (0.602, 0.302, 0.096) 
AEF (0.561, 0.317, 0.122) AEF (0, 0, 1) 
ASEA (0.536, 0.336, 0.128) ASEA (0.536, 0.336, 0.128) 
FWAS (0.590, 0.267, 0.143) FWAS (0.590, 0.267, 0.143) 
Extreme scenario 4 SPE-ASEA Extreme scenario 5 SPE-FWAS 
FAX  (0.631, 0.286, 0.083) 
57.160 
FAX  (0.631, 0.286, 0.083) 
41.824 
ASA (0.602, 0.302, 0.096) ASA (0.602, 0.302, 0.096) 
AEF (0.561, 0.317, 0.122) AEF (0.561, 0.317, 0.122) 
ASEA (0, 0, 1) ASEA (0.536, 0.336, 0.128) 
FWAS (0.590, 0.267, 0.143) FWAS (0, 0, 1) 
 
According to Eq. 6.28, the RI values of each MCSC within the supply network can be 
obtained, as shown in the following. 
- 65.521 53.497 12.024FAX N E FAXRI SP SP      
- 65.521 52.228 13.293ASA N E ASARI SP SP      
- 65.521 56.683 8.838AEF N E AEFRI SP SP      
- 65.521 57.16 8.361ASEA N E ASEARI SP SP      
- 65.521 41.824 23.697FWAS N E FWASRI SP SP      
Therefore, MCSCs can be prioritised in terms of their importance from different 
perspectives, as shown in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6. Ranking of MCSCs according to different types of priorities 
MCSC 
Local risk 
condition  
Rank 
Topological 
structure 
Rank RI Value Rank 
FAX  11.791 1 0.147 3 12.024 3 
ASA 13.222 2 0.288 2 13.293 2 
AEF 15.931 3 0.134 4 8.838 4 
ASEA 16.696 4 0.130 5 8.361 5 
FWAS 17.560 5 0.301 1 23.697 1 
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It can be seen that the FAX was the supply chain that has the best operational condition due 
to the relatively developed port infrastructure in Southern Africa. In contrast, FWAS was 
identified as the one with the highest operational risk level, which is closely related to its poor 
ground access systems to ports, relatively severely unbalanced trade volumes between import 
and export, and the increasing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years. However, FWAS 
was identified as the most important one in terms of its topological structure within COSCO’s 
global container shipping network. This also results in its important position in terms of the 
operational resilience impact on the Africa supply network. Based on the above results, the 
shipping routes (i.e. FAX, ASA, AEF, ASEA, and FWAS) consisting of the MCSCs in the 
Africa region are removed one by one to test their cumulative impact on the performance of 
the whole network. The results are depicted in Figure 6.6.  
It can be seen that when all shipping routes within the supply network are out of service, the 
operational performance of the container supply network gradually declines from the original 
status (65.521) to a total breakdown (0) (rather than a sharp drop), showing its good resilience 
when experiencing disruptive events. 
 
Figure 6.6. A drop of the operational performance after the shutdown of shipping routes 
 
6.4.4 Validation of the Model 
Two axioms introduced in Section 6.3.4 are used to validate the rationality of the proposed 
model and test the logicality of the delivery of the analysis results. As the sensitivity of the BR-
BN approach has already been tested in Chapter 4, this chapter will mainly focus on the novel 
part of the proposed model, i.e., the aggregation process using the ER approach. 
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The risk factor “information delay” (Op/IF_1) and the FAX supply chain is selected for the 
tests. The DoB associated with the linguistic term High is increased by 0.1 and, simultaneously, 
the DoB associated with the linguistic term Low is decreased by 0.1. Its impact is that the risk 
condition of FAX increased from 0.2261 to 0.2650, and the performance of the Africa container 
supply network decreased accordingly. Similar studies were conducted on 26 operational risk 
factors, and all the results obtained remain in harmony with Axiom 1. This reveals that the risk 
condition of MCSCs and performance of the entire transportation network are sensitive to the 
identified risk factors. 
Table 6.7. Influence magnitude of risk factors on the risk condition of FAX 
No. 
Risk factors Risk 
condition 
Variation 
of value Op/IF_1 Op/FF_1 Op/PF_1 
1 - - - 11.791 - 
2 0.1   12.205 0.414 
3  0.1  12.295 0.504 
4   0.1 11.998 0.207 
5 0.1 0.1  12.808 1.017 
6 0.1  0.1 12.502 0.711 
7  0.1 0.1 12.601 0.810 
8 0.1 0.1 0.1 13.015 1.224 
0.1 means a 10% reassignment of DoB in risk factors moving toward the maximal increment of risk 
level. 
The same DoB change (i.e. 0.1 increment in High and 0.1 decrement in Low) is applied to 
the other risk factors such as “payment delay from partners” (Op/FF_1), and “inaccurate 
demand forecast” (Op/PF_1) (one random risk factor from each of the information, financial 
and physical flow is selected respectively), and the combined impact of such changes on the 
risk condition of MCSCs and the performance of the entire supply network is checked. The 
obtained results are shown in Table 6.7 and 6.8, respectively. 
Table 6.8. Influence magnitude of MCSCs on the resilience of the supply network 
No. 
MCSCs 
Performance 
Variation 
of value FAX ASA AEF ASEA FWAS 
1 - - - - - 65.521 - 
2 0.1     63.757 1.764 
3  0.1    63.469 2.052 
4   0.1   64.054 1.467 
5    0.1  64.054 1.467 
6        0.1 61.894 3.627 
7 0.1 0.1    61.606 3.915 
8 0.1  0.1   62.191 3.330 
9 0.1   0.1  62.191 3.330 
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10 0.1    0.1 59.932 5.589 
11  0.1 0.1   61.903 3.618 
12  0.1  0.1  61.903 3.618 
13  0.1   0.1 59.734 5.787 
14   0.1 0.1  62.488 3.033 
15   0.1  0.1 60.229 5.292 
16       0.1 0.1 60.328 5.193 
17 0.1 0.1 0.1   60.040 5.481 
18 0.1 0.1  0.1  60.040 5.481 
19 0.1 0.1   0.1 57.772 7.749 
20 0.1  0.1 0.1  60.625 4.896 
21 0.1  0.1  0.1 58.366 7.155 
22 0.1   0.1 0.1 58.366 7.155 
23  0.1 0.1 0.1  60.328 5.193 
24  0.1 0.1  0.1 58.069 7.452 
25  0.1  0.1 0.1 58.169 7.352 
26     0.1 0.1 0.1 58.753 6.768 
27 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  58.465 7.056 
28 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 56.197 9.324 
29 0.1 0.1  0.1 0.1 56.197 9.324 
30 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 56.791 8.730 
31   0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 56.494 9.027 
32 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 54.532 10.989 
0.1 means a 10% reassignment of DoB in each MCSC moving toward the maximal decrement of the 
performance of the supply network. 
 
According to Axiom 2, if the model reflects the logical reasoning, then the influence 
magnitude for risk condition of FAX associated with the combination x of risk factors 
(evidence) should always be greater than the one from x-y (y ∈ x) (sub-evidence). The No. 2 
risk condition (in Table 6.7) is chosen as the sub-evidence to investigate the accuracy of the 
model. Other combinations of risk factors that are affected by the variation given to the DoB 
associated with linguistic variable High including No.5 and No.8 can be identified as the 
evidence. By comparing the evidence and sub-evidence, it can be seen that risk condition value 
in the second row (0.414) is always smaller than that in the fifth (1.017) and eighth (1.224) row. 
A similar phenomenon can also be observed in terms of the influence magnitude of MCSCs on 
the performance of the entire supply network, as presented in Table 6.8. Taking combination 
No. 17 as an example (evidence), its impact on the performance of the sample supply network 
can be calculated as 5.481 (=65.521-60.040). Then, the impact of its sub-evidence on the supply 
network performance can be calculated and shown as No.2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 11. Comparing all 
the relevant impacts of such evidence and sub-evidence, 5.481 is the one with the most 
influence. Therefore, the model is validated in the selected example. The additional 
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investigation was conducted using other combinations of risk factors and MCSCs. The results 
are consistent with Axiom 2, supporting the soundness and logic of the model.  
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a novel approach is proposed incorporating different advanced risk 
modelling and assessment techniques in a complementary way so as to achieve the 
comprehensive evaluation of MCSC performance from a systematic perspective. An empirical 
case study is conducted from a shipping company’s perspective, and the results confirm that 
the proposed method is capable of presenting sensitive and flexible risk results in real situations 
and providing a powerful tool for container shipping risk management. Although the case study 
of the proposed model in this chapter mainly focused on the operational aspects including 
information, financial, and physical flows, leaving the other risk sources from the risk 
classification framework such as managerial, natural environment, and political issues (see 
Chapter 3) to be addressed in future work, the proposed method still highlights its potential in 
facilitating overall risk assessment of operations in a wide context when being appropriately 
tailored to study other maritime supply chains, such as the global cargo supply chain and the 
global tanker supply chain, with more information and data being collected from a wider range 
and higher level. The risk-based resilience impact analysis is also believed to be significant for 
establishing suitable risk control options and selecting optimum ones to eliminate or mitigate 
the risk factors in the global container logistics system and to enhance its robustness and 
efficiency. Last but not least, the combination of the Hugin and IDS software is also helpful in 
facilitating real-time decision making under dynamic conditions. 
It is also noteworthy that the proposed framework provides a standard, generic method for 
the evaluation of MCSC performance. Although it is applied and demonstrated in a case study 
of the container shipping industry, it has the potential and flexibility to be tailored to meet the 
needs of the application in different supply chain industries. However, the specific risk factors 
under investigation may vary, and the developed BRB for risk reference (of the selected risk 
factors) needs to be reconstructed. In the new rule base, inputs from multiple domain experts 
need to be appropriately verified to ensure practical and non-biased belief functions (Yang et 
al., 2008) fitting the newly investigated supply chain context. Further, different risk parameters, 
as well as variables used to estimate the risk parameters, may be selected according to the 
feature of other industries and specific requirements of risk assessment.
 160 
 
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Summary 
This chapter summarises the research findings on the identification, classification, and 
assessment of risk factors associated with the container shipping industry in all previous 
chapters. It also highlights the advantages of the proposed models and techniques in the safety 
design, operation and management of MCSCs. Several limitations of the research are outlined, 
along with the opportunities arising from the developed methods for future improvement and 
applications. 
 
7.1 Conclusions and Contribution of the Research 
Containerisation is an essential and crucial part of the rapid development of global trade and 
international transportation. However, the increasing complexities and globalisation pose 
significant challenges for the safety and efficiency of maritime transportation operations. As a 
focal part connecting global supply chains, MCSCs involve multiple stakeholders from 
different segments such as sea, rail and road transport. Thus, the proper risk management of 
MCSCs is of great significance, and the need to appropriately estimate and control the risks 
involved in MCSCs by advanced approaches is appreciated by both academics and industrial 
participants in order to ensure personnel safety, enhance operational efficiency, and improve 
the reliability of the whole system.  
The findings from the literature review have revealed that previous studies have only 
focused on one or several particular types of risk of MCSCs, and rarely did they inclusively 
examine all of the possible risk factors and evaluate the relative importance of each of them. 
Besides, most of the studies paid more attention to the analysis of the local risk of certain 
segments within an MCSC, having their relationships with other parts of the chain neglected, 
let alone the overall influence of MCSCs on the performance of the entire container maritime 
transportation network. These MCSCs with higher weights, traffic volumes, and shipping 
connections, are believed to be more important compared to the others in terms of ensuring 
supply network resilience. Thus, the previous chapters of this thesis have developed an 
integrated framework for the comprehensive evaluation of MCSC performance based on a 
range of advanced risk assessment and network analysis approaches. The framework has been 
 161 
 
constructed in a generic sense which is able to deal with both engineering and managerial 
problems. The applied methods and research outcomes can be concluded as follows: 
1) Providing a novel risk classification framework and identifying a comprehensive list of 
risk factors within the container shipping industry (Chapter 3). 
2) Categorising the identified risk factors into different risk levels by using the risk matrix 
approach with primary data collected from the different stakeholders involved in an 
MCSC (Chapter 3). 
3) Applying BN to model FRB for the assessment of risk factors of MCSCs. More risk 
parameters are considered to extend the traditional risk concept in supply chain risk 
management (Chapter 4) 
4) Proposing a new indicator for measuring the overall importance of ports in maritime 
transportation networks by incorporating degree, closeness and betweenness centrality 
together (Chapter 5). 
5) Using the ER approach to synthesise the estimations of risk factors to achieve the risk 
assessment of MCSCs (Chapter 6). 
6) Applying the ER approach and the sensitivity analysis to evaluate the resilience impact 
of MCSCs on the entire container maritime supply network (Chapter 6). 
Although the approaches and methods proposed in this thesis are developed based on certain 
application situations, it is believed that these methods possess great potential as valuable and 
powerful tools to assist the stakeholders in the risk management and decision making of 
MCSCs and will gain more usage in the MCSC emergency planning and response. Moreover, 
these methods can be tailored according to the specific applications in practice to deal with 
operational problems in other transportation systems with different purposes and requirements, 
especially in situations where there is a high level of uncertainty. The implementation of the 
proposed methods could benefit real-life applications. A more specific description of the 
research contributions in terms of academic and practical aspects are provided as follows: 
 In the maritime shipping industry, risks usually appear in a variety of forms which will 
impact on diverse parts of an MCSC. It is therefore essential to comprehensively 
identify risk factors existing in MCSCs. The novel multi-dimensional, multi-level and 
multi-actor framework proposed for identifying and classifying risk factors in MCSCs, 
together with the comprehensive analysis based on the empirical data, provide a 
panorama picture of risk factors in MCSCs. The novelty of the classification framework 
can be seen via some emerging risk factors that are identified in Chapter 3 such as 
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refugee immigrants, ergonomics-related risks, and improper management of container 
storage areas. This can be a reflection of increasing complexity in the global supply 
chain environment. The research results empirically contribute to the literature and 
knowledge of supply chain risk management as few studies so far have investigated the 
risks in MCSCs from a systematic perspective using empirical data. Based on the 
empirical data collected through a large scale survey of industry experts, a bridge 
between the theoretical and applied research of MCSCs can be built in a timely manner, 
which helps to realise the difference of understanding of risks in the maritime container 
shipping between academics and practitioners. 
 
 Regarding the classification and screening of the identified risk factors, the 
comprehensive analysis of the risk factors from multiple dimensional aspects in 
MCSCs is of great importance in the shipping industry. For example, the information 
on the quantitative importance analysis (i.e. ARI) of each risk factor will be helpful for 
the stakeholders to understand which parts deserve more attention in the whole 
maritime supply chain so as to rationalize their safety resource allocation for accident 
prevention. Moreover, by incorporating the well-established ALARP principle into the 
risk matrix approach, the risk factors can be appropriately categorised into four different 
risk levels, which can help maritime safety authorities to effectively develop targeted 
risk mitigation countermeasures under different risk situations within the context of 
MCSCs. 
 
 In the risk assessment research, it is noteworthy that Chapter 4 introduces a novel 
quantitative method for risk assessment of MCSC risks by incorporating fuzzy logic 
and brief rule-based method into BNs. This combination provides a powerful tool to 
incorporate subjective judgments to evaluate risks and prioritise risk factors under 
uncertainty, as system risk analysis often requires using domain experts’ knowledge 
when risk records are incomplete. Further, representing risk inputs as a probability 
distribution on linguistic variables enables different types of uncertain information to 
be modelled using a unified form. The BR-BN method holds great potential in risk-
based designing and planning due to its ability to instantly rank the risk factors of a 
container supply chain according to the stakeholders’ needs with updated information, 
by which the real-time requirement in the industry can also be satisfied.   
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 Although the FRB method has been well established in the risk assessment context, its 
applications in risk management of maritime container transportation, especially with 
the consideration of more supply chain-targeted risk attributes, are relatively new. 
Based on traditional definitions of the risk concept, more attributes are explored within 
the context of MCSCs in order to better and more accurately measure the associated 
risk factors. Classifying risk consequences into different categories can also generate 
useful information for managers with respect to different decision-making requirements. 
Besides, using the same/equivalent sets of linguistic grades for both IF and THEN 
segments simplifies the communication between risk inputs and outputs based on DoBs. 
This facilitates practical implementation in the maritime industry. Meanwhile, 
considering the weight of each antecedent attribute creates more robust DoBs compared 
to the existing studies in the literature. 
 
 A new indicator for measuring the importance of ports in the global maritime 
transportation network is developed in Chapter 5. The multi-centrality indicator 
aggregates the information from diﬀerent centrality measures (e.g. degree, closeness, 
and between-ness centrality) by using the Borda Count method so that it can provide 
the whole proﬁle of ports when ranking them according to their positions in the 
container shipping network and provide a more comprehensive evaluation result for 
aiding rational decisions. The consideration of container throughput of ports provides 
a rational way to determine the weight of each individual centrality measure when 
aggregating them for the overall importance score. The method is capable of providing 
insights on the identiﬁcation of vulnerability in MCSCs, which contributes to 
generating valuable managerial implications for the stakeholders such as container lines 
and port authorities to ensure the robustness of the MCSCs. 
 
 Assessment of a single risk factor cannot reflect the overall risk condition of an MCSC, 
which inevitably hinders the proper and efficient risk management of supply chains. 
The ER algorithm is applied to aggregate the estimations of each risk factor from 
different risk sources together in order to provide an overview of the risk condition of 
the whole MCSC. Moreover, the importance of each MCSC within the container 
maritime transportation network is taken into consideration so as to investigate the 
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resilience impact of individual MCSCs on the performance of the entire supply network. 
This facilitates a more systematic analysis from an overall perspective being able to 
consider the combined influences of both the local risk condition of an MCSC and its 
global impact on the whole logistics system. To the best of author’s knowledge, this 
kind of work has not yet been seen in the previous research of supply chain risk 
management. 
7.2 Limitations of Research and Future Research 
The research has achieved its aim of providing an integrated framework for risk modelling 
and assessment of MCSCs in a complex and uncertain environment. However, due to the time 
and cost constraints, some problems in the current study have not been fully explored, which 
may be necessary and desirable in future investigation. The limitations of this research are 
identified as: 
1) Regarding the risk classification framework proposed in Chapter 3, it is inevitable that 
there may be a certain extent of correlation existing among the identified risk factors 
under different risk types. However, the level of correlation among these risk factors is 
not clear which calls for more hard empirical evidence. Thus, in the current study, it is 
assumed that all the identified risk factors are independent, which may not fully in line 
with the real-life situation. Besides, it would be better if the screening results of risk 
factors can be further validated with careful experts judgments due to the inherent 
mathematical limitations of the traditional risk matrices. 
2) The questionnaire survey is used to classify the identified risk factors and address the 
risk assessment with five risk parameters due to incomplete data, but it is acknowledged 
that both the size of the sampling population and the subjective nature of the responses 
could be a source of bias. Besides, due to the cost consideration and the time limit, only 
132 valid questionnaire replies were obtained in the survey. Thus, it would be better if 
more empirical data could be collected to validate the results further. 
3) This thesis uses a Chinese shipping company as a representative in the case study of 
constructing the sample container shipping network and performance measurement of 
MCSCs. It is believed that the results would be more accurate if the author had 
incorporated service information from other international container shipping companies 
worldwide. Also, it would be useful if a comparative study could be conducted to 
involve more inputs from other actors in the same supply chain such as freight 
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forwarders, logistics service providers, and port operators and investigate the features 
of other maritime transportation networks in terms of different types of cargo. 
4) This thesis mainly focuses on the identification and assessment of risk factors of 
MCSCs, with no more analysis related to the decision making which is also important 
in terms of a complete process of risk management. It would be useful if relevant 
decision-making tools can be developed based on the evaluation results of the current 
study. 
5) Complex risk inference and calculation processes are involved in the integrated 
framework for the comprehensive evaluation of MCSC performance, which is not 
friendly to unsophisticated users in practice. It would be useful if more convenient 
computing software can be developed to facilitate the industrial implications of the 
proposed models and approaches. 
Aiming to deal with the above-mentioned limitations, the current research can be extended 
in the following aspects: 
 Due to the lack of accurate industry-specific data, questionnaire surveys are applied for 
generating risk input based on the five risk parameters in the methodology. In the 
current study, the target respondents are mainly selected from academia and industry in 
the UK and China. In order to improve the findings for their better generalisation, future 
work is needed to collect more responses from international MCSC companies, located 
in different countries and regions. Besides, incorporation of objective risk data in terms 
of both likelihood and consequence derived from accident investigation reports and 
accident databases may also be needed to verify the findings further. 
 
 Another issue that has not been well addressed is the non-homogenous nature of the 
participants involved in the questionnaire survey, which means that the factors such as 
their work experience, age, and position may have some impact on their perception of 
risks. In the future, this issue can be further investigated by, for example, introducing 
the dominant factor which will be used to adjust the impact level of each expert’s/ 
participant’s judgments in the aggregation stage of the methodology. 
 
 The container maritime transportation network constructed in Chapter 5 can be further 
extended in the future work by taking into consideration the service information of other 
world-leading liner shipping companies including APM-Maersk, Mediterranean 
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Shipping Co, CMA CGM Group, and Hapag-Lloyd, to name but a few. This will 
contribute to a more accurate global container shipping network model in terms of the 
reflection of its topological structure and connections among ports. A comparative 
study of different container shipping companies is also expected to shed some light on 
the issue of the measurement of port position and MCSC importance in a maritime 
supply network.  
 
 As identified by the risk factor classification framework, many types of risks exist in 
MCSCs. This study investigated the risk assessment of operational aspects of MCSCs 
as an illustrative case of the proposed integrated approach. It would be interesting to 
consider multiple types of risks by incorporating risk inputs from other risk sources (i.e. 
social risk, natural environment risk, managerial risk, and infrastructure and technology 
risk) so that more complete results can be obtained. 
 
 Last but not least, future work may be needed to propose risk control options and 
resilience strategies, as well as to develop effective decision-making tools in order to 
reduce/eliminate the factors with high risk levels and enhance the container supply 
chain’s efficiency and resilience. Besides, more resilience characteristics identified in 
Chapter 2 may be incorporated to improve the current evaluation framework and offer 
more insight into the risk management of MCSCs for both academia and industry.  
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Appendices 
Appendix One  
 
 
Delphi expert survey on the classification and identification of 
risk factors  
 
 
Section A: Structure of the framework for risk factor classification 
Our research focuses on the containers maritime transportation, which is mainly composed 
of two parts, i.e. port operations and seaborne transportation. Thus, risk factors generated from 
relevant processes are identified, while those particularly associated with land transportation 
(e.g. road and rail) are not considered in this study. Risk factors of Maritime Container Supply 
Chains (MCSCs) in this study refer to the occurrence of triggering events, or certain situations, 
which would result in adverse such as human injury, property and/or environmental damage, 
business interruption, and reputation loss, influencing any component of an MCSC.  
Question 1. The framework presented in Figure 1 is developed based on academic 
literature, textbooks, and information from the internet. Could you please modify it if there is 
anything wrong or inappropriate in terms of the structure and components of this framework? 
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Classification of risks within 
container maritime supply chains
External risks Internal risks
Nature 
environment
Human society-
related
Economic 
environment
Policital 
environment
Security
Operations Management
Information 
flows
Financial 
flows
Physical 
flows
Human 
resources
Infrastructure 
& technology
Risk 
factors
Risk 
sources
Risk 
types
R1  ...   Rn... ... ... ... ... ...
Level A
Level B
Level C
Level D
 
Figure 1 Structure of the framework for risk factor classification
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Section B: Identification of risk factors  
Question 1. What are the possible risk factors in an MCSC based on your knowledge and 
experience? 
Question 2. The following tables are the risk factors associated with different parts of an 
MCSC system that I summarised from existing studies. Do you think they exist in the 
container shipping industry? How about your company? 
Question 3. Do you think there are any other risk factors that are not mentioned in the list? 
Please add them to the related tables. 
 
 
Table 1. Risk factors of economic environment 
Risk source Risk factors 
Economic 
environment 
R1. Financial crisis 
R2. Change of interest rates 
R3. Change of exchange rates 
R4. Fluctuation of fuel price 
R5. Unattractive markets 
R6. Fierce competition 
R7. Monopoly 9  
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
                                                 
9 For example, forwarding agency, shipping company, or terminal’s monopoly  
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Table 2. Risk factors of political environment 
Risk source Risk factors 
Political 
environment 
R1. Political instability 
R2. Maritime security initiatives 10 
R3. Different customs’ policies  
R4. Government regulations 
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
 
 
Table 3. Risk factors of security 
Risk source Risk factors 
Security 
R1. Terrorism 
R2. Regional conflict 
R3. Pirate /maritime robbery 
R4. Sabotage 
R5. Smuggling 
R6. Spying /espionage 
R7. Epidemic 
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
                                                 
10 E.g. container security initiative (CSI), 24-h rule, Megaports Initiative, etc. 
 190 
 
Table 4. Risk factors of nature environment 
Risk source Risk factors 
Nature 
environment 
R1. Changeable weather conditions 
R2. Nature hazards 
R3. Climate change 
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
 
 
Table 5. Risk factors of information flows 
Risk 
source 
Risk factors 
Information 
flows 
R1. Information delay 
R2. Information inaccuracy 
R3. IT vulnerability 11 
R4. Interpretation problems with documents, contracts and 
permits 
R5. Internet security 12 
R6. Poor information sharing 
R7. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility 
R8. Intellectual property 
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
                                                 
11 E.g. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 
12 Such as risk of intrusion or fraud 
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Table 6. Risk factors of financial flows 
Risk 
source 
Risk factors 
Financial 
flows 
R1. Payment delay from partners 
R2. Break a contract 
R3. Bankruptcy of shippers 
R4. Partners with bad credit 
Please add that any other risk factors should be 
considered 
 
 
Table 7. Risk factors of physical flows 
Risk 
source 
Risk factors 
Physical 
flows 
R1. Demand fluctuation 
R2. Transportation of dangerous goods  
R3. Container shortage 
R4. Port strikes 
R5. Port/ terminal congestions 
R6. Lack of flexibility of designed schedules 13 
R7. Problems with customs clearance 
R8. Electricity failure 14 
R9. Bottlenecks/ restriction in the transportation routes 
R10. Improper container terminal operations 
R11. Incorrect container packing 
R12. Transport accidents 15 
Please add that any other risk factors should be 
considered 
 
                                                 
13 Such as no alternative transport solution. 
14 Which may happen during reefer container shipping, or port operations. 
15 Such as ship contract, grounding, sinking, collision on quay, and oil spill. 
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Table 8. Risk factors of human resources 
Risk 
source 
Risk factors 
Human 
resources 
R1. Lack of skilled workers 
R2. Lack of motivation  
R3. Mental health problems 16 
R4. Language and cultural diversity 
R5. Lack of cooperation among departments 
R6. Poor safety culture/climate 
R7. Low degree of safety leadership 17 
Please add that any other risk factors should be considered 
 
 
 
Table 9. Risk factors of Infrastructure and technology 
Risk source Risk factors 
Infrastructure 
& 
technology 
R1. Lack of intermodal equipment 
R2. Poor channel condition 
R3. Limited storage ability 
R4. Low technical reliability 
R5. The undeveloped ground access system of a port 
Please add that any other risk factors should be 
considered 
 
                                                 
16 Such as fatigue, stress and anxiety of workers 
17 Lack of safety motivation, safety policy, and safety concern. 
 For Delphi expert survey 
Appendix Two  
 
 
Revision report of the classification framework and risk factors  
 
 
Based on the valuable comments from the Delphi expert group, the original framework for 
risk factor classification has been revised. Some indicators are added (or modified) while some 
others are deleted either due to the high correlations with other risk factors or because of the 
little consistency with the actual situation in the container shipping industry. The revised 
framework based on experts with rich industrial experience will be more pragmatic in terms of 
conducting empirical studies.  
In the rest of this report, the revised framework is shown in Figure 1, and the modified and 
newly added risk factors are highlighted in Table 1 to 5, respectively. Finally, the specific 
reasons for all of the modifications are also reported, presented in Table 6.  
 For Delphi expert survey 
Classification of risks within 
maritime container  supply chains
External risks Internal risks
Nature 
environment
Society
Economic 
environment
Policital 
environment
Security
OperationsManagement
Information 
flows
Financial 
flows
Physical 
flows
Infrastructure 
& technology
Risk 
factors
Risk 
sources
Risk 
types
R1  ... ...... ... ... ...   Rn...
Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV
Human 
resource
Working 
environment
...
 
Figure 1. Structure of the framework for risk factor classification
 For Delphi expert survey 
Table 1. Risk factors associated with Society 
Risk factors of economic environment (EE) 
R1. Financial crisis HS/EE_1 
R2. Change of interest rates HS/EE_2 
R3. Change of exchange rates HS/EE_3 
R4. Fluctuation of fuel price HS/EE_4 
R5. Unattractive markets HS/EE_5 
R6. Fierce competition HS/EE_6 
R7. Monopoly 18  HS/EE_7 
Risk factors of political environment (PE) 
R1. Trade policy instability 19 HS/PE_1 
R2. Maritime security initiatives 20 HS/PE_2 
R3. Regulations and measures 21 HS/PE_3 
R4. Regional political conflicts  HS/PE_4 
Risk factors of security (SE) 
R1. Terrorism HS/SE_1 
R2. Piracy /maritime robbery HS/SE_2 
R3. Sabotage HS/SE_3 
R4. Smuggling HS/SE_4 
R5. Spying /espionage HS/SE_5 
R6. Epidemic HS/SE_6 
R7. Refugee immigrants HS/SE_7 
 
 
Table 2. Risk factors associated with Nature Environment 
R1. Changeable weather conditions NE_1 
R2. Natural hazards 22 NE_2 
R3. Climate change NE_3 
                                                 
18 For example, forwarding agency, shipping company, or terminal’s monopoly  
19 E.g. Brexit, fall of EU. 
20 E.g. container security initiative (CSI), 24-h rule, Megaports Initiative, etc. 
21 E.g. IMO’s regulations, CO2 reduction measures 
22 Such as tsunami, typhoon, flood, etc. 
 For Delphi expert survey 
Table 3. Risk factors associated with Management 
Risk factors of human resource (HR) 
R1. Lack of skilled workers Man/HR _1 
R2. Lack of motivation Man/HR _2 
R3. Mental health problems23 of seafarers Man/HR _3 
R4. Human errors Man/HR _4 
R5. Unreasonable salary and welfare Man/HR _5 
Risk factors of working environment (WE) 
R1. Language and cultural diversity Man/WE_1 
R2. Lack of cooperation among departments Man/WE_2 
R3. Poor safety culture/climate Man/WE_3 
R4. Low degree of safety leadership 24 Man/WE_4 
R5. Poor ergonomics at the workplace  Man/WE_5 
 
Table 4. Risk factors associated with Infrastructure and Technology 
Risk factors of infrastructure and technology (I & T) 
R1. Lack of intermodal equipment I & T _1 
R2. Poor entrance channels of a port I & T _2 
R3. Limited storage ability I & T _3 
R4. Low technical reliability I & T _4 
R5. The undeveloped ground access system of a port I & T _5 
R6. Lack of regular maintenance of equipment I & T _6 
R7. Insufficient berthing capability I & T _7 
                                                 
23 Such as fatigue, stress and anxiety of workers 
24 Lack of safety motivation, safety policy, and safety concern. 
 For Delphi expert survey 
Table 5. Risk factors associated with Operations 
Risk factors of information flows (IF) 
R1. Information delay Op/IF_1 
R2. Information inaccuracy Op/IF_2 
R3. IT vulnerability 25 Op/IF_3 
R4. Internet security 26 Op/IF_4 
R5. Poor information sharing Op/IF_5 
R6. Lack of information standardisation and compatibility Op/IF_6 
Risk factors of financial flow (FF) 
R1. Payment delay from partners Op/FF_1 
R2. Break a contract Op/FF_2 
R3. Shippers going into bankruptcy Op/FF_3 
R4. Partners with bad credit Op/FF_4 
R5. Charter rates rise Op/FF_5 
R6. Cash flow problem Op/FF_6 
Risk factors of physical flow (PF) 
R1. Inaccurate demand forecast Op/PF_1 
R2. Transportation of dangerous goods Op/PF_2 
R3. Container shortage Op/PF_3 
R4. Port strikes Op/PF_4 
R5. Port/ terminal congestions Op/PF_5 
R6. Lack of flexibility of designed schedules 27 Op/PF_6 
R7. Problems with customs clearance Op/PF_7 
R8. Electricity failure 28 Op/PF_8 
R9. Bottlenecks/ restriction in the transportation routes Op/PF_9 
R10. Improper container terminal operations29 Op/PF_10 
R11. Incorrect container packing Op/PF_11 
R12. Transport accidents 30 Op/PF_12 
R13. Trade imbalance on container shipping routes Op/PF_13 
R14. Improper management of container storage area Op/PF_14 
                                                 
25 E.g. IT infrastructure breakdown or crash 
26 Such as risk of intrusion or fraud 
27 Such as no alternative transport solution. 
28 Which may happen during reefer container shipping, or port operations. 
29 Such as loading, uploading, handling, etc. 
30 Such as ship contract, grounding, sinking, collision on quay, and oil spill. 
 For Delphi expert survey 
Table 6. Reasons for the modifications of the classification framework and risk factors 
Original structure 
of  the framework 
Revised 
category 
Reason 
Management Modified 
Working 
environment 
It involves both physical conditions such as 
locations and surroundings and working 
atmosphere and culture of an organisation. 
Internal risks Modified 
Infrastructure 
and technology 
This is a fundamental element supporting 
functions of an MCSC. Thus, it should be on 
the same level as the category management and 
operations. 
Level A to D Modified Level I to IV 
It is more common to use Roman numerals 
(such as I, II, and III) rather than English letters 
when representing different hierarchical levels. 
 
Original risk factors 
Revised risk 
factor 
Reason 
Political Environment  
R1 Modified HS/PE_1 
The original risk factor emphasises on a 
national level, while the revised one (such as 
Brexit) is more accurate and direct considering 
its influence on international business activities. 
R3 Replaced HS/PE_3 
The benefits of different customs policies far 
outweigh the disadvantages they may bring. 
Thus, the original risk factor is replaced by 
“regulations and measures” which impact the 
cost-effectiveness ratio of container shipping. 
R4 Replaced HS/PE_4 The new one is more specific. 
Security 
R2 Deleted / 
It is abstractive and has an overlap with 
HS/PE_4. 
/ Added HS/SE_7 
The refugee issue becomes a popular issue in 
recent years, especially in European countries. 
It may increase the probability of smuggling. 
Human Resource 
R3 Modified Man/HR _3 
Seafarers are more likely to suffer from mental 
health problems due to the special working 
environment onboard. 
/ Added Man/HR _4 
Most of the accidents are the results of human 
errors, which is inevitable to some extent. This 
further highlight the importance of this factor in 
daily management.  
/ Added Man/HR _5 
This risk factor influences the labour cost of a 
company and the employees’ salary 
satisfaction. 
Working Environment 
/ Added Man/WE_5 
This factor is important to the realisation of 
occupational health and safety and productivity. 
Infrastructure and Technology 
 For Delphi expert survey 
R2 Modified I & T _2 
The original risk factor is vague, and thus it is 
revised using a more specific one instead. 
/ Added I & T _6 
Regular maintenance of equipment can improve 
its technical status, and extend its life cycle, 
which will contribute to the safe operations and 
cost reduction. 
/ Added I & T _7 
This may limit the throughput of a port, and 
result in the increase of waiting time for 
container ships. 
Information Flow 
R4 Deleted / 
The format of cargo carriage contracts is 
relatively fixed. 
R8 Deleted / 
Seldom does intellectual property will be a 
problem for the maritime container shipping. 
Financial Flow 
R3 Modified Op/FF_3 
The original risk factor is revised using more 
accurate description.  
/ Added Op/FF_5 
It is quite a common issue influence the cost of 
container shipping that should be considered. 
/ Added Op/FF_6 
It can be vital to the survival and development 
of a company, especially for small businesses. 
Physical Flow 
R1 Modified Op/PF_1 
The original one is regarded as a kind of 
external factors. It is one of the reasons which 
may result in inaccurate demand forecast from 
the perspective of operations. 
/ Added Op/PF_13 
This risk factor is related to the proper 
operations of empty containers. 
/ Added Op/PF_14 
This may reduce the effectiveness of port 
operations and cause accidents. 
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Appendix Three  
 
 
Questionnaire on the measurement of risk factors in maritime 
container supply chains 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Chengpeng Wan; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the Liverpool Logistics Offshore 
and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) in Liverpool John Moores University. My research topic in the 
first technical chapter is “Identification of risk factors in maritime container supply chains”, which 
intends to identify and assess risk factors of container supply chains, with focus on the maritime 
logistics process. The purpose of the questionnaire is to measure the identified risk factors in maritime 
container supply chains, so as to select the significant ones.  
 
I am writing to elicit your opinion as an executive in the whole process of the container maritime 
logistics with expert knowledge on risk assessment. Your participation is voluntary; however, your 
assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful questionnaire. The information 
gathered in this survey will be treated in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the policy of 
the Liverpool John Moores University. This survey will take you about 10-15 minutes. This 
questionnaire is anonymous. Thus your response cannot be attributed to you or your company. 
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me at +44-(0)777 087 3050, or by email 
at cpwan@whut.edu.cn, or my supervisor, Prof. Zaili Yang, by email z.yang@ljmu.ac.uk.  
 
Please accept my thanks for your anticipated co-operation. If you wish to receive a copy of the 
research results, please email me at cpwan@whut.edu.cn (regardless of whether you participate or 
not). 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Chengpeng Wan, 
PhD Candidate 
 
 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM), UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 777 087 3050,  
Email: cpwan@whut.edu.cn 
Add: Room 121, James Parsons Building,  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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Section A: Respondent’s Profile 
We would like to ask you about how your research or business involves transportation 
operations in container maritime supply chains. 
1. What is the type of your organisation?  
 Academia   Industry         Governmental body     Other 
 
2. Which part of the process of a maritime container supply chain are you 
involved in?   
 Port operations            Maritime transportation          the whole process           
 
3. What is your research area or professional role? 
      _______________________________________________________ 
 
4. What is your job title/position? 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
5. For how many years have you worked in the container shipping or related 
industry? 
 1-5 years      6-10 years      11-15 years      16-20 years      >20 
years 
 
6. How many employees are in your company/organisation? 
 1-50 people     51-100 people     101-200 people     201-500 people    
 >500 people    
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For the screening of the 64 identified risk factors, a 7×4 Risk Matrix is applied to 
determine their relative importance considering two dimensions, the likelihood and 
severity. In this research, the Likelihood Index (LI) is scored using 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 
7, shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definitions of LI 
Likelihood Likert scale Definition 
Extremely Rare 1 Has never or rarely happened 
Rare 2 
Not expected to occur for a few years; May only occur 
in exceptional circumstances 
Unlikely 3 Trivial likelihood, however, could occur at some time 
Possible 4 
Might occur at some time; Expected to occur every 
few months 
Likely 5 
Will probably occur in most circumstances; Expected 
to occur at least monthly 
Frequent 6 Expected to occur at least weekly 
Very Frequent 7 
Can be expected to occur in most circumstances; 
Occur at least daily 
 
While, the Severity Index (SI) of a risk factor is assigned a number from 1 to 4, 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Definitions of SI 
Consequence 
severity 
Likert 
scale 
Definition 
Minor 1 
Cause some inconvenience with minor impacts such as small 
cost/schedule increase. 
Moderate 2 
Cause some disruptions with medium impacts such as moderate cost 
increase, delay, and minor environmental damage. 
Severe 3 
Cause some disruptions, or sometimes failures with severe impacts 
such as major cost increase, major environmental damage or injuries 
Catastrophic 4 
Cause complete and irrecoverable failures (thus the minimum 
requirements cannot be achieved), long-term environmental damage, 
or death 
 
All identified risk factors are evaluated according to your experience and 
knowledge in view of the LI and SI.  Related questions are presented in the following 
sections.  
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Section B: The following questions are related to risk factors associated with society 
in MCSCs. Please fill the appropriate score in each of the following boxes: 
Risk factors of economic environment (EE) 
LI 
(from 1 to 7) 
SI 
(from 1 to 4) 
R1. Financial crisis HS/EE_1   
R2. Change of interest rates HS/EE_2   
R3. Change of exchange rates HS/EE_3   
R4. Fluctuation of fuel price HS/EE_4   
R5. Unattractive markets HS/EE_5   
R6. Fierce competition HS/EE_6   
R7. Monopoly HS/EE_7   
Risk factors of political environment (PE) 
R1. Trade policy instability  HS/PE_1   
R2. Maritime security initiatives HS/PE_2   
R3. Regulations and measures HS/PE_3   
R4. Regional political conflicts  HS/PE_4   
Risk factors of security (SE) 
R1. Terrorism HS/SE_1   
R2. Piracy /maritime robbery HS/SE_2   
R3. Sabotage HS/SE_3   
R4. Smuggling HS/SE_4   
R5. Spying /espionage HS/SE_5   
R6. Epidemic HS/SE_6   
R7. Refugee immigrants HS/SE_7   
 
 
Section C: The following questions are related to risk factors associated with the 
natural environment in MCSCs. Please fill the appropriate score in each of the 
following boxes: 
Risk factors of natural environment (NE) LI 
(from 1 to 7) 
SI 
(from 1 to 4) 
R1. Changeable weather conditions NE_1   
R2. Natural hazards  NE_2   
R3. Climate change NE_3   
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Section D: The following questions are related to risk factors associated with 
management in MCSCs. Please fill the appropriate score in each of the following 
boxes: 
Risk factors of human resource (HR) 
LI 
(from 1 to 7) 
SI 
(from 1 to 4) 
R1. Lack of skilled workers Man/HR _1   
R2. Lack of motivation Man/HR _2   
R3. Mental health of seafarers Man/HR _3   
R4. Human errors Man/HR _4   
R5. Unreasonable salary and welfare Man/HR _5   
Risk factors of working environment (WE) 
R1. Language and cultural diversity Man/WE_1   
R2. Lack of cooperation among 
departments 
Man/WE_2 
  
R3. Poor safety culture/climate Man/WE_3   
R4. Low degree of safety leadership Man/WE_4   
R5. Poor ergonomics at workplace  Man/WE_5   
 
 
 
Section E: The following questions are related to risk factors associated with 
infrastructure and technology in MCSCs. Please fill the appropriate score in each of 
the following boxes: 
Risk factors of infrastructure and technology (I & T) 
LI 
(from 1 to 7) 
SI 
(from 1 to 4) 
R1. Lack of intermodal equipment I & T _1   
R2. Poor entrance channels of a port I & T _2   
R3. Limited storage ability I & T _3   
R4. Low technical reliability I & T _4   
R5. The undeveloped ground access system  I & T _5   
R6. Lack of regular maintenance of equipment I & T _6   
R7. Insufficient berthing capability I & T _7   
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Section F: The following questions are related to risk factors associated with operations in 
MCSCs. Please fill the appropriate score in each of the following boxes: 
Risk factors of information flows (IF) 
LI 
(from 1 to 7) 
SI 
(from 1 to 4) 
R1. Information delay Op/IF_1   
R2. Information inaccuracy Op/IF_2   
R3. IT vulnerability Op/IF_3   
R4. Internet security Op/IF_4   
R5. Poor information sharing Op/IF_5   
R6. Lack of information standardisation and 
compatibility 
Op/IF_6   
Risk factors of financial flow (FF) 
  
R1. Payment delay from partners Op/FF_1   
R2. Break a contract Op/FF_2   
R3. Shippers going into bankruptcy Op/FF_3   
R4. Partners with bad credit Op/FF_4   
R5. Charter rates rise Op/FF_5   
R6. Cash flow problem Op/FF_6   
Risk factors of physical flow (PF)   
R1. Inaccurate demand forecast Op/PF_1   
R2. Transportation of dangerous goods Op/PF_2   
R3. Container shortage Op/PF_3   
R4. Port strikes Op/PF_4   
R5. Port/ terminal congestions Op/PF_5   
R6. Lack of flexibility of designed schedules Op/PF_6   
R7. Problems with customs clearance Op/PF_7   
R8. Electricity failure Op/PF_8   
R9. Bottlenecks/restriction on transportation routes Op/PF_9   
R10. Improper container terminal operations Op/PF_10   
R11. Incorrect container packing Op/PF_11   
R12. Transport accidents Op/PF_12   
R13. Trade imbalance on container shipping routes Op/PF_13   
R14. Improper management of container storage area Op/PF_14   
 206 
 
Appendix Four 
 
Measurement of the weight of risk parameters 
 
 
Risk parameters
Occurrence 
likelihood
Consequence Visibility
Time delay/
disruption
Additional cost
Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment)
Level I
Level II
 
Figure 1 Parameters of MCSC risk
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Table 1. Importance of risk parameters in Level I 
In Level I, which parameter do you think is more important? (please mark in the table) 
Increasing importance                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Increasing importance 
Parameters 
Extreme 
importance 
  
Very 
strong 
  
Strong 
importance 
  
Moderate 
importance 
  
Equal 
importance 
  
Moderate 
importance 
  
Strong 
importance 
  
Very 
strong 
  
Extreme 
importance Parameters 
9:1 8:1 7:1 6:1 5:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 1:5 1:6 1:7 1:8 1:9 
Likelihood                                   Consequence 
Likelihood                                   Visibility 
Consequence                                   Visibility 
 
 
Table 2. Importance of risk parameters in Level II 
In Level II, which parameter do you think is more important? (please mark in the table) 
Increasing importance                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Increasing importance 
Parameters 
Extreme 
importance 
  
Very 
strong 
  
Strong 
importance 
  
Moderate 
importance 
  
Equal 
importance 
  
Moderate 
importance 
  
Strong 
importance 
  
Very 
strong 
  
Extreme 
importance Parameters 
9:1 8:1 7:1 6:1 5:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 1:5 1:6 1:7 1:8 1:9 
Time delay/ 
disruption                                   Additional cost 
Time delay/ 
disruption 
                                  
Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment) 
Additional 
cost                                   
Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment) 
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Appendix Five  
 
 
Questionnaire on the assessment of key risk factors in maritime 
container supply chains 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Chengpeng Wan; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the Liverpool Logistics Offshore 
and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) in Liverpool John Moores University. My research topic in 
Chapter 4 is “Risk assessment of key risk factors in maritime container supply chains”, which intends 
to carry out an in-depth analysis of the crucial risk factors in maritime container supply chains from 
the aspects of occurrence likelihood, visibility of risk factors, consequence in terms of time 
delay/disruption, consequence in terms of financial loss/additional cost, and consequence in terms 
of quality damage.  
 
I am writing to elicit your opinion as an executive in the whole process of the container maritime 
logistics with expert knowledge on risk assessment. Your participation is voluntary; however, your 
assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful questionnaire. The information 
gathered in this survey will be treated in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the policy of 
the Liverpool John Moores University. This survey will take you about 10-15 minutes. This 
questionnaire is anonymous. Thus your response cannot be attributed to you or your company. 
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me at +44-(0)777 087 3050, or by email 
at cpwan@whut.edu.cn, or my supervisor, Prof. Zaili Yang, by email z.yang@ljmu.ac.uk.  
 
Please accept my thanks for your anticipated co-operation. If you wish to receive a copy of the 
research results, please email me at cpwan@whut.edu.cn. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Chengpeng Wan, 
PhD Candidate 
 
 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM), UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 777 087 3050,  
Email: cpwan@whut.edu.cn 
Add: Room 121, James Parsons Building,  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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Background information 
In the previous research, top five risk factors are identified in terms of the value of risk 
index, which are “ fierce competition”, “fluctuation of fuel price”, “change of 
exchange rates”, “unattractive markets”, and “transportation of dangerous goods”. 
These risk factors are identified as the key risk factors in a maritime container supply 
chain system, which will be further studied in this research.  
These key risk factors are evaluated in details in terms of their occurrence likelihood, 
visibility, consequence in terms of time delay/disruption, consequence in terms of 
additional cost, and consequence in terms of quality damage. Explanations of linguistic 
grades of each risk parameter are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definitions of linguistic grades of each risk parameter 
Parameter 
Linguistic 
grades 
Definition 
Likelihood 
Low Occurs less than once per year 
Medium Expected to occur every few months 
High Expected to occur at least monthly 
Visibility 
Low 
Impossible or difficult to be detected through intensive 
risk checks 
Medium Possible to be detected through intensive risk checks 
High Possible to be detected through regular risk checks 
Delay/disruption 
Low A delay of less than 24 hours in total 
Medium A delay but no more than 20% of the original schedule 
High A delay of more than 20% of the original schedule 
Additional cost 
Low An additional cost no more than 10% of the total cost  
Medium An additional cost between 10% and 50% of the total cost 
High An additional cost of more than 50% of the total cost 
Quality damage 
Low 
Slight cargo, equipment, or system damage but fully 
functional and serviceable 
Medium 
Minor incapability of systems or equipment and a small 
portion of goods may be damaged 
High 
Damage/loss of major systems or equipment, and serious 
damage to the transported goods 
 
For example (see Table 2): 
Based on your experience, in which level do you think that “Fierce competition” 
Likelihood would be? How about the visibility, delay/ disruption, additional cost/ 
financial loss, and quality damage (cargo/equipment)? It is noted that the sum of 
belief degree on all selected grades in terms of each risk factor is less or equal to 1. 
 
Then, please make your judgement for every risk factors in terms of each risk parameter 
based on your knowledge and experience in Table 3. 
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Table 2. Examples of judgement 
Key risk factors 
Risk parameters 
1. Likelihood 2. Visibility 
3. Consequence 
3-1. Delay/ disruption 
3-2.  Additional cost/ 
Financial loss 
3-3. Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment) 
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High 
Fierce competition 0.2  0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.8  0.8 0.2 0.1 0.9  0.2 0.2 0.6 
 
Table 3. Assessment of key risk factors in terms of different risk parameters 
Key risk factors 
Risk parameters 
1. Likelihood 2. Visibility 
3. Consequence 
3-1. Delay/ disruption 3-2.  Additional cost 
3-3. Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment) 
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High 
Fierce competition                
Fluctuation of fuel price                
Change of exchange rates                
Unattractive markets                
Transportation of 
dangerous goods 
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Appendix Six  
Table 1. Belief Rule Base in MCSC Risk Assessment 
Rules Antecedent attribute (input) Risk result (output) 
No L V CT CC CQ Low Medium High 
1 Unlikely Good Low Low Negligible 1   
2 Unlikely Good Low Low Moderate 0.69 0.31  
3 Unlikely Good Low Low Critical 0.69  0.31 
4 Unlikely Good Low Medium Negligible 0.92 0.08  
5 Unlikely Good Low Medium Moderate 0.61 0.39  
6 Unlikely Good Low Medium Critical 0.61 0.08 0.31 
7 Unlikely Good Low High Negligible 0.92  0.08 
8 Unlikely Good Low High Moderate 0.61 0.31 0.08 
9 Unlikely Good Low High Critical 0.61  0.39 
10 Unlikely Good Medium Low Negligible 0.65 0.35  
11 Unlikely Good Medium Low Moderate 0.34 0.66  
12 Unlikely Good Medium Low Critical 0.34 0.35 0.31 
13 Unlikely Good Medium Medium Negligible 0.57 0.43  
14 Unlikely Good Medium Medium Moderate 0.26 0.74  
15 Unlikely Good Medium Medium Critical 0.26 0.43 0.31 
16 Unlikely Good Medium High Negligible 0.57 0.35 0.08 
17 Unlikely Good Medium High Moderate 0.26 0.66 0.08 
18 Unlikely Good Medium High Critical 0.26 0.35 0.39 
19 Unlikely Good High Low Negligible 0.65  0.35 
20 Unlikely Good High Low Moderate 0.34 0.31 0.35 
21 Unlikely Good High Low Critical 0.34  0.66 
22 Unlikely Good High Medium Negligible 0.57 0.08 0.35 
23 Unlikely Good High Medium Moderate 0.26 0.39 0.35 
24 Unlikely Good High Medium Critical 0.26 0.08 0.66 
25 Unlikely Good High High Negligible 0.57  0.43 
26 Unlikely Good High High Moderate 0.26 0.31 0.43 
27 Unlikely Good High High Critical 0.26  0.74 
28 Unlikely Normal Low Low Negligible 0.92 0.08  
29 Unlikely Normal Low Low Moderate 0.61 0.39  
30 Unlikely Normal Low Low Critical 0.61 0.08 0.31 
31 Unlikely Normal Low Medium Negligible 0.84 0.16  
32 Unlikely Normal Low Medium Moderate 0.53 0.47  
33 Unlikely Normal Low Medium Critical 0.53 0.16 0.31 
34 Unlikely Normal Low High Negligible 0.84 0.08 0.08 
35 Unlikely Normal Low High Moderate 0.53 0.39 0.08 
36 Unlikely Normal Low High Critical 0.53 0.08 0.39 
37 Unlikely Normal Medium Low Negligible 0.57 0.43  
38 Unlikely Normal Medium Low Moderate 0.26 0.74  
39 Unlikely Normal Medium Low Critical 0.26 0.43 0.31 
40 Unlikely Normal Medium Medium Negligible 0.49 0.51  
41 Unlikely Normal Medium Medium Moderate 0.18 0.82  
42 Unlikely Normal Medium Medium Critical 0.18 0.51 0.31 
43 Unlikely Normal Medium High Negligible 0.49 0.43 0.08 
44 Unlikely Normal Medium High Moderate 0.18 0.74 0.08 
45 Unlikely Normal Medium High Critical 0.18 0.43 0.39 
46 Unlikely Normal High Low Negligible 0.57 0.08 0.35 
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47 Unlikely Normal High Low Moderate 0.26 0.39 0.35 
48 Unlikely Normal High Low Critical 0.26 0.08 0.66 
49 Unlikely Normal High Medium Negligible 0.49 0.16 0.35 
50 Unlikely Normal High Medium Moderate 0.18 0.47 0.35 
51 Unlikely Normal High Medium Critical 0.18 0.16 0.66 
52 Unlikely Normal High High Negligible 0.49 0.08 0.43 
53 Unlikely Normal High High Moderate 0.18 0.39 0.43 
54 Unlikely Normal High High Critical 0.18 0.08 0.74 
55 Unlikely Poor Low Low Negligible 0.92  0.08 
56 Unlikely Poor Low Low Moderate 0.61 0.31 0.08 
57 Unlikely Poor Low Low Critical 0.61  0.39 
58 Unlikely Poor Low Medium Negligible 0.84 0.08 0.08 
59 Unlikely Poor Low Medium Moderate 0.53 0.39 0.08 
60 Unlikely Poor Low Medium Critical 0.53 0.08 0.39 
61 Unlikely Poor Low High Negligible 0.84  0.16 
62 Unlikely Poor Low High Moderate 0.53 0.31 0.16 
63 Unlikely Poor Low High Critical 0.53  0.47 
64 Unlikely Poor Medium Low Negligible 0.57 0.35 0.08 
65 Unlikely Poor Medium Low Moderate 0.26 0.66 0.08 
66 Unlikely Poor Medium Low Critical 0.26 0.35 0.39 
67 Unlikely Poor Medium Medium Negligible 0.49 0.43 0.08 
68 Unlikely Poor Medium Medium Moderate 0.18 0.74 0.08 
69 Unlikely Poor Medium Medium Critical 0.18 0.43 0.39 
70 Unlikely Poor Medium High Negligible 0.49 0.35 0.16 
71 Unlikely Poor Medium High Moderate 0.18 0.66 0.16 
72 Unlikely Poor Medium High Critical 0.18 0.35 0.47 
73 Unlikely Poor High Low Negligible 0.57  0.43 
74 Unlikely Poor High Low Moderate 0.26 0.31 0.43 
75 Unlikely Poor High Low Critical 0.26  0.74 
76 Unlikely Poor High Medium Negligible 0.49 0.08 0.43 
77 Unlikely Poor High Medium Moderate 0.18 0.39 0.43 
78 Unlikely Poor High Medium Critical 0.18 0.08 0.74 
79 Unlikely Poor High High Negligible 0.49  0.51 
80 Unlikely Poor High High Moderate 0.18 0.31 0.51 
81 Unlikely Poor High High Critical 0.18  0.82 
82 Occasional Good Low Low Negligible 0.82 0.18  
83 Occasional Good Low Low Moderate 0.51 0.49  
84 Occasional Good Low Low Critical 0.51 0.18 0.31 
85 Occasional Good Low Medium Negligible 0.74 0.26  
86 Occasional Good Low Medium Moderate 0.43 0.57  
87 Occasional Good Low Medium Critical 0.43 0.26 0.31 
88 Occasional Good Low High Negligible 0.74 0.18 0.08 
89 Occasional Good Low High Moderate 0.43 0.49 0.08 
90 Occasional Good Low High Critical 0.43 0.18 0.39 
91 Occasional Good Medium Low Negligible 0.47 0.53  
92 Occasional Good Medium Low Moderate 0.16 0.84  
93 Occasional Good Medium Low Critical 0.16 0.53 0.31 
94 Occasional Good Medium Medium Negligible 0.39 0.61  
95 Occasional Good Medium Medium Moderate 0.08 0.92  
96 Occasional Good Medium Medium Critical 0.08 0.61 0.31 
97 Occasional Good Medium High Negligible 0.39 0.53 0.08 
98 Occasional Good Medium High Moderate 0.08 0.84 0.08 
99 Occasional Good Medium High Critical 0.08 0.53 0.39 
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100 Occasional Good High Low Negligible 0.47 0.18 0.35 
101 Occasional Good High Low Moderate 0.16 0.49 0.35 
102 Occasional Good High Low Critical 0.16 0.18 0.66 
103 Occasional Good High Medium Negligible 0.39 0.26 0.35 
104 Occasional Good High Medium Moderate 0.08 0.57 0.35 
105 Occasional Good High Medium Critical 0.08 0.26 0.66 
106 Occasional Good High High Negligible 0.39 0.18 0.43 
107 Occasional Good High High Moderate 0.08 0.49 0.43 
108 Occasional Good High High Critical 0.08 0.18 0.74 
109 Occasional Normal Low Low Negligible 0.74 0.26  
110 Occasional Normal Low Low Moderate 0.43 0.57  
111 Occasional Normal Low Low Critical 0.43 0.26 0.31 
112 Occasional Normal Low Medium Negligible 0.66 0.34  
113 Occasional Normal Low Medium Moderate 0.35 0.65  
114 Occasional Normal Low Medium Critical 0.35 0.34 0.31 
115 Occasional Normal Low High Negligible 0.66 0.26 0.08 
116 Occasional Normal Low High Moderate 0.35 0.57 0.08 
117 Occasional Normal Low High Critical 0.35 0.26 0.39 
118 Occasional Normal Medium Low Negligible 0.39 0.61  
119 Occasional Normal Medium Low Moderate 0.08 0.92  
120 Occasional Normal Medium Low Critical 0.08 0.61 0.31 
121 Occasional Normal Medium Medium Negligible 0.31 0.69  
122 Occasional Normal Medium Medium Moderate  1  
123 Occasional Normal Medium Medium Critical  0.69 0.31 
124 Occasional Normal Medium High Negligible 0.31 0.61 0.08 
125 Occasional Normal Medium High Moderate  0.92 0.08 
126 Occasional Normal Medium High Critical  0.61 0.39 
127 Occasional Normal High Low Negligible 0.39 0.26 0.35 
128 Occasional Normal High Low Moderate 0.08 0.57 0.35 
129 Occasional Normal High Low Critical 0.08 0.26 0.66 
130 Occasional Normal High Medium Negligible 0.31 0.34 0.35 
131 Occasional Normal High Medium Moderate  0.65 0.35 
132 Occasional Normal High Medium Critical  0.34 0.66 
133 Occasional Normal High High Negligible 0.31 0.26 0.43 
134 Occasional Normal High High Moderate  0.57 0.43 
135 Occasional Normal High High Critical  0.26 0.74 
136 Occasional Poor Low Low Negligible 0.74 0.18 0.08 
137 Occasional Poor Low Low Moderate 0.43 0.49 0.08 
138 Occasional Poor Low Low Critical 0.43 0.18 0.39 
139 Occasional Poor Low Medium Negligible 0.66 0.26 0.08 
140 Occasional Poor Low Medium Moderate 0.35 0.57 0.08 
141 Occasional Poor Low Medium Critical 0.35 0.26 0.39 
142 Occasional Poor Low High Negligible 0.66 0.18 0.16 
143 Occasional Poor Low High Moderate 0.35 0.49 0.16 
144 Occasional Poor Low High Critical 0.35 0.18 0.47 
145 Occasional Poor Medium Low Negligible 0.39 0.53 0.08 
146 Occasional Poor Medium Low Moderate 0.08 0.84 0.08 
147 Occasional Poor Medium Low Critical 0.08 0.53 0.39 
148 Occasional Poor Medium Medium Negligible 0.31 0.61 0.08 
149 Occasional Poor Medium Medium Moderate  0.92 0.08 
150 Occasional Poor Medium Medium Critical  0.61 0.39 
151 Occasional Poor Medium High Negligible 0.31 0.53 0.16 
152 Occasional Poor Medium High Moderate  0.84 0.16 
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153 Occasional Poor Medium High Critical  0.53 0.47 
154 Occasional Poor High Low Negligible 0.39 0.18 0.43 
155 Occasional Poor High Low Moderate 0.08 0.49 0.43 
156 Occasional Poor High Low Critical 0.08 0.18 0.74 
157 Occasional Poor High Medium Negligible 0.31 0.26 0.43 
158 Occasional Poor High Medium Moderate  0.57 0.43 
159 Occasional Poor High Medium Critical  0.26 0.74 
160 Occasional Poor High High Negligible 0.31 0.18 0.51 
161 Occasional Poor High High Moderate  0.49 0.51 
162 Occasional Poor High High Critical  0.18 0.82 
163 Frequent Good Low Low Negligible 0.82  0.18 
164 Frequent Good Low Low Moderate 0.51 0.31 0.18 
165 Frequent Good Low Low Critical 0.51  0.49 
166 Frequent Good Low Medium Negligible 0.74 0.08 0.18 
167 Frequent Good Low Medium Moderate 0.43 0.39 0.18 
168 Frequent Good Low Medium Critical 0.43 0.08 0.49 
169 Frequent Good Low High Negligible 0.74  0.26 
170 Frequent Good Low High Moderate 0.43 0.31 0.26 
171 Frequent Good Low High Critical 0.43  0.57 
172 Frequent Good Medium Low Negligible 0.47 0.35 0.18 
173 Frequent Good Medium Low Moderate 0.16 0.66 0.18 
174 Frequent Good Medium Low Critical 0.16 0.35 0.49 
175 Frequent Good Medium Medium Negligible 0.39 0.43 0.18 
176 Frequent Good Medium Medium Moderate 0.08 0.74 0.18 
177 Frequent Good Medium Medium Critical 0.08 0.43 0.49 
178 Frequent Good Medium High Negligible 0.39 0.35 0.26 
179 Frequent Good Medium High Moderate 0.08 0.66 0.26 
180 Frequent Good Medium High Critical 0.08 0.35 0.57 
181 Frequent Good High Low Negligible 0.47  0.53 
182 Frequent Good High Low Moderate 0.16 0.31 0.53 
183 Frequent Good High Low Critical 0.16  0.84 
184 Frequent Good High Medium Negligible 0.39 0.08 0.53 
185 Frequent Good High Medium Moderate 0.08 0.39 0.53 
186 Frequent Good High Medium Critical 0.08 0.08 0.84 
187 Frequent Good High High Negligible 0.39  0.61 
188 Frequent Good High High Moderate 0.08 0.31 0.61 
189 Frequent Good High High Critical 0.08  0.92 
190 Frequent Normal Low Low Negligible 0.74 0.08 0.18 
191 Frequent Normal Low Low Moderate 0.43 0.39 0.18 
192 Frequent Normal Low Low Critical 0.43 0.08 0.49 
193 Frequent Normal Low Medium Negligible 0.66 0.16 0.18 
194 Frequent Normal Low Medium Moderate 0.35 0.47 0.18 
195 Frequent Normal Low Medium Critical 0.35 0.16 0.49 
196 Frequent Normal Low High Negligible 0.66 0.08 0.26 
197 Frequent Normal Low High Moderate 0.35 0.39 0.26 
198 Frequent Normal Low High Critical 0.35 0.08 0.57 
199 Frequent Normal Medium Low Negligible 0.39 0.43 0.18 
200 Frequent Normal Medium Low Moderate 0.08 0.74 0.18 
201 Frequent Normal Medium Low Critical 0.08 0.43 0.49 
202 Frequent Normal Medium Medium Negligible 0.31 0.51 0.18 
203 Frequent Normal Medium Medium Moderate  0.82 0.18 
204 Frequent Normal Medium Medium Critical  0.51 0.49 
205 Frequent Normal Medium High Negligible 0.31 0.43 0.26 
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206 Frequent Normal Medium High Moderate  0.74 0.26 
207 Frequent Normal Medium High Critical  0.43 0.57 
208 Frequent Normal High Low Negligible 0.39 0.08 0.53 
209 Frequent Normal High Low Moderate 0.08 0.39 0.53 
210 Frequent Normal High Low Critical 0.08 0.08 0.84 
211 Frequent Normal High Medium Negligible 0.31 0.16 0.53 
212 Frequent Normal High Medium Moderate  0.47 0.53 
213 Frequent Normal High Medium Critical  0.16 0.84 
214 Frequent Normal High High Negligible 0.31 0.08 0.61 
215 Frequent Normal High High Moderate  0.39 0.61 
216 Frequent Normal High High Critical  0.08 0.92 
217 Frequent Poor Low Low Negligible 0.74  0.26 
218 Frequent Poor Low Low Moderate 0.43 0.31 0.26 
219 Frequent Poor Low Low Critical 0.43  0.57 
220 Frequent Poor Low Medium Negligible 0.66 0.08 0.26 
221 Frequent Poor Low Medium Moderate 0.35 0.39 0.26 
222 Frequent Poor Low Medium Critical 0.35 0.08 0.57 
223 Frequent Poor Low High Negligible 0.66  0.34 
224 Frequent Poor Low High Moderate 0.35 0.31 0.34 
225 Frequent Poor Low High Critical 0.35  0.65 
226 Frequent Poor Medium Low Negligible 0.39 0.35 0.26 
227 Frequent Poor Medium Low Moderate 0.08 0.66 0.26 
228 Frequent Poor Medium Low Critical 0.08 0.35 0.57 
229 Frequent Poor Medium Medium Negligible 0.31 0.43 0.26 
230 Frequent Poor Medium Medium Moderate  0.74 0.26 
231 Frequent Poor Medium Medium Critical  0.43 0.57 
232 Frequent Poor Medium High Negligible 0.31 0.35 0.34 
233 Frequent Poor Medium High Moderate  0.66 0.34 
234 Frequent Poor Medium High Critical  0.35 0.65 
235 Frequent Poor High Low Negligible 0.39  0.61 
236 Frequent Poor High Low Moderate 0.08 0.31 0.61 
237 Frequent Poor High Low Critical 0.08  0.92 
238 Frequent Poor High Medium Negligible 0.31 0.08 0.61 
239 Frequent Poor High Medium Moderate  0.39 0.61 
240 Frequent Poor High Medium Critical  0.08 0.92 
241 Frequent Poor High High Negligible 0.31  0.69 
242 Frequent Poor High High Moderate  0.31 0.69 
243 Frequent Poor High High Critical   1 
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Appendix Seven  
Table 1. Normalised centrality values and overall scores of all ports  
Port 𝐂𝑫
′ (𝒊) 𝐂𝑪
′ (𝒊) 𝐂𝑩
′ (𝒊) 𝑺𝑶(𝒊) 
Xingang 0.1635 0.5538 0.0086 189.621 
Qingdao 0.4052 0.6573 0.0699 207.348 
Shanghai 0.5711 0.8023 0.1560 211.657 
Dalian 0.1422 0.5452 0.0069 185.93 
Ningbo 0.4265 0.7701 0.0349 208.268 
Yantian 0.2938 0.6394 0.0458 205 
Shekou 0.2844 0.6394 0.0176 201.239 
Chiwan 0.1564 0.5275 0.0092 186.093 
Fuqing 0.0284 0.4480 0.0000 59.595 
Hong Kong 0.4194 0.6873 0.0794 209.343 
Xiamen 0.2678 0.6280 0.0312 202.326 
Nansha 0.2156 0.5960 0.0317 200.693 
Yantai 0.0095 0.4154 0.0000 37.457 
Zhanjiang 0.0213 0.4170 0.0000 48.345 
Taipei 0.0853 0.5249 0.0005 152.226 
Busan 0.3839 0.6785 0.0728 207.681 
Incheon 0.0474 0.4817 0.0098 141.361 
Kwangyang 0.0355 0.4785 0.0002 100.041 
Lianyungang 0.0640 0.4795 0.0011 130.526 
Kaohsiung 0.2701 0.6063 0.0267 201.988 
Prince Rupert 0.0379 0.4763 0.0000 91.484 
Long Beach 0.0758 0.4817 0.0007 135.333 
Oakland 0.0782 0.4862 0.0009 141.299 
Seattle 0.0427 0.4720 0.0000 93.636 
Tokyo 0.1043 0.4896 0.0089 167.375 
Cai Mep 0.1303 0.5288 0.0031 176.87 
Tacoma 0.0332 0.4710 0.0000 81.719 
Singapore 0.5450 0.7456 0.1608 211.017 
Port Klang 0.3957 0.6763 0.0693 207 
Jakarta 0.0616 0.4699 0.0006 113.357 
Laem Chabang 0.1161 0.5121 0.0027 167.963 
Los Angeles 0.0261 0.4607 0.0000 57.212 
Colombo 0.1706 0.5672 0.0066 190.181 
Vancouver 0.0569 0.4806 0.0003 117.945 
Yokohama 0.1137 0.4953 0.0065 169.215 
Osaka 0.0687 0.4828 0.0031 145.011 
Colon 0.0498 0.4752 0.0002 105.341 
Savannah 0.0687 0.4839 0.0004 129.199 
Charleston 0.0403 0.4720 0.0000 89.947 
New York 0.0900 0.4884 0.0013 149 
Boston 0.0332 0.4752 0.0000 83.111 
Cape of Good Hope 0.0427 0.4774 0.0002 104.666 
Norfolk 0.0782 0.4884 0.0013 145.004 
Panama Canal 0.0877 0.4896 0.0016 150.345 
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Suez Canal 0.0829 0.4907 0.0010 146.25 
Baltimore 0.0237 0.4423 0.0000 51.294 
Halifax 0.0355 0.4637 0.0000 70.106 
Houston 0.0379 0.4774 0.0001 98.979 
Mobile 0.0379 0.4774 0.0001 98.979 
New Orleans 0.0284 0.4689 0.0000 68.02 
Miami 0.0284 0.4689 0.0000 68.02 
Jacksonville 0.0284 0.4689 0.0000 68.02 
Rotterdam 0.2251 0.5765 0.0615 201.406 
Felixstowe 0.1422 0.5452 0.0196 191.761 
Gdansk 0.0403 0.4918 0.0024 131.921 
Wilhelmshaven 0.0284 0.4896 0.0000 88.884 
Algeciras 0.1256 0.5342 0.0108 185.778 
Southampton 0.1019 0.5369 0.0033 174.888 
Dunkerque 0.0829 0.5262 0.0037 168.344 
Hamburg 0.1706 0.5672 0.0090 192.925 
Zeebrugge 0.0379 0.5084 0.0000 106.001 
Le Havre 0.1161 0.5410 0.0065 181.275 
Khor Fakkan 0.1635 0.5642 0.0091 191.954 
Piraeus 0.2488 0.5910 0.0242 200.331 
Antwerp 0.1825 0.5734 0.0042 188.78 
Malta 0.1374 0.5495 0.0042 183.193 
Jeddah 0.2180 0.5813 0.0180 197.971 
Tanjung Pelepas 0.0948 0.5262 0.0014 163.067 
La Spezia 0.0687 0.5159 0.0002 137.882 
Genoa 0.1445 0.5424 0.0185 191.097 
Valencia 0.1114 0.5383 0.0044 178.265 
Fos 0.0972 0.5275 0.0020 166.096 
Barcelona 0.0711 0.5060 0.0002 137.238 
Beirut 0.0972 0.5262 0.0022 166.473 
Jebel Ali 0.1967 0.5642 0.0137 194.993 
Port Said 0.1185 0.5197 0.0036 173.989 
Izmit 0.0711 0.5024 0.0008 145.144 
Ambarli 0.0450 0.4884 0.0000 106.183 
Constantza 0.0545 0.4930 0.0032 145.602 
Odessa 0.0427 0.4884 0.0000 102.801 
Mersin 0.1137 0.5355 0.0036 176.56 
Ashdod 0.0640 0.5084 0.0060 157.218 
Haifa 0.0782 0.5302 0.0028 166.225 
Alexandria 0.0592 0.5184 0.0005 140.697 
Koper 0.0735 0.4953 0.0076 161.331 
Trieste 0.0403 0.4785 0.0000 92.008 
Rijeka 0.0545 0.4907 0.0018 138.107 
Venice 0.0616 0.4953 0.0024 145.781 
Damietta 0.1066 0.5210 0.0020 165.824 
Port Qasim 0.0782 0.4113 0.0022 114.255 
Nhava Sheva 0.1303 0.5612 0.0080 187.282 
Hazira 0.0332 0.3922 0.0000 56.705 
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Mundra 0.1374 0.5612 0.0064 185.2 
King Abdullah 0.0521 0.3922 0.0004 87.059 
Gioia Tauro 0.0355 0.3922 0.0000 59.022 
Tangier 0.0877 0.4237 0.0016 118.414 
Djibouti 0.0853 0.5236 0.0026 164.591 
Cagliari 0.0545 0.4137 0.0003 90.619 
London Gateway 0.0592 0.4203 0.0004 96.225 
Dammam 0.0735 0.5097 0.0020 153.615 
Jubail 0.0640 0.5000 0.0013 144.955 
Kumport 0.0545 0.4129 0.0005 93.037 
Aliaga 0.0355 0.3951 0.0000 60.652 
Iskenderun 0.0355 0.3951 0.0000 60.652 
Karachi 0.1161 0.5288 0.0024 171.773 
Izmir 0.0640 0.4170 0.0012 106.093 
St. Petersburg 0.0190 0.3748 0.0000 36.634 
Kotka 0.0190 0.3748 0.0000 36.634 
Dublin 0.0047 0.3663 0.0000 26.022 
Oslo 0.0095 0.3676 0.0000 28.655 
Helsingborg 0.0095 0.3676 0.0000 28.655 
Gothenburg 0.0095 0.3676 0.0000 28.655 
Ravenna 0.0142 0.3768 0.0000 33.575 
Ancona 0.0190 0.3775 0.0000 36.875 
Gemlik 0.0190 0.3775 0.0000 36.875 
Thessaloniki 0.0284 0.3802 0.0003 62.815 
Novorossiysk 0.0142 0.3748 0.0000 32.271 
Varna 0.0142 0.3748 0.0000 32.271 
Istanbul 0.0142 0.3748 0.0000 32.271 
Napoli 0.0118 0.3657 0.0000 28.013 
Gebze 0.0213 0.3937 0.0000 43.781 
Salerno 0.0213 0.3937 0.0000 43.781 
Casablanca 0.0308 0.3974 0.0000 59.798 
Melbourne 0.0592 0.4742 0.0007 120.587 
Sydney 0.0592 0.4742 0.0007 120.587 
Brisbane 0.0948 0.4907 0.0025 157.437 
Adelaide 0.0237 0.4369 0.0000 54.741 
Fremantle 0.0213 0.4324 0.0000 51.724 
Kobe 0.0427 0.4785 0.0000 97.755 
Oakland 0.0521 0.4817 0.0004 121.323 
Lyttelton 0.0521 0.4817 0.0003 119.265 
Napier 0.0521 0.4817 0.0003 118.922 
Tauranga 0.0521 0.4817 0.0003 118.922 
Port Chalmers 0.0261 0.4658 0.0000 60.472 
Wellington 0.0213 0.4369 0.0000 49.975 
Bahrain 0.0261 0.4720 0.0000 69.6 
Hamad 0.0237 0.4678 0.0000 59.118 
Khalifa Port 0.0427 0.4839 0.0001 107.739 
Sohar 0.0332 0.4731 0.0000 80.177 
Bandar Abbas 0.0355 0.4731 0.0000 82.837 
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Sokhna 0.0261 0.4689 0.0000 64.71 
Aqaba 0.0379 0.4795 0.0000 97.831 
Port Sudan 0.0261 0.4763 0.0000 74.164 
Durban 0.0308 0.4648 0.0000 68.532 
Keelung 0.0521 0.4752 0.0096 137.818 
Apapa 0.0782 0.5000 0.0030 158.435 
Tin Can 0.0521 0.4851 0.0001 115.03 
Cotonou 0.0521 0.4851 0.0001 115.373 
Tema 0.0711 0.4965 0.0030 153.804 
Cape Town 0.0498 0.4828 0.0001 112.822 
Lome 0.0782 0.5024 0.0024 157.029 
Onne 0.0355 0.4795 0.0000 89.34 
Walvis Bay 0.0332 0.4806 0.0000 87.675 
Abidjan 0.0735 0.5134 0.0072 164.557 
Pointe Noire 0.0308 0.4720 0.0000 76.22 
Luanda 0.0308 0.4720 0.0000 76.22 
Castellon 0.0261 0.3768 0.0000 44.498 
Dakar 0.0450 0.3929 0.0006 86.512 
Lagos 0.0284 0.3768 0.0000 47.808 
Takoradi 0.0284 0.3768 0.0000 47.808 
Tilbury 0.0332 0.3781 0.0005 74.266 
Tanger Med 0.0190 0.3781 0.0000 37.527 
Mombasa 0.0427 0.4731 0.0001 97.701 
Dar es Salaam 0.0332 0.4720 0.0000 84.344 
Pasir Gudang 0.0261 0.4710 0.0000 67.318 
Itaguai 0.0308 0.4742 0.0000 79.154 
Santos 0.0948 0.5184 0.0013 159.756 
Paranagua 0.0900 0.5184 0.0011 157.391 
Navegantes 0.0427 0.4742 0.0000 91.425 
Montevideo 0.0853 0.5184 0.0010 155.381 
Buenos Aires 0.0853 0.5184 0.0010 155.381 
Rio Grande 0.0379 0.4742 0.0000 86.767 
Sepetiba 0.0569 0.4678 0.0000 95.437 
Imbituba 0.0450 0.4678 0.0000 81.957 
Itajai 0.0450 0.4678 0.0000 81.957 
Itapoa 0.0664 0.5000 0.0004 138.071 
Manzanillo 0.0995 0.4930 0.0018 155.978 
Buenaventura 0.0711 0.4817 0.0004 130.579 
Callao 0.0711 0.4817 0.0005 132.294 
Cardenas 0.0308 0.4648 0.0000 65.788 
Puerto Quetzal 0.0308 0.4648 0.0000 65.788 
Guayaquil 0.0545 0.4699 0.0001 101.448 
Iquique 0.0261 0.4699 0.0000 66.014 
Valparaiso 0.0261 0.4699 0.0000 66.014 
Lazaro Cardenas 0.0640 0.4710 0.0002 109.101 
Balboa 0.0664 0.4710 0.0002 110.449 
San Antonio 0.0403 0.4658 0.0000 76.36 
Lirquen 0.0403 0.4658 0.0000 76.36 
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Ensenada 0.0498 0.4742 0.0001 101.276 
Cartagena 0.0308 0.4689 0.0000 71.33 
Kingston 0.0308 0.4689 0.0000 71.33 
Caucedo 0.0308 0.4689 0.0000 71.33 
Sihanoukville 0.0166 0.4547 0.0000 45.973 
Bangkok 0.0284 0.4678 0.0000 71.226 
Nagoya 0.0332 0.4597 0.0000 73.362 
Moji 0.0213 0.4499 0.0000 51.605 
Haiphong 0.0332 0.4678 0.0000 78.544 
Ho Chi Minh 0.0640 0.4953 0.0073 156.685 
Fangchenggang 0.0379 0.4170 0.0235 110.099 
Qinzhou 0.0213 0.4170 0.0000 48.345 
Yangpu 0.0213 0.4170 0.0000 48.345 
Gaolan 0.0213 0.4170 0.0000 48.345 
Humen 0.0213 0.4170 0.0000 48.345 
Da Nang 0.0166 0.4607 0.0000 46.951 
Jiangyin 0.0521 0.4851 0.0001 117.088 
Vizag 0.0261 0.4617 0.0000 57.864 
Manila 0.0213 0.4617 0.0000 53.561 
Penang 0.0213 0.4720 0.0000 65.297 
Pipavav 0.0284 0.4795 0.0000 80.734 
Dafeng 0.0095 0.4480 0.0000 42.347 
Daesan 0.0118 0.4499 0.0000 43.661 
Shantou 0.0190 0.4658 0.0000 52.197 
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Appendix Eight  
 
 
Questionnaire on the operational risk assessment of maritime 
container supply chains 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
My name is Chengpeng Wan; I am currently pursuing a PhD degree at the Liverpool Logistics Offshore 
and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) in Liverpool John Moores University. My research topic in 
Chapter 6 is “An integrated approach for comprehensive safety evaluation of MCSCs from a systematic 
perspective”, in which a case study of maritime container supply chains related to the Africa region is 
carried to illustrate the practicality of the proposed method in the safety evaluation. In the survey, 26 
identified operational risk factors would be assessed in terms of their occurrence likelihood, visibility, 
and consequence associated with time delay/disruption, financial loss/additional cost, as well as 
quality damage. 
 
I am writing to elicit your opinion as an executive in the whole process of the container maritime 
logistics with expert knowledge on risk assessment. Your participation is voluntary; however, your 
assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful questionnaire. The information 
gathered in this survey will be treated in the strictest confidence, as this has always been the policy of 
the Liverpool John Moores University. This survey will take you about 15-20 minutes. This 
questionnaire is anonymous. Thus your response cannot be attributed to you or your company. 
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me at +44-(0)777 087 3050, or by email 
at cpwan@whut.edu.cn, or my supervisor, Prof. Zaili Yang, by email z.yang@ljmu.ac.uk.  
 
Please accept my thanks for your anticipated co-operation. If you wish to receive a copy of the 
research results, please email me at cpwan@whut.edu.cn. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Chengpeng Wan, 
PhD Candidate 
 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM), UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 777 087 3050,  
Email: cpwan@whut.edu.cn 
Add: Room 121, James Parsons Building,  
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
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Background information 
There are altogether 26 risk factors related to the operational aspect of maritime 
container supply chains, and they will be evaluated in details in terms of their 
occurrence likelihood, visibility, consequence in terms of time delay/disruption, 
consequence in terms of additional cost, and consequence in terms of quality damage. 
Explanations of linguistic grades of each risk parameter are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definitions of linguistic grades of each risk parameter 
Parameter 
Linguistic 
grades 
Definition 
Likelihood 
Low Occurs less than once per year 
Medium Expected to occur every few months 
High Expected to occur at least monthly 
Visibility 
Low 
Impossible or difficult to be detected through intensive 
risk checks 
Medium Possible to be detected through intensive risk checks 
High Possible to be detected through regular risk checks 
Delay/disruption 
Low A delay of less than 24 hours in total 
Medium A delay but no more than 20% of the original schedule 
High A delay of more than 20% of the original schedule 
Additional cost 
Low An additional cost no more than 10% of the total cost  
Medium An additional cost between 10% and 50% of the total cost 
High An additional cost of more than 50% of the total cost 
Quality damage 
Low 
Slight cargo, equipment, or system damage but fully 
functional and serviceable 
Medium 
Minor incapability of systems or equipment and a small 
portion of goods may be damaged 
High 
Damage/loss of major systems or equipment, and serious 
damage to the transported goods 
 
Based on your knowledge and experience, please make your judgement for each risk 
factor in terms of the given risk parameters in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Assessment of operational risks of maritime container supply chains 
Operational risk Risk parameters 
Risk factors related to 
Information flow 
 Likelihood  Visibility 
Consequence 
Delay/ disruption Additional cost 
Quality damage 
(cargo/equipment) 
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High 
1. Information delay                
2. Information inaccuracy                
3. IT vulnerability                
4. Internet security                
5. Poor information sharing                
6. Lack of information standardisation 
and compatibility 
               
 
Risk factors related to  
financial flow 
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High 
7. Payment delay from partners                
8. Break a contract                
9. Shippers going into bankruptcy                
10. Partners with bad credit                
11. Charter rates rise                
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12. Cash flow problem                
 
Risk factors related to  
physical flow 
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High 
13. Inaccurate demand forecast                
14. Transportation of dangerous goods                
15. Container shortage                
16. Port strikes                
17. Port/ terminal congestions                
18. Lack of flexibility of designed 
schedules 
               
19. Problems with customs clearance                
20. Electricity failure                
21. Bottlenecks/restriction on 
transportation routes 
               
22. Improper container terminal 
operations 
               
23. Incorrect container packing                
24. Transport accidents                
25. Trade imbalance on container 
shipping routes 
               
26. Improper management of container 
storage area 
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Appendix Nine  
Examples of performing the ER algorithm 
Suppose the risk factors “information delay” and “information inaccuracy” are represented as 
R1 and R2, respectively. Their risk status is expressed as: 
 
 
And the relative weights of the two risk factors are: 
 
 
Then, the synthesised risk status of the two risk factors can be calculated as follows: 
According to Eqs. 6.8 and 6.9: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Eqs. 6.10 to 6.15: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 {( ,0.63),( ,0.31),( ,0.06)}R Low Medium High
1 {( ,0.65,( ,0.34),( ,0.01)}R Low Medium High
1
0.173
=0.49
0.173+0.181
w 
2
0.181
=0.51
0.173+0.181
w 
1 1
11 1 =0.49 0.63=0.3087M w  
2 2
11 1 =0.49 0.31=0.1519M w  
3 3
11 1 =0.49 0.06=0.0294M w  
1 1
22 2 =0.51 0.65=0.3315M w  
2 2
22 2 =0.51 0.34=0.1734M w  
3 3
22 2 =0.51 0.01=0.0051M w  
1 11 =1-0.49=0.51H w 
2 21 =1-0.51=0.49H w 
3
1 1 1
1
1 =0.49 (1- 0.63- 0.31- 0.06) 0m
m
H w 

 
    
 

3
2 2 2
1
1 0.51 (1- 0.65- 0.34 - 0.01) 0m
m
H w 

 
     
 

1 1 1 0.51 0 0.51H H H   
2 2 2 0.49 0 0.49H H H   
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According to Eq. 6.19: 
 
According to Eqs. 6.16 to 6.18: 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the normalised combined DoBs of risk factors 1 and 2 can be obtained using Eqs. 
6.20 and 6.21. 
 
 
 
  (which means that the risk estimations of R1 and R2 are complete) 
Therefore, the combined results of estimations on R1 and R2 can be expressed as: 
 
 
1
3 3
1
1 2 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 3 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1
1
1 1
(1 0.3087 0.1734 0.3087 0.0051 0.1519 0.3315 0.1519 0.0051
0.0294 0.3315 0.0294 0.1734)
1.1378
s t
s t
t s
K M M M M M M M M M M M M M M


 


 
         
 
 
 
         
  


1' 1 1 1 1
2 11 2 1 2( )
1.1378 (0.3087 0.3315 0.3087 0.49 0.3315 0.49)
0.4809
K M M M H M H   
      

2' 2 2 2 2
2 11 2 1 2( )
1.1378 (0.1519 0.1734 0.1519 0.49 0.1734 0.49)
0.2153
K M M M H M H   
      

3' 3 3 3 3
2 11 2 1 2( )
1.1378 (0.0294 0.0051 0.0294 0.49 0.0051 0.49)
0.0195
K M M M H M H   
      

'
1 2( ) 1.1378 (0.51 0.49) 0.2843UH K H H    
'
1 2 1 2 2 1( ) 0UH K H H H H H H   
1'
1
'
0.4809
0.6719
1 1 0.2843UH

   
 
2'
2
'
0.2153
0.3008
1 1 0.2843UH

   
 
1'
1
'
0.0195
0.0273
1 1 0.2843UH

   
 
'
'
0
1
U
U
U
H
H
H
 

{( ,0.672),( ,0.301),( ,0.027)}R Low Medium High
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In Chapter 2, the research related to the definition and characteristics of the maritime 
transportation resilience and the methods widely applied in this field are comprehensively 
discussed, which provides the main structure and content for publication [1] (A literature 
review paper). 
Chapter 3 proposes a novel framework for the classification of risk factors of maritime 
container supply chains (MCSCs) and screens the identified risk factors using a risk matrix 
method, which contributes to publication [4]. 
Chapter 4 performs an effective and efficient risk assessment of the major risk factors of 
MCSCs by combining the fuzzy rule base and Bayesian network in a complementary manner, 
which contributes to publication [5]. 
In Chapter 5, the method on how to construct a database for network analysis of global 
container liner networks is used in publication [2], while the newly proposed multi-centrality 
indicator which is used to measure the importance of ports in maritime container transportation 
networks contributes to publication [3]. 
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Chapter 6 develops an integrated framework for facilitating safety evaluation of MCSCs from 
a systematic perspective by considering both the local risk condition of an MCSC and its global 
impact on the resilience of the entire maritime container supply network, contributing to 
publication [6]. 
 
